Changing an Army : an oral history of General William E. DePuy, USA retired

CHANGING

MARINE CORPS U LIBRARY

3000020023

AN
ARMY

AN ORAL HISTORY OF

GENERAL WILLIAM K DePUY,

USA RETIRED

UNITED STATES MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

AND
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

(

CHANGING

AN
ARMY

AN ORAL HISTORY OF

GENERAL WILLIAM E. DePUY,

USA RETIRED

/ ROMIE L. BROWNLEE

P AND

y7 WILLIAM J. MULLEN III

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UNITED STATES MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE, PENNSYLVANIA

AND
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

JAMES CARSON BRECKINRIDGE LIBRARY """

TRAINING AND EDUCATION CENTER
MARINE COiiPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND -
9SANTIC0, VA 22134-5050 »r-s4s-

CMH Pub 70-23

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. DePUY

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (March 1966 — February 1967)

FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks originally published
General William E. DePuy's oral history as a convincing example of this relatively new
technique in the historian's arsenal. It soon became apparent, however, that the
audience recognized in this interview a larger, more enduring value and utility. Here
was an Army leader, a fighter, trainer, and thinker, imparting his wisdom and experi-
ence to the officer and NCO corps in his own words. The overwhelming demand from
the Army's senior leaders and its school system for copies of the DePuy oral history
quickly exhausted the original printing. It gives me great pleasure to publish the first
Center of Military History edition of this important document.

The DePuy interview easily fulfilled the Military History Institute's criteria for oral
history publications. It concerned a figure immediately recognizable to a large number
of Army officers, one who had made a major impact on the development of the Army
since World War II, and one whose career had spanned a period of significant change
within the service.

While these considerations remain valid, it seems to me that another element has
emerged during the two years that Army leaders have read and discussed the DePuy
oral history. Simply put, General DePuy's career demonstrates that one man can make a
huge difference in our Army.

General DePuy was commissioned from ROTC in 1941 and joined the 20th Infantry
in time for the famous Louisiana Maneuvers. Subsequently assigned to the 90th
Infantry Division, he trained and prepared with the division for its role in the liberation
of Europe. In particular, the division's fight through the hedgerows of Normandy in June
and July 1944 provided then Captain DePuy with a profound lesson. He saw soldiers
suffer and die because of poor leadership or insufficient training. As a consequence he
dedicated himself to the goal of leader development.

His subsequent military career bore eloquent testimony to this dedication. Service
on the postwar Army Staff involved him in decisions that dramatically affected training,
doctrine, force-structure, and policy development. Later service in Vietnam allowed him
to apply his years of planning and training in a combat situation. Finally, his assignment
as the first commander of TRADOC gave him the opportunity to directly transform the
Army in the post-Vietnam era.

It takes brains, hard work, dedication, and probably a bit of luck for one man to
directly influence a great military institution. DePuy blended these ingredients to the
fullest, and in doing so left us a profoundly important legacy. My hope is that today's
young officers, our Army's future leaders, will read and profit from General DePuy's
words.

I wish to thank the officers who conducted the interviews — Brigadier General
William J. Mullen III and Colonel Romie L. Brownlee. My appreciation also goes to

Colonel Rod Paschall, director of the Military History Institute, and his staff for
preparing the original publication and their cooperation in facilitating the Center's new
edition. The views expressed by General DePuy are, of course, his own. His freely
expressed opinions do not necessarily represent or reflect approved statements of
policy or recognized positions of the U.S. Army or those of the Department of Defense.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

VI

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWERS

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COLONEL
ROMIE L. BROWNLEE

BRIGADIER GENERAL
WILLIAM J. MULLEN III

Conducted as part of the Academic Year 1979 Senior Officer Oral History Program, these
interviews with General William E. DePuy, US Army, Retired, were conducted at the General's
home in Highfield, Virginia, by Lieutenant Colonels Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III.
The two interviewers, both students at the Army War College, had served previously with General
DePuy and conducted extensive research on the General's background and professional career
prior to conducting the three interview sessions. Their pre-interview research included a review of
pertinent unit histories, annual historical summaries, the official World War II Army histories
("Green Books"), pertaining to the General's service in the 90th Infantry Division, monographs
that addressed programs with which General DePuy was involved, interviews with personalities
familiar with the General, and a review of other US Army Military History Institute senior officer
oral histories that touched on the DePuy era. Additionally, news accounts, professional
periodicals, and the Military History Institute's archives were also consulted. Finally, both
interviewers participated in an oral history workshop prior to conducting the interviews with
General DePuy.

A native Texan, Les Brownlee graduated from the University of Wyoming and was selected as
the Distinguished Honor Graduate of the US Army Ranger School after he was commissioned in
the Infantry in 1962. After serving as an airborne infantry company commander in Vietnam during
1965, Colonel Brownlee returned to combat in 1969 as a battalion advisor with the South
Vietnamese Airborne Division. Colonel Brownlee served as General DePuy's aide in 1973 while
assigned to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Following his promotion
to lieutenant colonel, Colonel Brownlee was selected for battalion command in Germany in 1978.
Colonel Brownlee holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration from the University of
Alabama. His decorations include the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, the
Bronze Star, and the Purple Heart. He retired from the Army in 1983, and presently lives with his
wife, Nancy, and two children, Tracy and John, in Fairfax, Virginia. Colonel Brownlee is currently
the National Security Assistant to John W. Warner, United States Senator from the State of
Virginia.

VII

Brigadier General William J. Mullen III is the son of a distinguished Army family and was born at
Plattsburg Barracks, New York. A 1959 graduate of West Point, he was commissioned in the
Infantry and was an early participant in the Vietnam War first serving there in 1962. Returning to
that country again in 1966, General Mullen commanded an infantry company in the 1st Infantry
Division then commanded by General DePuy. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1972, General
Mullen was selected for battalion command in 1975, and subsequently commanded the 1st
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. General Mullen holds a Masters Degree in International Affairs from
George Washington University. His decorations include the Distinguished Service Cross, the
Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Soldier's Medal, and the Purple Heart. General Mullen
presently is the Assistant Division Commander for Support, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

VIII

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. From North Dakota to Normandy 1

II. Education of a Battle Leader 40

III. Across the Moselle and Into Germany 68

IV. The Need for Change: Reflections on World War II 90

V. Education of a General Staff Officer 102

VI. Early Days of the Second Indochina War 121

VII. Introducing Agility: The First Division 137

VIII. Washington Transition: 1967-1972 168

IX. Changing an Army 180

1985 AFTERTHOUGHTS 199

INDEX 205

MAPS

Number Page

1 . The Normandy Beachhead 20

2. Development of the Beachhead 21

3. 90th Division's Drive Across the Merderet River 23

4. 90th Division Prepared to Attack Le Plessis 33

5. 90th Division Drive on the Mont-Castre Forest 34

6. 90th Division's Section of First Army's Front 37

7. Breakthrough, 25-27 July 1944 42

8A. The Falaise Gap 48

8B. Argentan-Falaise Pocket, 12-16 August 1944 48

9. Closing the Argentan-Falaise Pocket 51

10. 90th Division's Advance to the Saar River 53

1 1 . The 357th Infantry Regiment's Attack Across the Saar 55

12. The 357th Infantry Regiment Poised for its Advance on Maizieres-les-Metz 59

13. 90th Division's Advance to the Moselle River 60

14. Third Army's Front on the Evening of 25 September 1944 60

15. The Fighting for Maizieres-les-Metz 62

16. 90th Division Crosses the Moselle River 64

17. The Battle of Metz 65

18. 90th Division Prepares to Crack the "West Wall" 69

19. The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes 70

20. The Ho Chi Minh Trail 132

21 . Corps Tactical Zones and Support Command Areas of Responsibility 136

22. 1st Infantry Division's Area of Operations .139

23. The Battle of Ap Tau O 143

24. Operation ATTLEBORO 145

IX

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Major General William E. DePuy ii

Corporal William E. DePuy 2

ROTC Cadet William E. DePuy 4

Second Lieutenant William E. DePuy 4

20th Infantry Regiment on 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers 6

2d Cavalry and 92d Reconnaissance Company on 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers 6

Americans Training in England for Upcoming Invasion of European Continent 9

Diagram of 1944 Infantry Battalion Organization 13

Diagram of 1944 Headquarters and Headquarters Company of an Infantry Battalion 13

American Troops on a Road March in the English Countryside 15

American Equipment Being Stored in England in Preparation for the Upcoming Invasion 15

US Headquarters for the European Theater of Operations 18

Landing at Normandy Beach 22

Hedgerow Scene 26

Typical Hedgerow Defensive Positions 27

Diagram of Typical German Hedgerow Defensive Positions 28

M4A1 Medium Tank with Hedgerow Cutter 29

Major General Samuel T. Williams 32

Major General Raymond S. McLain 32

Major General James A. Van Fleet 32

Impact of World War II on Normandy Villages 36

Major General Eugene M. Landrum Addressing the 357th Infantry Regiment 40

Typical German Defensive Positions 43

German 20mm Antitank Gun 44

German 75mm, High Velocity, Self-Propelled Antitank Gun 44

Scenes of Destruction in the Falaise Gap 50

Diagram of German Observation Pillbox 56

Typical German Pillbox 56

The Capture of Maizieres-les-Metz 61

German 88mm "Rhinoceros" Tank Destroyer 67

Panzerfaust 60 Recoilless Antitank Grenade Launcher 67

357th Infantry Regiment Crossing the Moselle River 73

The 90th Division Crossing the Flooded Moselle River 74

The 2.36-inch Antitank Rocket Launcher or "Bazooka" 75

Typical View of the Dragon's Teeth Along the Siegfried Line 77

A Typical Scene as the 90th Division Crossed the Moselle River for the Second Time 81

Republic P-47 Mustang "Thunderbolts" 83

North American P-51 Mustang Fighter 83

British Supermarine Spitfire 83

German Stuka dive-bombers on a Mission 83

The Reichsbank Wealth Discovered by 90th Division in the Salt Mines Near Merkers, Germany 88

Page

Generals and Others Touring the Salt Mines 89

Durer Engraving Taken from the Berlin Museum 89

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy Receiving the Distinguished Service Cross 92

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy Receiving One of Three Silver Stars Awarded During World War II . 92

Major General William G. Weaver 98

Major General George Bittman Barth 98

Lieutenant General Orwin C. Talbott 100

General Richard G. Stilwell 100

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy During a Reprieve from Combat in May 1945 101

Major DePuy as S-3, 357th Infantry Regiment 101

The DePuy Foxhole 110

A 106mm Recoilless Rifle and 3.5-inch "Bazooka" 111

General Maxwell D. Taylor 113

General Bernard W. Rogers 113

Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe 113

Diagram of the Pentomic Infantry Division 114

General Andrew J . Goodpaster 116

Colonel DePuy Shown Briefing the Commandant of the German Infantry School in 1961 116

General William B. Rosson 118

General George S. Blanchard 118

Special Forces and Vietnamese Soldiers During a Combat Patrol Into Vietcong Territory 119

ACSFOR Organizational Chart as of July 1963 120

General Paul D. Harkins 122

General William C. Westmoreland 122

US Army Advisors Working with South Vietnamese 122

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Conducting Area Sweeps 123

General DePuy Encouraging Montagnard "Rebels" to Release "Prisoners" in September 1964 129

General William C. Westmoreland 138

Scenes from Operation ATTLEBORO 147

Typical Scenes in the Rung Sat Special Zone 150

Close Air Support 158

A Typical NAPALM Strike 158

Major General DePuy Presenting 1st Infantry Scholarship to Richard Fieller 166

Eric Nunez Holds His Scholarship Certificate 166

Major Generals DePuy and John H. Hay at General DePuy's Change of Command Ceremony . 167

Diagram of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff's Office 173

M551 Armored Reconnaissance Assault Vehicle — SHERIDAN 176

The M561 1 1/4-ton Gama Goat 176

General Paul F. Gorman 184

"How to Fight Manuals" 188

Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with Bushmaster 194

Concept Based Requirements System 201

XI

CHAPTER I
From North Dakota to Normandy

INTERVIEWER: General DePuy, we will begin by asking about your childhood years, and
attempt to get some information to fill in the void in the historical records. We know that you were
born in Jamestown, North Dakota. Could you tell us about your boyhood? What were some of
your hobbies and your favorite subjects in school, even before high school?*

GEN DEPUY: I was an only child as was my father. My closest friend was my paternal
grandfather who lived with us and was a Victorian romantic, golfer and hunter. My other
companions were books. My father was of French Huguenot descent and my mother's family
were Scotch-Irish from Canada. They were splendid parents in every respect. My family ended up
in North Dakota because my grandfather was a doctor, and while he and his brother were on their
way to the west coast, someone asked them to get off the train to treat an epidemic of some sort
in Bismarck, and they never got back on the train. I might add that my grandfather was, among
other things, "Sitting Bull's" personal physician. Those must have been pretty exciting days. I
have always regretted that I wasn't there. But, anyway, my father was a country banker. When I
was a young man, Jamestown was a very small town of about 5,000, on the prairie of North
Dakota, down in a little valley out of the wind. It was populated almost entirely by Germans and
Scandinavians, a few English, and an odd Frenchman; a very conservative kind of a community. It
was also a very interesting area. It was a high-risk area plagued by drought, grasshoppers, and
occasionally blessed with good crops — mostly wheat. Some people made a lot of money, but
most did not. In some respects, it still had a rather frontier atmosphere. Other than that, most of
us grew up during the Depression, the onset of which out there was in about 1926-27.

The agricultural depression came first, and then the crash of '29, so nobody had a lot of money.
It's cold where we lived in North Dakota, with short summers and long winters. There was a
nearby river where we did a lot of skating. I was never particularly fond of school — the academic
part. I have no way of comparing the quality of the schools up there to the quality of the schools
elsewhere, but suspect that they were probably pretty good. The literacy rate in the Upper Plains
States is perennially the highest in the nation. There was more of a European-type atmosphere
there compared to other parts of the country. We did a lot of skating, a little bit of skiing, and a lot
of game bird hunting, because there were literally millions of birds up there on the midcontinent
flyway.

INTERVIEWER: Did anyone in your family at that time, have a military background? Had you
given any thought toward a military career or toward the Army? Was your reading slanted in that
direction?

*This interview with General William E. DePuy, US Army, Retired, was conducted by Lieutenant Colonels William J.
Mullen and Romie L. Brownlee on 19 March 1979, at General DePuy's home in Highfield, Virginia, as part of the U.S.
Army War College/U.S. Army Military History Institute's Senior Officer Oral History Program.

GEN DEPUY: Well, my father was a lieutenant in World War I. He did not go to France. My
grandfather never participated in any war. His father, my great grandfather, was killed in the Civil
War. He was a captain of Michigan Infantry, and was killed at Cold Harbor in Virginia, on the
peninsula. They were citizen soldiers, not career professionals. But, as a child, I was interested in
the history of World War I. I read the whole set of books my father had, which was called, The
Literary Digest History of World War I. * It was about 20 volumes and covered the war in great
detail. I really enjoyed them. The nearest military influence was Company "H" of the 165th
Infantry, of the National Guard, in Jamestown.

Corporal William E. DePuy

Squad Leader, Company "B"

109th Engineer Battalion

34th Infantry Division

INTERVIEWER: You attended college at South Dakota State. What was your college major and
what were your aspirations at that time?

GEN DEPUY: Well, what I might do is pick up that military thread a little bit. I moved down to
South Dakota in 1935, when I was a junior in high school, and then, went to college, South
Dakota State College, which is right there in Brookings. My father had moved from the bank of
Jamestown to the bank in Brookings, and I joined the National Guard, as did all my friends in
those days. We needed the money. It wasn't much money by today's standards, but any money
was important in those days. Also, when I entered College, ROTC was mandatory. Everybody was
in it. The first two years you had to be in it, and then, the second two years were optional. So, you
automatically became a private in the ROTC regiment when you started college, and then, I was in

*FrancisW. Halsey, comp., The Literary Digest History of the World War (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1919).

the Guard at the same time. Then, when the choice came to move into senior ROTC in the junior
year, I made that choice, and I liked it very much. And then, to carry the story on to the end, when
the draft started in 1940, we had to choose between the Guard and the ROTC. Most of us dropped
out of the Guard and stayed with the ROTC for obvious reasons. It's better to be a lieutenant. At
that time I was a corporal, a squad leader, in Company "B", 109th Engineers, 34th Infantry
Division. So, the choice between the two was easy to make.

I didn't distinguish myself academically in any way. I didn't do very well in math. I was going to
be a banker, and follow in the footsteps of my father, which is, I guess, not an unusual thing to
do. So, I took whatever courses I could find in that little college that applied, and there weren't
very many. I also took some engineering courses. But, anyway, I graduated with a BS in
economics, which was the closest thing I could find to the banking business. If it hadn't been for
the war, I'd probably have ended up in the banking business. During college the only sport that I
got involved in was hockey. I played a lot of hockey, and we eventually had a little semipro hockey
team. We made a little pocket money out of that by playing around in a league that was located
mostly in southern Minnesota and eastern South Dakota. We had a lot of fun doing that. In high
school I played football even though I only weighed 128 pounds. But, I played. I had the unusual
job of quarterbacking my high school football team from the tailback position. So, I had fun there.
I would run the ball — could call the signals that let me run. That's hard to beat.

INTERVIEWER: Could you tell us something about what ROTC was like in those days at South
Dakota State? For example, was there anyone there who may have influenced you, like the
Professor of Military Science? You mentioned that you really liked ROTC.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, I really did like it. We had some very interesting chaps there from the Regular
Army. One was a Major Ed Piburn. Ed Piburn was at least half-Indian, and a fine officer; he was
married to a full-blooded Cherokee — a marvelous looking woman. He later became a brigadier
general and assistant division commander of the 10th Armored Division. We also had a man
named Ray Harris who was quite portly but kind of ferocious and inspiring. He used to crawl
around on the floor of the auditorium teaching us how to crawl. He would turn very red in the face
because he really was beyond that. But, the man who inspired everybody was a colonel named
James P. Murphy. Murphy was a fatherly kind of fellow with a very entertaining and wide ranging
vocabulary with all sorts of little figures of speech that made him amusing to all of us simple chaps
out there on the reservation. We loved him, and he inspired us all toward the Army. There's no
question that he was a great recruiter and wanted us all to be in the Army.

I might say that I almost entered the Marine Corps instead of the Army, because every year we
had only one officer who was taken into the Regular Army. But, we usually had two who went
into the Marine Corps. Now, that was rather typical up in the Plains. The Marine Corps recruited
very heavily in the Upper Middle West, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, etc. I wanted to get
the Regular Army commission, but I lost out to an individual by the name of Bob Barthell, later a
colonel in the Signal Corps. Then, two of us tried for the Marine Corps. The Marines usually
selected two except for that particular year when there was only one commission available.
Colonel, now retired, Stan Nelson of the Marine Corps got it. We had to go on duty first with the
Army, and we were on the Louisiana Maneuvers when the telegram came through saying that he

had been picked, and that I hadn't been. Well, I was heartbroken, but, in retrospect, it's the best
thing that ever happened. Anyway, as you can see, I was very enthusiastic by that time. I really
had been swept up with enthusiasm for the military.

INTERVIEWER: Did you select the Infantry as your branch?

GEN DEPUY: No, everybody at South Dakota State was in the Infantry. There was no choice.
Everybody, even the engineering graduates, went into the Infantry. Barthell went in and later
changed to the Signal Corps. Chuck Wilson, who retired as a major general, was an engineer
graduate, a brilliant engineer, but he went into the Infantry and stayed in the Infantry. He would
have been a magnificent engineer. But, no, there was no choice.

INTERVIEWER: Is there anything else that happened during those years, or any other person
that you can think of, who influenced you later?

GEN DEPUY: Not really. The officers in the cadet regiment were the colonel and the battalion
commanders; I was the regimental adjutant in my senior year. I was the captain of the Scabbard
and Blade, which included a little social hazing. But, anyway, all of the military things appealed to
me, and I liked them better than I did economics and other things. So, it was easy for me to decide
to stay in the Army after the war. Furthermore, the pay was better.

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ROTC Cadet William E. DePuy
South Dakota State College

General DePuy as a newly
commissioned second lieutenant.

INTERVIEWER: Your initial assignment, I believe, was to Fort Leonard Wood with the 20th
Infantry Regiment. But, other than the ROTC, did you have any kind of officer training before you
reported there?

GEN DEPUY: No. There wasn't any in those days. It was assumed that we were trained in
ROTC, and relative to everybody else in the World War II Army, I guess we were. But, by any
objective standard, we were untrained.

INTERVIEWER: So, after being commissioned following your graduation in '41, you reported to
Fort Leonard Wood as a new second lieutenant and a platoon leader?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. There were 25 to 30 of us, I think, and we all went to the 20th Infantry, the
63rd Infantry, and the 1st Infantry Regiments. We were divided between the three regiments and
we all immediately went, almost without exception, to rifle platoons.

INTERVIEWER: Then you went to Communications School at Fort Benning?

i

GEN DEPUY: Yes. I reported in to the 20th Infantry on June 25th, 1941 . That fall we went on the
Louisiana Maneuvers.* I was a rifle platoon leader. Incidentally, we walked all the way to
Louisiana and back — five hundred miles down, and five hundred miles back. We prided
ourselves on never losing a man. There were some good things about that Army. Tactically, it was
not proficient, but in many soldierly things, it was good. And, I'd say that I learned more about
just plain soldiering from six months in the 20th Infantry than I learned in all the rest of my service.
Colonel Milburn was the regimental commander. He later became a corps commander, Lieutenant
General "Shrimp" Milburn. The battalion commanders of the 20th Infantry were World War I
integrated officers who, generally speaking, were tough and hazing kinds of men. But, they made
you do things that are good, liking taking care of the men, and demanding that "nobody drops
out," and so, nobody did. The soldiers were sufficiently terrified, so that nobody ever dropped out
of that 1,000 mile march unless he went to the hospital. Tactics consisted of getting on line and
advancing in rushes — it was called extended-order drill.

When I came back from Louisiana, I went to Communications School because I had been
selected to become the battalion adjutant. In those days, the battalion adjutant was quite a guy
because he commanded the headquarters detachment, which was the same as the headquarters
company. He was the adjutant, he was the communications officer, he was the pioneer officer,
and he had the battalion sergeant major in his detachment, plus a battalion supply sergeant. The
first lieutenant did all of that. In fact, he was the battalion staff. There was the battalion
commander, the battalion executive officer, a battalion adjutant, and the companies, and that's it.
Oh, incidentally, the adjutant was also the intelligence officer, and the S-1, the S-2 and the S-4. I
could be mistaken about this, there might have been an S-3, but I don't think so. Incidentally, that
is the way Soviet battalions are still organized — no staff for operations. But, he certainly was
everything else, to include the headquarters company commander. So, the battalion commander

*For a discussion of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers see Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large- Scale Maneuvers in the
United States, 1935- 1964 (Fort Monroe: USACONARC, 1964), 47-62.

A machine gun company from the 20th Infantry Regiment going
into action while "under fire" as part of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers.

The "old" 2d Cavalry and the "new" 92nd Reconnaissance Company
joining forces during the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers

wanted me to take over that job from a Lieutenant Humphrey — a very fine officer. So, the one
thing he thought I really ought to learn was communications. All the rest was thought to be
simple — or perhaps unimportant.

INTERVIEWER: Now, you joined the 357th Infantry Regiment of the 90th Division, at Camp
Barkley, Texas, and you trained with that unit for over two years before it deployed to Europe and
the European theater in March of '44.* We'd like to know what those two years were like in terms
of the effectiveness of the training that the division received. What were the major training
problems? Were they similar to those we face today? We have asked ourselves, "What would it be
like to have a unit for two years and then take that unit into combat?"

GEN DEPUY: I joined the 357th Infantry as a communications officer out of the school at
Benning. I joined the headquarters company of the regiment which was still in the process of
forming up. In those days the regimental communications section had a first lieutenant
communications officer and three second lieutenant battalion communications officers, each
having little sections which worked with the battalions but belonged to the regiment. Later, the
battalions got their own. But, in any event, I started out being the communications officer for the
1st Battalion, but I belonged to the regiment. After a very short period of time, I became the
regimental communications officer. And then, I became what they called the liaison officer, but I
was really the assistant regimental S-3, one of several. I think by that time I was a first lieutenant.
Then I became the S-3 of the 1st Battalion. I went back and forth once or twice as people came in
who were senior to me and so on, but, generally, I spent my time either as a communications
officer during those two years, or in the regimental S-3 section, or as the 1st Battalion S-3. So,
that was my viewpoint.

I really have to say something about the officers who were assigned to the regiment. I'll say a lot
more about them later, but there was no apparent expertise on tactics anywhere in the regiment,
including the Regular officers, which included the regimental commander, one of the battalion
commanders, and maybe two, three, or four others, out of some 135 officers. No one had any
experience in war. The regimental commander may have been in France, but in those days my
impression was that the name of the game was to "soldier," meaning that there were a lot of little
rules — a lot of them good rules such as how to take care of your men, and "officers eat last,"
and such.

There also was a lot of "rank hath its privileges" (RHIP), another name for hazing for which
today you would be court-martialed. In my opinion, RHIP was an excuse for mediocre officers to
take advantage of those junior in rank. At one time RHIP may have made some sense, but by the
time it spread out into an expansion army, it was just a license to steal. So, there was a lot of
hazing.

There wasn't much conviction about the tactics. The regimental commander, for example,
when he talked to us, didn't talk about tactics, he talked about movements. I have a theory about
that. We were motorized by that time, and all the energy and imagination in the division was

*U.S. Army, A History of the 90th Division in World War II (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Company,

1946).

George Von Roeden, Regimental History of the 357th Infantry (Weiden, Bavaria: Ferdinand N. Buchdruckerei, 1945).

totally absorbed in how we could get a regiment mounted up in trucks, move down the road, not
get lost, and get there on time. We spent months just learning how to do that, whereas, we
should have spent months learning how to fight. Perhaps the reason for that was that the division
commander, the regimental commander, and the battalion commander were comfortable with a
truck movement, but they weren't comfortable with training for combat. In both cases the training
was procedural-mechanical.

With the advantage of hindsight it is clear to me now at least part of what was wrong. We
followed the Army Training Program. The so-called ATP was a time-oriented process. A unit
spent so many hours or days on each subject. For example, 30 hours of field firing, 6 hours on first
aid, and 2 weeks on platoon in the attack. The goal or object was to complete the training — get
it done! Never mind whether or not the troops learned anything. The process completely obscured
the product. If a soldier missed first aid training he must make it up so that 100 percent of the unit
went through the prescribed ATP. Performance-oriented training was not introduced into the
Army until TRADOC did so in the mid-70s. The learning function was obscured and secondary to
the scheduling function. Few took training very seriously.

We trained around Camp Barkley, Texas. We went to the Louisiana Maneuvers. We went out
to the desert near Blythe, California — Camp Granite. We exercised in the desert, then went to
Fort Dix, and then, on to England. When we were in England, before the Normandy invasion, we
were in terrain not unlike that of Normandy, certainly more like Normandy than the desert was like
Normandy. But, for some reason or other, we did not take advantage of that. It never seemed to
occur to us that we were going to be confronted in Normandy with very poor visibility, and that
this would create a control problem and a firepower problem. I don't remember any of that being
discussed at all. My guess is that that was not really unusual in the expansion army of World War

INTERVIEWER: I would like to hear your assessment of how good you thought the unit was
when it deployed?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I had no way of knowing how good it was. I was loyal to it, and by that time,
I had a lot of friends in it. My fellow officers and good friends were wonderfully young, bright,
eager fellows trying to do their best. They were wonderful material from which to make an army.
But, for some reason, we didn't take full advantage of that. One thing about the 90th Division was
that its enlisted soldiers were older. In those days the draft used to go in cycles, and when we
were filled, we were filled with older soldiers. They were around 25 years old. We had a lot of them
25 to 30, while some units were filled with soldiers 19 and 20 years old. That was regarded later, as
a problem by some people. I don't know if it was or not.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any specific events or incidents that occurred during your training
that happened to stick in your mind as particularly good or particularly bad, that you retained
through the years, other than what you have already mentioned?

GEN DEPUY: Well, again, the emphasis was always on things that we could understand. For
example, we made a lot of 25-mile marches, because everybody understood how to make a

25-mile march. You either made it, or you didn't. You either had stragglers, or you didn't. And
again, we had truck movements and written orders and communications — all of the stuff that
goes on above the fighting. Incidentally, this is not unknown in today's Army or anybody's army
at any time. But, I think it was worse there. I don't think it was anybody's particular fault; it was
the fact that it was the blind leading the blind.

Typical English countryside training scenes as Americans
prepare for the upcoming invasion of the European Continent.

When we went to war that part of the division which was really well-trained on the combat side
was the artillery. The artillery is easier to train because it's very mechanical and mathematical, and
they do very well. But, the artillery was good, and although it was an infantry division, it was the
infantry battalions, companies, platoons, and squads that I thought were poorly trained.*

INTERVIEWER: I've got some voids that I'd like to fill in — background material. Was there any
attempt to obtain feedback from the fighting that had been going on? It would seem that the
British and French experience in France prior to Dunkirk, should have been available to the United
States Army. Combat in the Pacific was characterized by small unit actions that would seem to
have had some value in terms of lessons that could be taught. And, I would suppose that by the
time you were in England, there would have been some feedback from the North African
campaigns. Was there any attempt to get any of that type of information to you at all?

GEN DEPUY: Well, there were after action reports and lessons learned, but not very many, and
they didn't seem to be emphasized too much. I do remember one thing though, that was brought
back from the battlefront, and that was marching fire. That became somewhat of a fad, and
marching fire, as you probably recall, was, if you analyze it, an effort to maintain fire superiority
during the assault. It's not a bad idea, assuming that you put it in the right context. They used
marching fire as a method of attack — as the sole method of attack. What they should have
done, of course, was position the heavy machine guns and light machine guns and even rifle
companies, so as to gain total fire superiority with small arms as well as mortars and artillery, and
then, during the assault, use marching fire, which would have maintained the fire superiority. It
reminds me a great deal of the experiments at the Combat Developments Experimentation
Command (CDEC), in 1976.

At the time we were doing the Parapet Foxhole or PAR FOX experiment we discovered that the
platoon that attacked with one squad and a light machine gun in the overwatch and two squads
attacking, was about forty percent as effective as a platoon that had two squads and a machine
gun suppressing and only one moving. The reason was that the fire superiority, as they called it in
World War II, we now call it suppression, was maintained. As you know, the problem with
infantry is that while you may get fire superiority through suppression, just at the time when you
need it the most, during the assault, when the troops all rise up out of their foxholes or from
behind a hedgerow and move forward, you lose it. So, the enemy then comes up out of his holes
and starts to fire at you, and you lose the suppression.

So, marching fire obviously was designed to overcome that problem, but somewhere in the
transmission between the lessons learned and our unit, marching fire became the tactic through
which you attacked. In other words, we lined up two battalions with two companies up and they
went across the line of departure, using marching fire. It might have worked if the enemy was not
well dug in, not well camouflaged, and very weak; but, if the enemy was professional, as the
Germans usually were, was well-hidden, and was in very good positions, marching fire as often as
not, just wasn't sufficient. We marched into their killing zones. We didn't learn about overwatch
suppression until later in the war.

*For a discussion of pre-invasion training or lack thereof, see G.A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II:
Cross-Channel Attack (Washington: USGPO, 1951), 158-197.

10

INTERVIEWER: Did the training programs include live fire?

GEN DEPUY: They included infiltration courses, live fire exercises, and overhead fire, all against
fixed targets. The enemy doesn't shoot back, and so, you don't learn a whole lot, and of course,
they were normally not done above maybe, platoon level, or company level at the most. Then,
once in awhile we would fire the "mad minute" to impress us with our own firepower. However,
the M-1 rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in
combat by the average soldier. He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the
attack, he rarely ever saw a target. So, he was indisposed to shoot. The Germans, on the other
hand, used machine pistols which were area weapons. That is, they sprayed the area ahead of
them and achieved fire superiority which we now call suppression.

INTERVIEWER: In the training program, did there seem to be a master plan that indicated when
you would deploy, or did you just train up to a point and then realize that you weren't going to
Europe right away after all, and then drop back?*

GEN DEPUY: That's right. What happened was that we went through the training program, the
ATP, once at Camp Barkley, which was culminated by a trip to the Louisiana Maneuvers. And, at
the end of that, some people came to test us during division exercises. I remember they came
from a corps commanded by General Daniel I. Sultan. They were supposed to pronounce whether
we were ready or not. They rendered the typical Army report of the time, which said that the
troops didn't use cover and concealment that they bunched up too much, and that our discipline
on the march was only fair, and things like that. In other words, they said what every report has
always said about exercises. Well, then what happened was that we were motorized. So, then we
zealously went after movement by truck. Concurrently, we went through some more ATP training
and then we went to the Desert Training Center. So, we went through another ATP cycle at the
Desert Training Center. So, I would say that we went through two and a half or three ATP
cycles.**

Now, there also was a lot of cadreing. We sent several cadres to other divisions which sliced
right through our command structure. I might add about cadreing that we never sent our best
people, but we also never sent our worst people. People who were cadred were, almost without
exception, from the middle — not bad enough to embarrass us, but not good enough to destroy
us. That was the game.

INTERVIEWER: During this training were you equipped with the same weapons and gear that
you had when you finally went to war?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, essentially we had M-1s and Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), and that
light machine gun that we had until very recently, with the aerated barrel, the air-cooled light

*For an explanation of the Mobilization Training Program, and its revision during World War II, see Robert R. Palmer,
Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast, United States Army in World War II: The Procurement and Training of Ground
Combat Troops (Washington, USGPO, 1948), 442-455.

**90th Division training at the Desert Training Center is discussed in Moenk, Large Scale Maneuvers, 104-105.

11

machine gun. We had eight heavy water-cooled machine guns. We had 105 millimeter infantry
howitzers in a cannon company. The antitank company changed from 37 to 57 millimeter towed
guns, and the mortars were always 60mms and 81mms, so we really didn't change weapons
during that whole time. However, we did pick up tanks in England, and tank destroyers in France.

INTERVIEWER: I'm curious about the troops. By now you had been with them for two years.
You must have had a lot of problems caring for the soldiers and their dependents. Apparently you
were not in a "we're going to war tomorrow" posture. Were people able to go home or were they
all kept on base until just before you reported to Fort Dix? Were they allowed to go home on leave?

GEN DEPUY: Nobody knew when we were going to go to war. So, the atmosphere was one in
which the troops were being continuously told that when they finished their training, they were
going to war. Now, mind you, the soldiers didn't have any dependents anywhere nearby. You
know, the soldiers came from all over, and so did the officers. Unless the soldier happened to have
lived in the neighborhood, his dependents, if he had any — his mother and father in most cases,
his wife if he had one — were back in New England, or California, or wherever, so they were not
a problem. And, we gave leaves. Not too many, but I suspect that everybody got a couple of
weeks a year, and some of the officers, because they made a little more money, had their wives
nearby. But, the government paid no attention to them and there were absolutely no provisions
made for families. It was all business, 24 hours a day. You lived in the unit. If your wife was
nearby, and you were an officer, maybe you could sneak out from time to time. There were some
short periods of time in which you were permitted to go on weekends if you had your family
nearby. So, taking care of families was not regarded as a problem. It was wartime, and all of the
so-called people problems and programs that we have now, were unheard of back then.

INTERVIEWER: Were you living in tents at that time, or did you live in wooden buildings?

GEN DEPUY: At Leonard Wood, we went into buildings, into barracks, wooden barracks. At
Camp Barkley, Texas, we went into tents, which were then converted into hutments, which were
tents with plyboard walls.

INTERVIEWER: Did the battalion adjutant work with the communications people who came
down from regiment?

GEN DEPUY: No. The Army reorganized between the time I was with the 20th Infantry and the
time I was with the 357th Infantry. The 20th Infantry and the 1st Infantry had been brought down
to Leonard Wood from Fort Warren at Cheyenne, Wyoming, where they had been stationed for a
long time. Then there was the 63rd which had been cadred out of the 3rd Infantry at Fort Snelling,
Minnesota. They were still in the old organization which was very light on staff and very high on
command. But, when I got down to the 357th Infantry, it was in its World War II organization and
had a staff at battalion and regiment. However, if I'm not mistaken, the headquarters company
commander was also the S-1. There was an S-2, S-3, and S-4, and a separate communications
officer by that time. At first the communications officer belonged to the regimental headquarters

12

company, but later, he became part of the battalion's permanent staff. I can't remember when
those little changes took place. (See Figures 1 and 2)*

INTERVIEWER: The 90th Division deployed to England between March and April of '44. The
division's unit history said that there was a training program and that some of that training
included attacking fortified positions, and fighting in hedgerows. That suggests to me that
someone had thought about what you were going to encounter. Yet, the account that you just
gave us contradicts that and implies that the training wasn't carefully thought out.

GEN DEPUY: Attacking fortified positions — we did that. We also did that back in the desert.
Attacking fortified positions was a rather set piece type of thing. By the way, it wasn't bad
training. It was very practical. You buttoned them up with small arms fire and then some very
brave young men went up there with a satchel charge on the end of a pole — they called it a pole
charge — stuck it against the embrasure or in the embrasure, pulled the fuse, and it went off.
Normally, that would take care of it; in fact, in war, it did take care of it. But, it required a good
young man. Our tactical training in England was perfunctory. I do not remember ever hearing
about hedgerows and their effects on tactics.

HEADQUARTERS

AND

HEADQUARTERS

COMPANY

RIFLE
COMPANY

RIFLE
COMPANY

RIFLE
COMPANY

HEAVY
WEAPONS
COMPANY

1

1

BATTALION

BATTALION

MEDICAL

TRAINS

SECTION

FROM

FROM

SERVICE

REGIMENTAL

COMPANY

MEDICAL
DETACHMENT

Figure 1. Infantry battalion

BATTALION
HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

CO
HQ

PLAT
HQ

BN HQ
SEC

rm

MSG
CEN
SEC

COM
PLAT

-B

WIRE
SEC

RADIO

AND

VISUAL

SEC

AM b

PIONEER

PLAT

ANTITANK
PLAT

PLAT
HQ

^^^ S^^^

• 57-MM • 57 MM • 57 MM

Figure 2. Headquarters and Headquarters company, Infantry battalion.

'See Field Manual 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington: USGPO, 1944).

13

INTERVIEWER: The difference may, in fact, be made clear by the rest of the paragraph on
training which states that not only did the division work on attacking fortified positions and
fighting in hedgerows, but it also worked on road marches and obstacle courses. So, if the latter
two are included on the same scale as the former two, one gets an idea of what was happening.

GEN DEPUY: My memory of training in England was that we did a lot of road marches to stay in
physical conditioning. We had a lot of trouble finding small arms ranges and grenade ranges. So,
we tried to maintain our weapons proficiency and physical condition and do a little bit of tactical
training, but in England that was very, very difficult because there wasn't any room. England was
ready to sink with American troops. We did go over into Wales and found a training area where
we were able to do a little bit of tactical training at about company level. That's the only place we
conceivably could have done any work against hedgerows. I do remember that the hedgerows,
when we got in them in France, were a great surprise to us, and a great problem. They were to
everybody.

INTERVIEWER: How were the Americans received by the British in 1944?

GEN DEPUY: I believe that the British were beginning at about that time, to get the V-1s, or had
already been getting them for awhile. The V-2s hadn't started. They had been through the Battle
of Britain, and they had had some successes in the desert. Except for the V-1s, I thought that
British morale was pretty good, I mean the general civilian morale, was pretty good. They were
clearly dumbfounded by being inundated with so many Americans. Remember, they had that
marvelous old saying about "overpaid, oversexed and over here". Our guys only made $50.00 a
month, I think. I think it went from $30.00 to $50.00. That was a lot of money, especially if they
spent it all at one time. They might spend up to three months' pay at one time. So, they could be
kind of rowdy and, being a mix of everybody that you could find in America, some of them were
rougher than others. Now, the British weren't too keen about that. But, they were very keen
about having us over there to help in getting the war over with. So, on balance, they tolerated us
as individuals and welcomed us as an idea.

INTERVIEWER: This question has to do with the turbulence in the unit. Earlier, you referred to
the requirement to cadre other units, and you talked about the massive shakeup that the division
underwent in England. What is your assessment of the impact on the division of the cadreing and
the other shakeups that occurred just before you went into battle?

GEN DEPUY: We went through approximately three training cycles, and the cadres were
insignificant compared to wartime losses. So, if you can't take cadreing, you can't go to war. My
main retrospective thought about all of that is, that because we didn't have any officers in
positions of responsibility who had confidence in their war fighting role, their tactical role, we
didn't have any quality control. Nobody ever got fired for anything. No one! So, we kept the
hopeless people side-by-side with the good people. And, it never changed. Everybody got to
know one another. We really knew every officer in the regiment by the time we got to .England.
But, we also knew that there was a lot of deadwood in the unit, including two out of three

14

Marching, marching, and more marching. A typical scene throughout the
English countryside as Americans prepared for the upcoming invasion.

Half-tracks lined up awaiting the invasion of the European Continent. Some
felt England was about to sink under the weight of American troops and equipment.

15

battalion commanders. So, my problem was that there was no tough thinning out of the officers
who should have been eliminated before they got a lot of people killed. And, that can only
happen, I guess, if you have experienced officers who have standards and who know what it is
they expect. Unfortunately, we didn't have such people.

INTERVIEWER: With regard to the leadership failures, the two that you referred to, were they
due to a lack of technical competence or of courage?

GEN DEPUY: As you know, the 90th Division was studied for years at Fort Leavenworth as an
example of the impact of leadership on unit performance. In this respect the 90th was unusually
weak going into the war. It recovered, but in the process, thousands of good men were lost.
When General McLain took over after about six or seven weeks of combat he told us that the
soldiers of the 90th were just as good as the soldiers in any other division but that they had been
poorly led. That was an understatement of monumental proportions.

In the first six weeks of the battle in Normandy, the 90th lost 100 percent of its soldiers and 150
percent of its officers. In the rifle companies that translates to losses of between 200 and 400
percent. Those losses compare with the worst of World War I.

In this same period two division commanders were relieved. In my regiment one regimental
commander was relieved in England and another in Normandy. The one relieved in England
returned to the regiment and was killed within two days. Two battalion commanders also were
relieved, and one ran away and was then relieved.

The consequences of all this leadership failure could be predicted. My regiment simply did not
perform notwithstanding the heroic efforts and tragic losses among the lower ranking officers and
the bewildered troops. Much the same picture applied to the whole division in terms of
performance.

INTERVIEWER: Where did the Army get these officers, from the National Guard or the
Reserves?

GEN DEPUY: The division and regimental commanders were regular officers. They were clearly
unqualified for command in battle. The commander who took the regiment to Normandy was as
close to being totally incompetent as it is possible to be. He knew nothing about an infantry
regiment. He was erratic to the extreme. Three or four times he ordered the regiment straight
ahead into a repeat performance of a failed attack. He will never be forgotten by the survivors. Of
the three battalion commanders, one was a graduate of the Military Academy — he was brave
but had a personal problem; one was a Reserve officer who had insufficient inner strength to lead
troops and face battle; and the third one was a despicable punk from the Illinois National
Guard — he had given ample evidence of his character continuously during the two years before
Normandy. Upon issuing his order for the first attack of the war he went to the aid station, turned
himself in and was evacuated. He was pursued by the authorities and reduced to enlisted rank.

16

The value system in the 90th Division did not identify and eliminate these officers before they had
done their grisly work.*

INTERVIEWER: In Vietnam I know that you always had an idea about who was ready to step into
any spot, be it a vacancy caused by a casualty or by something else. When these battalion
commanders were changed, apparently within a short period of time, did the regimental
commander have any idea of who to put in, or did it just sort of happen? Did he just sort of reach
down and get lucky? How did he handle the replacement of battalion commanders?

GEN DEPUY: We had severe problems with the regimental commander at the same time. But,
better people were picked — we were desperate for good men. The 1st Battalion was taken over
by a lieutenant colonel named Ed Hamilton who is still in the Washington area. He was very good
and very brave. He lost an eye at Metz. The 2nd Battalion was taken over by a good man named
Ward who was wounded and replaced by a school teacher from Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
named Ben Rossow, who was also a good man. The 3rd Battalion was taken over by John Mason
who later commanded the regiment. He was the regimental S-3 when we went to England and to
France, and a very good man. So, we went from three disasters to three good, but relatively
untrained, men. They learned on the job. From then on, things began to look up. Then we
brought in a good regimental commander as well. Colonel, later General Bittman Barth took over
the regiment after having been the 9th Division's Chief of Staff. He was a lifesaver.

INTERVIEWER: What part did you play in the planning for Normandy?

GEN DEPUY: Obviously not much since I was only a captain. But, I do have one story perhaps
worth telling. In April of 1944, I was a regimental assistant S-3. The 90th Division headquarters
borrowed me to go to London with "Hanging Sam" Williams and Major Ed Hamilton, the
Assistant G-3, on a "secret" mission. It turned out that we were to make the arrangements for all
of the shipping to take the 90th Division to Normandy. The 90th was the follow-up division on
Utah Beach behind the 4th Division, which made the assault landing. Anyhow, we arrived in
London, stayed at the Grosvenor House, and went to the Selfridge Department Store on the edge
of Mayfair, by Marble Arch, where Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army
(ETOUSA), was located. The store had been moved out and hundreds of desks, telephones, and
US Army people had moved in. In April of 1944, it was sheer pandemonium. We started at the top
with a major general and after two frustrating days, had worked our way down to an elderly major
of the transportation section of the Quartermaster Corps. His desk was right smack in the middle
of the five acres of floor space and indistinguishable from all the rest except for one thing — this
major, whose name I believe was Button, seemed to be the only one who knew anything about
where all the ships were, and which ones we might have. I say "might" advisedly. As you would
expect, "Hanging Sam" lost interest at this point. He wasn't about to deal with a minor player like
Button. So, he went off on his own business. We met at night at the Grosvenor. Ed Hamilton then
went back to Birmingham, and I was left alone at the working level.

*The general quality of field grade officers, and battalion commanders in particular, during this period, is discussed in
Palmer, Wiley and Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, 466-469.

17

20 Grosvenor Square, London
U.S. Headquarters for the European Theater of Operations

The first step was to select the ships, then prepare the unit loading lists and lastly, match the
load lists with the ships. Sounds easy? To my amazement, Button said to me, "Here are all the
ships that will be in English waters in late May. Which ones do you want?" I said I didn't have a
clue and asked for his recommendations. He said that some ships were much larger and better
than others and that because I had arrived before the representative of the 2nd Division, I might as
well take my pick. So I did. I picked large ships. The 90th had about nine ships in all. The poor old
2nd Division had about 30 because all the big ships had been taken by the 90th — by me. What a
system!

The last step was the most interesting. I was taken to see a brigadier of QM-7 in Whitehall. He
was the mastermind behind all of the transportation planning. In peacetime he was an executive of
Cunard lines. He sent me to see a group of Merchant Marine captains who had been
commissioned in the British Army to prepare loading plans. They worked in a basement a block
away from Selfridge. For five days I joined them around a huge round table on which they had the
blueprints of the ships' decks and cargo spaces. For each piece of American equipment they had a
wooden block prepared to scale — length, width, and height — which they would place on the
drawings and number. It was my job to advise them on the sequence of debarkation and to make
sure that a howitzer also had a prime mover, etcetera. Mind you, we only had five days and I had
only the most general knowledge about the division's plans at the Normandy end. In short, we
transloaded from the ships to landing craft off the beach. To end this story — it worked! These
same merchant captains, there were about eight that I remember, were the selfsame chaps who
had done the loading plans for North Africa, and, I believe, for Sicily, but on that point I'm not so
certain.

18

There is something classical about this story. After all the grand plans are drawn and the
generals have had their say, it devolves upon some half-trained, half-baked captain to "do it". It's
a small miracle that anything "works".

INTERVIEWER: On what day did the regiment actually land in Normandy?

GEN DEPUY: We landed at noon on the 8th of June. One of the regiments, the one that General
Talbott was in, was sunk — their ship was sunk. Fortunately, the troops were able to get away
safely. They were supposed to be the first regiment in. They were going to come in on the
afternoon of D-Day, and we were to come in the next day or two, which is what we did. [See
Maps 1 and 2, pages 20 and 21]

INTERVIEWER: What were the conditions on the beach?

GEN DEPUY: The 4th Division had cleared the beach. They landed partly on the wrong part of
the beach, so everything was a little off kilter, but we came in nevertheless. There was no fire on
the beach or bombing. We went across the causeways. We were to go into an attack position just
across the Merderet River. Well, when an advanced recon party got up to the Merderet River, the
82nd had a part of a regiment already across. There was a bridge across the Merderet at the
middle of a long causeway. It was a very difficult place to get across, particularly in the daytime.
The Germans had some high velocity guns which were sighted on that bridge. I was the S-3 of the
1st Battalion. Later in the afternoon of 8 June, I went up with one or two other people to pick out
the attack position across the river. We got across this bridge and picked out an area on the edge
of a little cluster of houses by the name of le Motey. Then we took the troops up and across the
causeway and into this attack position. We launched our first attack early on the morning of 9
June. By the way, the troops were jittery and opened fire on imaginary snipers while in the attack
position. [See map 3, page 23]

INTERVIEWER: Were you motorized at this time?

GEN DEPUY: No, but it didn't make any difference — Normandy was a foot war.*

INTERVIEWER: What did the troops have on their backs? What was the basic load for an
infantryman?

GEN DEPUY: The first thing we had were fatigues that were impregnated against chemical
attack. These fatigues were fixed up so that if the enemy used mustard gas it wouldn't penetrate.
Also, you couldn't sweat through them. So, they were really awful hot and, God, after a few days,
you could smell soldiers a mile away. Finally, they decided that there wouldn't be a chemical
attack, and we got out of the impregnated clothing — it was the greatest relief. It was almost the
greatest relief in the war. They carried a blanket and a shelter half, which they didn't need,

*For the situation on Omaha Beach, see U.S. War Department, Historical Division, American Forces in Action Series:
Omaha Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944) Washington: USGPO, 1945). Reprinted by the Battery Press, Inc., 1984.

19

THE

NORMANDY

BEACHHEAD

14 JUNE 1

944

llllllll Front

LINE

f^ j German units

0 5

10

MILES

Map 1 — The Normandy Beachhead

20

I

Map 2 — Development of the Beachhead

21

Landing at Normandy Beach, 6 June 1944

22

90th division west of merderet

10-13 JUNE 1944

Positions of Forward Elements

2400, 9 June
— — — 2400, 10 June
,WA\WW\V 2400, 13 June

Map 3 — 90th Division's drive across the Merderet River

23

ammunition, grenades and pyrotechnics, extra bazooka ammunition, and lots of extra machine
gun ammunition. Every rifleman came in with a little extra which they dropped in the assembly
area, plus mortar ammunition. When they got off the ships, they were loaded because they
weren't expected to go directly into an assault, and they didn't. So, we brought a lot of stuff when
we came in, which we dropped in the final assembly area. It became sort of the first reserve of
ammunition. I might add that I think we still had some of that ammunition when the war was over
because, as you know, the infantry in World War II didn't shoot much small arms ammuniton,
except the machine guns. So, that was about it.

INTERVIEWER: Did they carry rations?

GEN DEPUY: They had K-rations in those days, which looked like a brick, but not the C-rations.
C-rations in those days were the next step up. The assault ration was a candy bar. It was a
chocolate bar. The artillery ate B-rations. Most of us also carried an escape and evasion kit, and a
little map, which everybody later wore as a scarf. They were marvelous silk scarves with a map of
the Cotentin Peninsula on them. We also had some other survival equipment. I have forgotten
everything the kit contained, but there were some halizone tablets, a small compass, a fishhook,
and a couple of other things like that, which, of course, nobody used. So, that was what we went
in with.

INTERVIEWER: And, I assume you had gas masks?

GEN DEPUY: And gas masks.

INTERVIEWER: How long did the gas masks last. Did the soldiers keep them all through the war
or did they dump them along the way?

GEN DEPUY: They kept them during the first month and then the assumption was made that
there wouldn't be a gas attack so they turned in the gas masks and the impregnated clothing.
There were a few gas scares in Normandy. Sure, it was just smoke, white phosphorus or
something like that, but there were several occasions when the troops thought that they were
being gassed and yelled "gas," and then ran away.

INTERVIEWER: Did the soldiers have entrenching tools?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, they had entrenching tools.

INTERVIEWER: Once you crossed the river and got into your attack position, and the division
started to fight, did you run into the hedgerows right away?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. Most of Normandy consists of small fields — pastures and gardens —
surrounded by sunken roads and divided by hedgerows. Let me say something about our first
attack. We were astride the road to Gourbesville near Amfreville. The regimental plan was to

24

attack with one battalion on each side of the road, and one battalion, the 2nd Battalion, in reserve.
The 1st Battalion was on the left. We attacked straight ahead with two companies up and one in
reserve to follow in center of sector. Each of the forward companies lined up two platoons abreast
with two squads on line in the most classic formation out of the book. The artillery preparation
was fired with the 105mms in fairly close along the hedgrows and the 155mms a little deeper. The
mortars fired at the first hedgerow.

After about 10 minutes of fire the battalion moved forward. When the lead companies crossed
the second or third hedgerow they came under very heavy small arms fire and were caught in an
open field. I do not believe that any of our troops fired their weapons after the first few minutes.
When the attack stopped the Germans threw a heavy barrage of mortar fire into the first and
second small fields between the Line of Departure and the forward line of troops. Casualties were
very heavy. We had walked into his killing ground. After 30 minutes the lead companies came
back to the second hedgerow and that was it. The other battalion had only slightly more success
but was also repulsed. An effort to move the reserve company around the left flank resulted in a
single file movement up a sunken road into some German machine gun fire which terminated the
first attack of the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry — all in all, a dismal affair.

For five more days the regiment continued its attack toward Gourbesville. On the 14th of June,
at 2020 hours, elements of the 3rd Battalion worked around the right (north) flank and entered the
town, but were forced out the next day. By 2240 on the 15th, the 3rd Battalion had recaptured
Gourbesville. This was the first substantial objective seized by the regiment. But, it cost the lives
of hundreds of brave junior officers and soldiers. This was a great bloodletting without much to
show in return. Consideration was given to the idea of breaking up the division and using it as
replacements but fortunately, that course was rejected and the division eventually pulled itself
together through on-the-job training and the slow emergence of fighters and leaders through a
process of seasoning and natural selection.

INTERVIEWER: What tactic finally evolved to advance through the hedgerows?

GEN DEPUY: A lot of work was done on trying to analyze the way the Germans defended. We
finally did figure it out. The Germans would assign a squad to a terrain compartment. In other
words, one series of hedgerowed fields like checkerboards. The Germans would put about two
men on the first hedgerow, usually near the corners. The next hedgerow back would be their main
position, and the third hedgerow back would be their reserve position. So, when you started the
attack, the first two guys would knock off one or two of the attackers and slow things down. Then
you had to go over the top of that hedgerow in the face of the main position. You suffered more
casualties, and normally, that ended the attack. [See Diagram, page 28]

The troops would straggle back, and you would end up taking just one hedgerow. That was
typical. Now, if you happened to carry the second hedgerow, the whole German squad would
drop back to the third one. As far as we were concerned, we rarely ever took the third hedgerow.
Eventually, what we tried to do was to figure out how to suppress this system with indirect fire.
We put the 60mms on the first hedgerow, the 81mms on the second hedgerow, the 105mms on
the third hedgerow and the 155mms back on the roads and reserve areas — and then we tried to

25

/

ensure that the attack would have enough impetus to simply carry through the whole thing.
Toward the end of the campaign, we made one or two such attacks successfully.*

But, what we finally learned, which is what all seasoned soldiers finally learn, is not to attack
them where they are. The way we cracked those positions was simply by finding a hole
somewhere around the flank. Find a hole, get through that hole and get in their rear, and then the
whole bloody thing would collapse. Then you'd have them in the open. That's the kind of thing I
wished we had learned during the two years we were training in the United States and during the
three months we were training in England.

I wish someone had told us that simple fact — don't attack them where they are strong, but try
to find a weak spot and go through the weak spot. Of course all of this was in the field manuals,
but for whatever reason, it wasn't transmitted to us, or perhaps more honestly, it didn't sink in.
We learned it the hard way and from then on, until the end of the war, all of the good commanders
fought their battles by looking for a way around the enemy; they practically never went straight
forward. Every time we had to go straight forward, we took high casualties as, indeed, we will in
our Army today, if we train our people to take the hill straight on. The thing to do is to go around
and behind the enemy, and then they will have to come out.

A typical hedgerow scene

*For a description of this campaign see U.S. War Department, Historical Division, American Forces in Action Series:
St-Lo(7July-19July 1944) Washington: USGPO, 1946. Reprinted by the Battery Press, Inc., 1984.

26

&

4fe&

*«

..'■■ :-;^--- : "

Hedgerow country clearly favored the defender.
One never knew for sure just what was on the other side.

27

Typical German hedgerow defensive positions were
always mutually supporting and organized in depth.

28

INTERVIEWER: Did you have tanks with improvised clearing blades on the front?

GEN DEPUY: The rhinoceros. Yes, we had some, but they were only marginally successful
simply because the hedgerows were often too thick even for those devices. A lot of the
hedgerows were very high; some of them were six, seven, and eight feet high. They even had
trees growing on top of them, and if you went down inside of them you would find that it was a
mass of roots, great huge roots of great huge trees. No tank was able to get through the big ones.
The tanks could get through only the little ones. If the hedgerow was only two or three feet high,
then those tanks could go through. The idea was to break through that second and third defensive
line. I would say that we had some success in doing that, but it's awfully difficult terrain for tanks.

M4A1 Medium Tank equipped with a hedgerow cutter
was used for breaking through hedgerows.

INTERVIEWER: But, for the trooper, it must have been like scaling a wall. Every time he wanted
to move into the field on the other side of the hedgerow, he would have to climb up and over a six
to eight foot hedgerow.

29

GEN DEPUY: Yes, and you can imagine how the trooper must have felt going over a hedgerow
and coming down onto a stage out in the complete open, with the enemy just behind the next
hedgerow. Now, they didn't want to go across the middle of that field — that's the last thing
they wanted to do. So, what the troops tried to do, almost always, and almost always with bad
results, was to work along the hedgerows that were perpendicular to our front. And, time after
time, we would get a platoon caught with all of the soldiers lying head-to-toe along the side of a
hedgerow.

INTERVIEWER: Could they crawl through the middle?

GEN DEPUY: You mean through the middle of the field?

INTERVIEWER: I don't mean through the middle of the field, but through the middle of this wall,
the hedgerow?

GEN DEPUY: No. What I'm trying to say is that instead of going over this hedgerow and then
going through the middle of the field, they would go over the hedgerows at the corners, and then
try to go right up along the perpendicular hedgerows. It's human nature to want to be next to
something and not to be exposed in the open. So, the Germans would dig right through the
hedgerow and have a little hole that they could see and shoot through, and then, they would just
fire right down the hedgerow and catch a whole column of soldiers crawling forward.

INTERVIEWER: Did they use mortars effectively in support of those tactics?

GEN DEPUY: They did. They used mortars very, very well. The minute we would cross that first
hedgerow, the field would be filled with mortar fire, and if you ever got past that one, the next
field also would be filled with mortar fire, as well.

INTERVIEWER: Could you overwatch from your hedgerow?

GEN DEPUY: We didn't do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that
almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by
small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about
mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn't
think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for
maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-1 rifle was a precision weapon but there were no
precision targets. This problem was not confined to the 90th Division. You have read SLAM
Marshall and know that even in the 101st only 25 percent of the troopers fired.* And, we only had
eight heavy machine guns in a battalion. So, it didn't work very well. We didn't do direct fire
suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.

INTERVIEWER: Didn't you shoot the bazookas at these things?

*Fora discussion of this problem see S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow, 1947).

30

GEN DEPUY: They did occasionally. They did shoot the rocket launchers at the corners once we
found out that the corners were where they'd be. And, sometimes that worked. Then, of course,
the Germans would try to position themselves so that they were not quite in the corner.

INTERVIEWER: Did you run into mines? Did the Germans mine the hedgerows?

GEN DEPUY: They would put booby traps out in front of the hedgerows, and then they'd mark
the gaps. They didn't mark them so that we could find the gaps, but they'd know where they
were. So, there were mines, and there were booby traps. We would lose a lot of people just trying
to go over a hedgerow.

INTERVIEWER: Having discussed the hedgerow fighting, I'd now like to get your version of the
relief of Major General Landrum, who commanded the division during the first few days of the
Normandy campaign.

GEN DEPUY: General Landrum was the second division commander in Normandy and the
second to be relieved. You know, I really was at a very low level so I don't know all of the things
that happened, but I think his relief stemmed from the fact that the division didn't perform very
well. The regiment that I was in certainly contributed to that by not performing well. Under the
circumstances I've described, I think you can see why. I think the other regiments did a little better
than ours, but I don't think they did a whole lot better. That may be unfair for me to say, because I
wasn't there. So, let me just say that the division certainly didn't achieve its objectives, and it
didn't contribute a lot to the winning of the battle in Normandy during the first few weeks.
Landrum was not visible to the fighting troops; certainly at battalion level and below, he wasn't
felt. The man who was felt was "Hanging" Sam Williams. And, that's a tragic story because
"Hanging" Sam was fired. They got the wrong man. "Hanging" Sam Williams was the assistant
division commander, and he was with us all the time. He was very helpful and a very brave, and
powerful man, as everybody found out later. He had been with the division while it trained in the
United States and really was the only man who ever impressed me as being a soldier with
experience. He was with my regiment at Beau Coudray where we did very poorly and took a lot of
casualties. Apparently, when he went back to the division command post, he was accused of
siding with the troops against the division commander. So, he was relieved.

INTERVIEWER: Who relieved him?

GEN DEPUY: Landrum. And then Landrum was relieved shortly thereafter.

INTERVIEWER: So, the relief of General Landrum took place around the 30th of July; yet, he
had only taken command of the division around the 12th of June.

GEN DEPUY: Was it on 30 July? Was it that late?

INTERVIEWER: That's when McLain took over, the 30th of July, but I'm not sure if Landrum had
been relieved earlier than that.

31

GEN DEPUY: All right.

INTERVIEWER: In that fighting around Beau Coudray — and again, these are more questions
about the relief of Landrum. Actually, what I want to determine are the differences between
McLain and Landrum. So, just to review the record, there was very fierce fighting in the
hedgerows and past the hedgerows. The 1st Battalion of the 357th, was sort of a lost battalion for
a couple of days around Beau Coudray and the fighting had reached the point where the engineers
were fighting as infantry, and the cooks and drivers were being used as individual replacements.
From all accounts, it would seem that the other divisions were having to do the same thing. The
82nd, the 79th, and the 83rd Divisions weren't making much more progress than was the 90th.
The fighting went on around the clock. It was just attack, and be attacked, then attack, and be
attacked again. I think one of the regiments, the 358th, suffered 52 percent casualties in just one
attack, the attack on the island. The fighting seems to have been very, very tough. I would guess
that the attack on the island led to the relief of Landrum. It was about then that somebody must
have made the decision to relieve him. But, here's a man who came down, took command of the
division and had about six very bad weeks. Point blank, the question would be, did Landrum have
a chance to impose himself on the division; did he really have a chance to take charge or was the
train going so fast that it was perhaps beyond any man's ability to grab hold of it and do much
with it? [See Maps 4 and 5, pages 33 and 34]

GEN DEPUY: Well, I suppose all of that is somewhat true. The division didn't distinguish itself at
all during that period. I think that Landrum's chief participation in the campaign was simply to take
the plans drawn up by the division G-3, Dick Stilwell (one of the finest soldiers in the Army), and
just order the regiments to implement them. It was "don't tell me your troubles, just follow
orders." There wasn't any active battlefield leadership. He didn't come around and visit the
regiments or the battalions, or talk to people and find out what the problems were. So, the
division didn't do very well. As a result, they got rid of him and brought in McLain. They did have
some good generals around, McLain being one, and Van Fleet being another.

V-

Major General
Samuel T. Williams

Major General
Raymond S. McLain

Major General
James A. Van Fleet

32

r"

FIRST ARMY ZONE

2 July 1944

ALTFTUCe IN METERS

L_

!•: HI&ih

0

10 50 !00 tso 200

L-

12 3 4 3

ules

Map 4 — 90th Division prepared to attack Le Plessis

33

Map 5 — 90th Division drive on the Mont-Castre Forest

34

INTERVIEWER: I believe that Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., was selected over McLain to command the
division but he died of a heart attack before he could be put in.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. I guess Bradley finally said that they didn't want to break up the division and
I'm glad they didn't. It would have been a terrible thing considering the sacrifice of the soldiers and
junior officers. It's bad to break up a unit. What you want to do is make it well. Give it leaders. The
soldiers are always the same.

INTERVIEWER: At the same time that this was going on, you changed regimental commanders
on about the 16th of June, when Colonel Barth took command.

GEN DEPUY: Well, we changed commanders twice. What happened was that when John
Sheehy was relieved in England, he then became the spare colonel. Every division carried a spare
colonel. That was interesting because all three regimental commanders knew that there was a guy
sitting there waiting. That colonel's job was to just mosey around, stay current, and be ready. So,
Sheehy, who had been the regimental commander for a couple of years, was shunted aside by the
colonel who then was relieved after a terrifying week of almost total failure. They then sent
Sheehy back down to take over his old regiment again. Well, can you imagine anything worse
than that? When he came back down to look at his regiment it was decimated.

By then I was the S-3 of the regiment, because Mason had gone down to take over 3rd
Battalion. Colonel Sheehy was in a daze. He just couldn't believe what he found. We were being
ordered to make another attack. Colonel Sheehy, with a glazed look in his eye, just walked out of
the CP, found his driver, and said, "Drive down the road to Gourbesville." Somebody said, "You
can't." But, he told his driver, "Go." To this day, we don't know whether he did that because he
was desperate and couldn't stand it any longer, or if he didn't know the situation, or if he was out
of his mind, or just what drove him. They just drove down the road right into the Germans. Then
Barth arrived. I don't remember the exact dates; it all happened very rapidly, within a matter of a
couple of weeks.

INTERVIEWER: Colonel Sheehy was only there three days before he was killed. He came in on
the 13th of June, and was killed on the 16th.

GEN DEPUY: Right. You see, he got down there just long enough to find out what the
conditions were and issue a couple of orders, and then he drove off into the enemy lines.

INTERVIEWER: After Colonel Barth took over, the battle of Beau Coudray took place. That
seemed to be a very intense action with a lot of casualties. You were the regimental S-3 at that
time. I'd be very interested in your recounting that particular battle.

GEN DEPUY: Well, first of all, if you could look at a 1:5,000 or 1:10,000, or even 1:2,500 map,
and we had some of those, you would see that the road that led straight south into Periers from
St. Jores, went between a swampy area on the east and the Foret de Mont Castre on the west.
Between the high hill and the swamp was the village of Beau Coudray, in the vicinity of le Plessis.

35

So, there was a very narrow bottleneck. You couldn't go through the swamp, and our boundary
didn't let us go through Foret de Mont Castre. What we tried to do was go straight ahead through
the town and make a shallow envelopment across a shoulder of the Mont Castre. And, for
however many days it took, we fought to get through the bottleneck on the road to Periers. In all
my comments you must understand that I was removed two echelons from the company battles.
It was a good vantage point but I was not personally a part of the endless, bitter, grinding combat
at the fighting edge. Had I been, I would surely not be reporting as I am today. [See Map 6, page
37]

Anyway, we went on down into that battle with the 3rd Battalion on the right and the 1st
Battalion on the left. The 3rd Battalion managed to get into the town and "K" Company actually
got across the main transverse road that went through the town and off to the right, and up to the
top of Foret de Mont Castre. The Germans counterattacked; they brought up a bicycle battalion
among other things, and brought up some parachute troops, and one of the companies of the 3rd
Battalion disappeared. The 1st Battalion was on the left and there wasn't much room. The 2nd
Battalion was in reserve. Pretty soon we committed the 2nd Battalion around through the
adjacent regiment on our right and tried to get it up on the slope of the Foret in order to have the
unit come down on Beau Coudray from the west. The battalion got down into this thing we called
the "ladder," which was an open terraced area, and was stopped maybe 500 yards from the edge
of Beau Coudray. The Germans received additional reinforcements and launched another
counterattack and this time the 1st Battalion was chopped up. That's when we threw in a
battalion of cooks and bakers over on the extreme left. I can't remember one day from the next,
but the record will show how long the battle lasted. But, the regiment was in very bad shape at the
end. It really lost its integrity, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions didn't have the kind of cohesion it
took to mount a meaningful attack.

The fierce fighting took a heavy toll on Normandy villages

36

Map 6 — 90th Division's sector of First Army's front

37

At this point I must say something on behalf of the junior officers and soldiers of my regiment.
These poor devils were sent to us through the replacement system and often went into combat
without a chance even to meet, much less know, the men with whom they fought. Many died
never knowing what it was all about. These are the men to whom we professional soldiers owe a
great debt. They were the real heroes. But, we don't even know their names. What a tragedy. The
brutality and stupidity of those days have affected all the rest of my professional life.

INTERVIEWER: The unit history states that in six days of fighting there were 851 casualties, with
166 killed.

GEN DEPUY: That's right, about three hundred casualties per battalion.

INTERVIEWER: And, I believe it also indicated that this is when there were 13 straight days of
battle with almost no rest or sleep of any kind. In line with that, General Patton once remarked
that soldiers can attack for three days with no sleep. However, it appears that you certainly
exceeded that. Based on your impressions, was that about the most that the soldiers could take?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I don't know when they went past the breaking point, but I can tell you for
sure that the regiment lost its ability to mount an offensive action after just a few days of battle.
After that, orders may have been issued to attack, but no attacks took place. They may have been
leaning forward in the foxhole but the disorganization was sufficiently high and morale was
sufficiently low, so that nothing really happened. Infantry leaders were totally exhausted and in a
daze. There was a pervasive feeling of hopelessness. The troops withstood some counterattacks
but as far as movement forward, there wasn't any. Once the attack of the 2nd Battalion coming
down from the right flank bogged down, that was the end of the unit's offensive capability.

I do remember vividly how that whole battle ended. We made the terrible mistake of putting the
regimental CP in a little town called St. Jores. We were right at a main road junction and on the
night just before the Germans withdrew, they fired up their stockpiled ammunition. They had a
couple of large caliber guns; I don't know how big they were, 150 to 203 millimeters, but anyway,
they dumped everything they had on that road junction. We were there all night long, and all night
they did it. We were feeling very sorry for ourselves, but the next morning, when we woke up, we
discovered the enemy had withdrawn from our front. Typical German doctrine by the way — very
methodical.

INTERVIEWER: In that fight, the regimental history indicates that "Charlie" and "King"
Companies repulsed 14 counterattacks accompanied by tanks during the day. Can you describe
the kind of tempo that we are talking about in such fights?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I wasn't there with "K" or "C" Company, but my guess is that what they
were talking about was maybe, two or three assault guns. We are not talking about what you
would visualize as a large tank attack. There might have been a Mark IV tank or two, but in all
probability, what happened was that the Germans used some self-propelled 76 millimeter assault
guns combined with their airborne infantry. They were better trained and they maneuvered. They

38

were professionals. They simply suppressed and moved, suppressed and moved. They gained fire
superiority, and then gobbled up chunks of those companies up there, which, by that time,
probably were not returning fire.

INTERVIEWER: Now, if there were 14 attacks, and again, I'm looking at the unit history, that
would indicate that the Germans came in and hit, and then perhaps, went back to figure out
another place to come in and hit again, as opposed to coming in and actually biting off a big piece
of ground and trying to hang on to it.

GEN DEPUY: I think that when reports are coming in from company level, which is what we are
talking about, you have to realize what kind of a report you'll get. All probes are considered to be
attacks. So, my guess is that of the 14 attacks, five, six, or seven of them were merely the
Germans looking for a hole. They were probing for the flanks. And, they were pretty good at that.
They probably also ran their assault guns up a little bit from time to time, and fired while probing.
There were probably only two or three rather large attacks. When I say large attacks, by the way,
let me tell you, I'm only talking about 200 or 300 people at the most. Some of those large attacks
might have been as few as 50 to 100 men.

INTERVIEWER: Did they usually include artillery?

GEN DEPUY: Some artillery, but nothing like we had. Some mortars, some assault guns, and a
lot of small arms fire by the Germans. A lot of machine pistol fire, a lot of maneuver, and some
hand grenades or potato mashers.

INTERVIEWER: Was this a standard German tactic? If they were driven from a piece of ground,
or if they had people attacking them would they very quickly mount a counterattack of some
weight and try to stop you, or drive you back?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. The reason they were counterattacking at Beau Coudray is that they wanted
to hold that little cork in a bottle. If you ever saw it on a map, you'll see that it is just an incredible
bottleneck.

INTERVIEWER: Now, was this part of the Falaise Gap?

GEN DEPUY: No. If you look at this map, there is the Foret de Mont Castre, and we were right
there, right across the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, facing straight south, and we were
attacking straight south. But, if you looked across there, there was a river that went across most
of the way, there was a hill or two, and there were these huge, swampy, inundated kinds of areas.
When you looked at the terrain there was just one way through. So, the Germans kept
counterattacking to hold that bottleneck. The Germans were very doctrinaire about other things,
too. They always counterattacked before they withdrew. They fired a lot of artillery. They hit you
very hard and then they would withdraw. You could count on that.

39

CHAPTER II

Education of a Battle Leader

INTERVIEWER: I imagine that the regiment, and probably the division, were at a pretty low ebb
following that fight. What occurred to get the units back on their feet?

GEN DEPUY: Well, let's see, first we went through Beau Coudray, then south. The 358th had
that episode on the island and then the breakout took place at St. Lo after the carpet bombing.
The people on our left made the breakout. We were on the west side and the 1st Division and
others in the V and XIX Corps made the breakthrough near St. Lo. Soon, the whole front
collapsed in front of us and we were given orders to move.

We were part of the new Third Army. Suddenly, we were moving and we were taking a few
prisoners. We didn't have to fight much, and we moved down behind an armored division to
Avranches. We did a little fighting near St. Hilaire-du-Harcouet. Then, we broke out with the
mission of going first to Mayenne, then to Le Mans, and then north, toward Argentan.* That was
the breakout and, of course, by that time, General McLain was in command. We had confidence
in McLain. And, he visited the troops. We saw him often. He knew what troops could do, and he
told them that they were okay, but that the division's leadership had been bad. And, he was right!

Major General Eugene M. Landrum addressing the officers
of the 357th Infantry Regiment during a lull in the activity.

*For a thorough discussion of the breakthrough see Martin Blumenson, United States Army in World War II:
Breakout and Pursuit (Washington: USGPO, 1961).

40

So, what happened? We had some successes. Sure, they were easy successes, but everybody
needs success. Human beings, individually or collectively, need success. And, success feeds on
itself. It breeds confidence, and confidence breeds more success, until by the time we got to Le
Mans and turned and started up toward the Falaise Gap, toward Argentan and Alencon, we were
beginning to feel that we were soldiers. In Normandy the division lacked pride because it had had
no successes of which to be proud. Certainly my regiment didn't. The only thing we were proud of
was that we somehow had stuck it out. That's a negative thing, but, you know, we took a
perverse pride in the fact that we were still there. But, that's not enough. So, McLain loosened
things up and then circumstances provided victories; the victories provided confidence, and the
confidence made for a good division. I think that probably happened to dozens of divisions, but
we needed it more than most. [See Map 7, page 42]

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier that General Bradley's staff at one time had
recommended that he consider breaking up the division. Instead, he put McLain in. Supposedly,
there were 16 field grade officers relieved after McLain came in. However, Colonel Barth indicated
that to his knowledge, no regimental commanders were relieved, nor were any battalion
commanders in his regiment. In fact, he only knew of three battalion commanders being relieved
in the entire division. Were you aware of anything happening at that time?

GEN DEPUY: The only thing that happened in our regiment was that our regimental executive
officer was transferred. He was a very nice guy, but the rule that McLain had was, "No executive
officers who aren't fully capable of taking over." So, he made an assessment and got rid of those
who couldn't take over. And, you are right, by that time we had good men commanding the
battalions. Major Ed Hamilton, a real fighter, was commanding the 1st Battalion; Major Ward, a
cool, tough customer, led the 2nd Battalion; and John Mason, the best commander in the
regiment during the war, had the 3rd Battalion. And, our regimental commander was super. So,
you see, we had the makings of a good regiment even before McLain got there.

INTERVIEWER: By this time you were the regimental S-3. How did you do your job as the S-3
given these changes of battalion and regimental commanders? Were you required to stay in the
CP when the regimental commander was out?

GEN DEPUY: Well, it varied. I was brought up to the regiment about one day before Sheehy
came back. Then Barth came in. Now, he was an artilleryman. He had never commanded an
infantry regiment before, so he really wasn't sure of things. Buddy Ryder was the S-2. By the way,
he is still a major general I believe, over in Europe. Barth just told us, "I'm going to have to rely
very heavily on you on technical matters. I'll take care of the command, but you're going to have
to keep me straight." And, that was a wonderful thing. That made us feel good. He was a great
leader, and he understood people very well. But, from a technical and tactical standpoint, from
then on I did the planning, the drawing of objectives, determining boundaries, coordinating with
the artillery, and talking to battalion commanders to get their views before we put out orders. I
had, in other words, a very marvelous opportunity to be an operations officer for a man who
wasn't an operations officer.

41

Map 7 - Breakthrough, 25 -27 July 1944

42

INTERVIEWER: Were there things that the Germans did during these particular operations that
you haven't mentioned already that stuck with you? Are there some things they did that led you to
adopt some of your philosophies on defense?

GEN DEPUY: I was impressed with several things. First, I was impressed with the positions that
the German infantry soldiers constructed. I was impressed with the skill and the care that they
took in finding positions which had cover and natural concealment. They were almost impossible
to see and yet, they afforded fields of fires exactly where they needed them in order to stop us. In
other words, their fieldcraft was super, and you may remember that in the 1st Division, I spent a
lot of time on that. My favorite battalion in the 1st Division really was the 1st Battalion, 26th
Infantry, because they did more of that than anybody else. George Joulwan and Jim Madden
really put in imaginative positions wherever they went. That idea caught fire with the soldiers of
that battalion more than it did with the others. They were doing precisely what I think infantry
should do. I took that lesson with me to the 8th Infantry, the 30th Infantry, and the 1st Division, to
the dismay of some people, but, nonetheless, that was a pet pigeon of mine. And, that's where I
got it.

German individual firing positions

were well constructed and very

difficult to locate, even when

practically right on top of them.

Typical German machine gun position.

At the far right is the entrance

to a shelter with a heavy log roof

for protection against artillery fire.

The second thing that I learned was about the depth of German positions. We just had one line.
The Germans had a little zone defense so that they had elasticity and resilience. You could not
punch through it very easily. They didn't do things in a linear way. They took pieces of terrain and
knit them together into a position from which they were able to fire in all sorts of directions. They
used the terrain, they used cover and concealment, and they used imagination. In Normandy our
people always lined right up on one hedgerow and then down another hedgerow. You know, one
line. And, if you observe many units in the American Army today, you will find that that still is

43

exactly what we do. The linear mentality in the defense. Now, hopefully, we're getting better, but
it's a natural thing to do. It's the way a layman imagines a war — a line. So, I learned that from
the Germans.

I guess I was impressed with their use of just one, two or three mechanized vehicles like assault
guns or tanks. Only two or three times did I see them use a lot of tanks in what we would call a
tank attack. But, most of the time, when you ran into German positions, you would run into a
mixture of infantry and some kind of tracked fighting vehicles. Sometimes they were only little
vehicles with 20 millimeter cannons, often 20 millimeter antiaircraft guns. Whatever they could
find, a self-propelled 88mm, a self-propelled 76mm, or a self-propelled 57mm, they integrated into
their defenses. And, they moved them around a lot. They wouldn't just sit in one place. We'd hear
them moving; they'd be over here firing at us, and then, the next time, they would be over there
firing at us.

German 20mm antitank gun

German 75mm, high velocity,
self-propelled antitank gun

The fourth thing that I was absolutely convinced of was suppression. The Germans were
masters of suppression using machine pistols. They'd spray our front, drive our soldiers to the
ground, and then, they'd come in on us. And, the more they shot, the less our people shot, and
the more dangerous it got, until finally, when all of our people had stopped shooting, we knew
that the Germans were either going to overrun us, or capture some of our people, or kill our
people, by getting right on top of us and throwing hand grenades. So, I guess I came out of
Normandy having learned those four things.

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything in particular that you learned about our soldiers, other than
what you've already mentioned, in terms of what you could or could not expect of them?

44

GEN DEPUY: Well, I certainly came away with a feeling that only a small percentage of the
soldiers did almost all of the fighting.* If you just left them alone then some 10 percent of the
soldiers were the ones who actually took the initiative, moved, fired their rifles, threw hand
grenades, and so on. The other 90 percent would defend themselves if they had to, but would not
do the other things unless an officer or a sergeant directly ordered them to do it, in which case
they usually would do it. I learned that you couldn't depend on them doing things simply because
there was a plan to do it, or because of some generalized order to do it, and this included the junior
officers. You had to say, "do this," "do that," "now fire there," "now do this," and "now move
there." You would always end up with a good sergeant or a good officer and three or four men
doing all of the work. Unfortunately, the rest of them contributed to the casualties. And, to this
very day, I'd rather have a 40-man company than a 220-man company, if I could pick the 40 men.
I'd pick sergeants and officers and a few natural fighters if I could. So, what I'm saying is that I
came away absolutely impressed with the fact that the average man, like nine out of ten, or eight
out of ten, does not have an instinct for the battlefield, doesn't relish it, and will not act
independently except under direct orders. If they are in a crew they are better. If they are in a tank
or with a machine gun, they are better because there is teamwork involved. If an officer orders
them to do something eyeball-to-eyeball, most men, even the ones who don't want to do it, have
no initiative, and are scared to death, normally will do exactly what he tells them to do. Once,
during the Battle of the Bulge, we moved into an attack at night (early morning). We got behind
the Germans and prepared to jump off from the edge of some woods across an open, snowy field
to seize the little village of Berle, Luxembourg. I had "B" Company in the overwatch and "A"
Company doing the attack. Just before we were ready to go, a machine gun opened up on us
from the rear, back in the woods. You see, we had gone past the Germans. We had slipped
through them at night. And, some of them had turned around, came back, and spotted us milling
around in the woodline. So, they set up a machine gun and started firing at our backs. I didn't
want to stop the attack because I had the artillery just about ready to go. So, I grabbed the first
two soldiers I could find, I didn't know who they were, and I said, "You and you, I want you to go
back and knock out the machine gun right now, because we are going to attack that town. Now,
get going." And, they did! They were scared to death, but they did it. They would never have
done it if I hadn't said, "We have to do it, you have got to do it — now go do it!" This means that
effectiveness varies directly with leadership actively applied.

INTERVIEWER: During this time did you start to develop the ideas that later became the "eleven
men-one mind" or "follow me and do as I do" concept, or did that come later?

GEN DEPUY: "Eleven men-one mind" was the articulation of the overwatch concept. The idea
was to provide a conceptual framework for the operation of a squad. Of course the goal was to get
more soldiers involved in the fighting and to reduce the necessity of stopping to explain how the
two fire teams were to provide "fire and movement." That came after the war, but the impetus
came from the generally poor performance of wartime squads. Often a platoon leader would give

'See S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 36-43 and 50-63.

45

up on squads and run a whole platoon as one mob or as a bunch of individuals. Of course that was
an act of desperation.

Once the idea of operating two mutually supporting teams has taken hold then the question of
how to control a fire team arises. The answer is that the team leader leads. He is in front and his
team follows on each side in a "V" formation. That is where the "follow me and do as I do" came
from. By the way, Gideon said the same thing — "Observe me and do likewise."*

INTERVIEWER: That's what you were telling us in Vietnam during September of '66, when you
came around to each battalion and led a platoon with all of the officers following you. You moved
that platoon through the brush and showed us the cloverleaf, and how to maintain control
through the use of specific instructions.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, how to move a platoon in the jungle without getting zapped. But, it required
very specific instructions, right!

INTERVIEWER: When you broke out of Normandy there was an organization that became
known as Task Force Weaver, which included the 357th. Was there anything about that
organization that was particularly noteworthy? I know it made quite an advance all the way to the
Mayenne River.**

GEN DEPUY: Yes, to the Mayenne River and on to Le Mans. As I recall, Task Force Weaver
consisted of my regiment, the 357th, plus a tank battalion, the 712th, and in addition, to the direct
support artillery battalion, the 343rd Field Artillery Battalion (105mms), we had the 345th Field
Artillery Battalion (155mms) in general support. There were two elements — the 3rd Battalion
plus the tanks on a southern route, and the regiment ( — ) on the northern route. Brigadier General
Weaver was in command. This was the only time in World War II when we had close air support.
We had Air Force officers with radios at the head of each column. At Mayenne some engineers
did some very brave things and pulled the detonating cords off of the charges on the bridge. In the
meantime, we found some fishing boats, some little rafts, and logs, and crossed the river. That
was really about the second victory that the regiment had, and it made everyone feel good. There
wasn't much to it, frankly, but it made them feel good. Then we moved on toward Le Mans. Our
regiment plus the division tank battalion (Task Force Weaver), was the left element of XV Corps.
There were no friendly units on our left — just Germans. The regimental headquarters had one
exciting night when the 1st Battalion under Ed Hamilton, which was leading, went way on ahead.
The 3rd Battalion was on a parallel road, and we had the 2nd Battalion in the rear, and I mean
really in the rear, further in the rear than they should have been. The regimental headquarters,
consisting of about ten people along with Frank Norris who commanded the 155mm battalion,
Bob Salisbury, his S-3, the regimental antitank platoon, and about three jeeps, set up in a little
town known as Ste. Suzanne. We stopped there and were trying to communicate with the 3rd

fDePuy, William E. "Eleven Men-One Mind," Army, 8 (March 1958), 22-24, 54-60.

**For a discussion on the activities of Task Force Weaver see Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 434-437 and
497-498.

46

Battalion, which was down south moving towards Le Mans. The 1st Battalion was in a fight up
ahead of us, and the 2nd Battalion was nowhere to be seen when a German corps headquarters,
together with odds and ends, drove down from the north into the town. [See Maps 8A and 8B,
page 48]

The road from the north was a route that the Germans were trying to use to get out of the
Falaise Pocket. They didn't know that we had moved as far east as Ste. Suzanne. We positioned
the antitank platoon on that road and it shot all night long. Before the night was over, infantry,
tanks, and much more came down that road and surrounded little Ste. Suzanne. They put tanks
up on top of a hill that looked right down into the town square. By morning we had consolidated
our little band in one or two houses in Ste. Suzanne. To our chagrin and embarrassment, we had
to call the 1st Battalion back and send back to get the 2nd Battalion moved up. That was one of
the regimental experiences. Then, about 20 miles further, toward Le Mans, the 3rd Battalion was
pushing a German column ahead of it and approached a point where two roads merged. The 1st
Battalion was halfway past the fork when the Germans came up on them from the rear. The 2nd
Battalion then came along, so we had a big melee there. This happened to every unit going across
France. They all remember those engagements with relish because they were all easy victories and
made the troops feel competent and brave. But, each time they had one of those experiences they
gained a little more confidence, lost their awe of the Germans, and became better soldiers. Next,
we went to Le Mans, turned north and went up to Alencon, then on to Argentan, and attacked
into the southern flank of the Germans trying to get out of the Falaise Pocket.*

INTERVIEWER: Were you mounted then?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, we were mounted on trucks.

INTERVIEWER: How did you normally communicate with the battaiions, by radio?

GEN DEPUY: Radio and visits.

INTERVIEWER: Did the radios work pretty well with you mounted and moving?

GEN DEPUY: Frankly, the infantry radios weren't very good, but we could almost always
communicate through our artillery radios which were vehicular radios drawing power from the
vehicle — as are tank radios. The infantry radios were mostly battery powered.

INTERVIEWER: You moved on the southern flank of the Falaise Gap and were part of a major
victory, one which resulted in the destruction of German mechanized equipment such as tanks
and self-propelled gear. I'm curious as to how you achieved your tank kills?

GEN DEPUY: Most of the kills in the Falaise Pocket, including tanks, were caused by air and
artillery because the Germans were trying to get out and there were very few roads. Columns

Tor an overall view and discussion of this aspect of the campaign see Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 425-429.

47

THE FALAISE GAP

XXXXX XX ARMY BOUNDARY

1 nmiiiin FRONT LINE

'4 •■ MORTAIN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Map8A — The Falaise Gap

AR6ENTAN- FALAISE POCKET

12-16 Auguit 1944

Map8B — Argentan-Falaise Pocket, 12- 16 August 1944

48

would get caught on the road by artillery fire because, you see, for several days, we had been
sitting on the high ground looking down on the German columns. We weren't permitted to go into
the Pocket because of that boundary dispute between the British and the Americans. But, our
observers were on the high ground shooting into a bowl.

The final bottleneck in the Falaise Pocket was at a little town called Chambois. The 358th
Infantry finally put a battalion right in there and absolutely stopped the escape of the German
forces. Our tanks and tank destroyers knocked out some tanks at the head of the columns, but the
real slaughter, and it was an incredible inferno, was done by the artillery. Oh, and by the fighters. I
guess it's wrong to say that it was all done by the artillery. P-47s and the British rocket firing
Typhoons were also in there all of the time. In fact, they shot at us some too, but they were very
effective in destroying columns. [See Map 9, page 51]

There was a main east-west road that was blocked at Chambois. There were two or three
parallel columns all headed to the east, right on the road where they tried to pass one another.
Then, on each side of the road, in the fields, were clearly discernible additional columns, about ten
on each side of the road, so there were about 20 to 25 parallel columns as far as the eye could see.
By that I mean miles of destroyed vehicles, horses, tanks, and trucks. It was just an incredible
sight. And, indeed, if we fight again, and if the Seventh Army and V Corps can hold and prevent a
breakthrough, and the Russians get jammed up coming in, and if the Air Force can get at them,
there is no doubt in my mind that that's where the killing will occur. Killing comes from heavy
firepower.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that you thought our artillery was pretty good. It appears that
there was a lot more artillery at your beck and call than what we have today.

GEN DEPUY: That's right, the artillery was good. It was technically very sound; more so than the
Germans. It could mass more quickly and had better communications. I think the command and
control and the fire direction techniques of the American Army were superior to the German
Army. I think they are superior today, by the way. The Germans still make an artillery battalion
organic to a brigade. It's not a part of the Division Artillery. That's not a good system. Yes, we had
a lot of artillery. It was very good and we could always get lots of it. At the Saar and afterwards, it
was not unusual for me as a battalion commander to be supported by five or six battalions of
artillery anytime I really needed it. If I had a problem I could get it. Now, I didn't use it all the time,
but if I really had an emergency and I really wanted a lot of firepower, it was there. They could
mass it and I could get all of it through my direct support battalion.

INTERVIEWER: What day did you become a battalion commander?

GEN DEPUY: I can't remember what the date was. It was two days before we crossed the Saar,
so it must have been about 4 December 1944.

INTERVIEWER: Would you describe the circumstances surrounding your assumption of
command? Was there a wounded battalion commander?

49

Aerial view of the massive destruction at Falaise Gap.

German men, animals and vehicles were caught and
destroyed by American artillery within the Falaise Gap.

The rain of destruction left German vehicles in an unrecognizable mass.

50

CLOSING
THE ARGENTAN-FALAISE POCKET

17-19 Augutt 1944

Front line .evening 16 August

ooooooooo Positions reached (7 August

Positions reached IB August

tt Positions aeacheo r9 August

XXX TEMPORARY SOUNOARv

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Map 9 — Closing the Argentan-Falaise Pocket

51

GEN DEPUY: No. As we came up to the Moselle River north of Metz, Colonel Hamilton was
wounded and was replaced for a little while by a Lieutenant Colonel Strickler. Next, a lieutenant
colonel from the 101st Airborne Division took command and was in command during the crossing
of the Moselle at Koenigsmacker, and the fighting between the Moselle and the Saar. Just as the
regiment came up to the Saar, just south of Merzig and north of Dillingen, there was some
fighting to get to the bank of the river. There were a couple of big hills there. One had a huge cave
with a lot of refugees in it. The battalion commander found it difficult to lead his battalion during
that fighting. I remember that the regimental CP was in a little village about a mile and a half short
of the river, behind one of these big hills. He simply walked in one night and told the regimental
commander that he couldn't take it anymore. Then, as soon as he walked out, the colonel waved
his finger at me and said, "Go to the 1st Battalion," And, to this day, I don't know exactly what he
wanted me to do — whether he wanted me to go down and take command or just what he
wanted me to do. But, in any event, I went down and sent a message back that I had taken
command of the battalion. They already had orders to cross the river in a day and half or two days.
So, I had a day and a half to get ready to take the battalion across the river. And, it was a battalion
that was not full of confidence because the former battalion commander was the sort who said,
"Well, we have orders to take that hill. I know it will be tough so we'll try it first with "A"
Company. If they don't make it, we'll try "B" Company." Now, you know that no "A" Company
in the Army would ever take a hill that way. [See Map 10, page 53]

INTERVIEWER: So, this occurred after Colonel Barth had been wounded and Colonel "X" had
taken over. He was with the regiment from about the end of October through mid-February, then
he departed. What happened to him?

GEN DEPUY: Well, he was relieved and John Mason took over.

INTERVIEWER: So, you had some of your command under Colonel "X" and the rest of it under
Colonel Mason.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. The story of the 90th Division is a story of leadership — both good and bad.
During the whole time from June to the following May, we had five regimental commanders. By
the way, we had six division commanders during the same period. Of the regimental commanders,
two, Bittman Barth and John Mason, were superb — Barth an old regular and Mason a born
leader. Sheehy was killed after three days. We have already said enough about the first man who
led us into Normandy. Colonel "X" was a strange case. He seldom ventured outside the command
post. On operational matters he was simply not involved. He left that entirely up to me and I
always talked to the battalion commanders before orders were issued. Colonel "X" spent
considerable time standing before the map board coloring the forests green, the rivers blue, the
towns black, and the fields brown. The operations sergeant kept him supplied with crayons.
Eventually he was relieved. The regiment barely noticed his presence.

INTERVIEWER: When you arrived to take command of the 1st Battalion, what was your
impression of the company commanders? Were they competent?

52

Map 10 — 90th Division's advance to the Saar River

53

0

■#

GEN DEPUY: I knew them all. The company commanders were fine, but they had been spoiled
by a very weak battalion commander. One of them was a fellow named George Spaith who I took
all the way through the rest of the war. Another was a captain named Reckavik, who was killed. In
any event, "C" Company was Reckavik's and "A" Company was Spaith's. The "B" Company
commander's name was Horner. He later became my S-3. Well, the first thing I told them was that
they were great guys but that times were going to change and that they were going to do exactly
what they were told to do, and that we were going to start functioning as a battalion. I said, "You
know, I've been aware of what has been going on in this battalion and you know as well as I do,
that that's not going to work. You know that everybody is going to get killed if we pussyfoot
around like that. So, now we are going to go ahead and get to work."

Well, we did! Now, it turned out that the Saar operation was a very tough operation — one of
the toughest of all. But, they all did what they were told to do, and as a battalion, we did what we
were told to do. In fact, we were the only battalion in the regiment that did exactly what it was told
to do at the time of the crossing. I had the left flank battalion in the division with nothing on my
left. You see, the 90th and the 95th were side by side when we went across. There was nothing on
the left flank of the 90th. We were going to make a corps bridgehead, XX Corps I think it was —
Sam Walker's daddy commanded it — and then, we were going to break out and go to Mainz.
They were going to shoot an armored division through us. The Siegfried Line ran along the river
with some of the pillboxes right at the water's edge. And, halfway across the flood plain was a
railroad track up on an embankment; under that embankment there were more pillboxes. Then the
flood plain extended further to the woodline and hills beyond. I guess from the river to the hills it
was a half mile, a quarter of a mile to the railway embankment, and a quarter of a mile to the road
at the foot of the wooded hills. At the road there was another line of pillboxes and back up in the
woods there were still more pillboxes and concrete shelters. * [See Map 1 1 , page 55]

So, there were three lines of pillboxes, plus some scattered ones up in the woods. Up on top of
the hill, on the left flank, there was a highway intersection, not really a major one but an important
one for that area. Well, anyway, my job was to cross the river, get on that hill and block that major
road junction on the left flank of the division's bridgehead.

My concept of crossing that river is one that reflects my view to this day on how to do things. I
felt that if we stopped to fight at the river, or at the railroad track, or at the road, then we would
never get to where we were going. So, I felt that the only way we could ever get through that
maze of pillboxes and up on top of that hill was to totally decentralize things down to individual
squads. So, in the day and a half that I had, I personally talked to every company commander and
then I had the company commanders bring in every platoon leader and squad leader and I gave
them all the same orders — "Get in the boats and cross the river. If you are shot at from the
pillbox, go to one side or the other of it. Don't stop and don't go back. Go to the right or go to the
left, but go inland and cross the railroad track. Don't stop to fight anybody. When you get to the
road, turn right and move south until you come to the end of the woodline. When you get to the
end of the woodline wait until at least a platoon is there and then go up the hill to the road junction
and wait. Get yourself set up for defense and wait until we all get there. Then we'll organize. If you

*For an overview of the operation and photographic details concerning the German defenses, see Hugh M. Cole,
United States Army in World War II: The Lorraine Campaign (Washington: USGPO, 1950, 558-592.

54

DILLINGEN-PACHTEN BRIDGEHEAD

6-19 December 1944

* Crossing area
•" Advance, 6 December

minium Forward positions, evening 19 Dec
German defenses. from captured map:
m Pillbox """"" Wire

iooo

Map 1 1 — The 357th Infantry Regiment's attack across the Saar

55

are the only one who gets there, the mission is to block that road. If we all get there, we'll all block
that road. If only one company gets there, fine. But, block that road junction!"

Well, we all got there. I think we might have lost two men out of 500. The crossing really was
hairy because I initially made a horrible mistake. In the little town of Rehlingen, which was right on
the near riverbank, I infiltrated in a platoon of quad 50s mounted on the back of half-tracks. I
wanted them there just in case we got stopped in the middle of the river by pillbox fire and weren't
able to get across. Well, my mistake was that I gave the antiaircraft lieutenant in command of that

OBSERVATION TYPE
PlLLrBOX

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scAir i -«o

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Diagram of a typical German
observation type pillbox.

platoon, responsibility for deciding when to open fire. I actually thought I had given that
responsibility to the commander of the tanks; I also had a tank platoon and a tank destroyer
platoon in there, and some .50 caliber machine guns from the battalion trains. In other words, I
had that town loaded with firepower, but what I didn't have, was clear responsibility as to whom
would decide when to use it. You see my orders were, "Don't open fire unless we're getting heavy
fire from the pillboxes on the river." Well, it turned out that heavy fire to me and heavy fire to that
lieutenant from the antiaircraft platoon, who never had been on the front-line in his life, was quite
different.

56

What happened is that we had the boats lined up about 100 yards from the river. The engineers
had put them there and we had engineer tape leading from the assembly areas to the boats. After
they picked up a boat, each squad was to go straight to the river, get in, and go and do all of those
good things that I talked about. Well, just about the time the first two companies got to the boats
and were picking them up, about two machine pistols fired from the other side of the river and the
whole goddamned town of Rehlingen lit up. All the .50 calibers, all the tanks and all the tank
destroyers were firing tracers. It lit up the whole Saar River Valley and it woke up every defender
for 25 miles. So, it really was a very inauspicious initiation as a battalion commander. Once we got
them shut down and the enemy fire died down a little bit, my S-3, a guy named McAlister, and I,
walked along and went to every boat and every squad. A few of them we had to put into the boats
at pistol point. I suppose that is not an approved leadership technique.

INTERVIEWER: What time of the day was this?

GEN DEPUY: Two o'clock in the morning. It was dark and raining; just awful weather. You
know, typical German November and December weather. Just as ugly as you can imagine. But,
when all was said and done, they all got there. Everybody got there. They had gone around, over,
and between pillboxes. I went to the rendezvous place and there were, oh, maybe 50 or 60 guys
milling around. I found out who they were and said, "Let's go." Now, by the time I got up to the
road junction, half of the battalion already was there, and within another hour the whole bloody
works was there.

I had every man carry a mine, an antitank mine. We had about 300 antitank mines, and they
saved us. We made a big circle around the road junction, and sort of tried to fit the terrain as best
we could in the dark, especially on the two roads that came from the enemy's direction. We put
minefields across the roads from tree line to tree line and then, even amongst the trees. We also
left some mines exposed as a deterrent. There were five or ten occasions when the Germans tried
to come down those roads with armored vehicles of all different kinds, but they never went past
the minefield.

We were surrounded. (The map on page 55 is misleading.) The 2nd Battalion didn't come up on
our right until later because they became involved in a fight amongst the pillboxes. Soon, the
troopers began complaining that they couldn't feel their toes anymore. We had a lot of cold
weather injuries. The foxholes were filled with water. It rained incessantly and we had four or five
sharp engagements every day when the Germans tried to pry us off that road junction. This kept
the soldiers in their water-filled holes. We'd take the soldiers out occasionally, and try to rotate
them through a couple of German storage bunkers that were inside our perimeter. We put all the
wounded in the biggest bunker. We had our doc with us, Dr. DeLeo. In those days you always
took your doc with you. He ran this little aid station right in the middle of the perimeter and it
finally got loaded with wounded, people with immersion foot, and other people who were sick.
We had several pneumonia cases.

The fighting there was interesting. Several times the Germans managed to get a few troops
inside our perimeter but we were able to take care of that. Once, two German machine gunners
slipped through and set up about 10 yards from the battalion command post, which was a four-
man bunker. No armored vehicles penetrated. We were able to strip away their infantry and they
stopped at the mines. We used a lot of artillery. We could get three or four battalions of artillery

57

through our direct support battalion. The Air Corps' XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), dropped
us some ammo and medical supplies in wing tanks. One pilot couldn't get his tank to drop so
when he came in for the third time he brushed it off on a tall pine tree. He flew a P-47 out of Etain,
and we sent him a silver star.

Finally, we were given orders to come back across the river. We didn't know it but the Battle of
the Bulge had started. Our attack never went further east than that. I could have gone forward,
but the rest of the attack got all tangled up in the pillboxes behind us and then the river flooded;
the Germans had the high ground to the north, and the engineers could never keep a bridge in.
Anyway, I finally got orders to pull back. I got those orders about five o'clock in the afternoon
stating that I was to pull back that night — I was to pull back to the town of Dillingen, get on the
ferries, cross the Saar, and then be refitted and reconstituted. Well, that was quite a challenge. I
had a whole bloody pillbox full of wounded people and guys who couldn't walk, and I had another
bunker with, oh, maybe 10 or 15 dead in it.

Anyway, I decided that I would use the same technique to get out of there that I had used to get
in. We started pulling out at midnight; it was as black as the inside of a goat. It was raining which
was good. So, the orders were that each squad was to come to the aid station and pick up one
wounded or sick man and take him with them. Their orders were, "Go downhill toward the river.
When you get to the road, then turn left, but don't cross it, and stay in the ditches. Don't fight
anybody. If they shoot at you, go around them. Don't stop and fight. Go to the road, turn left and
keep going. No matter what happens, keep going until you see a lot of houses, then go right in
amongst them and stop. Where the road goes into the town, stop. We'll all get together there and
figure out how to get down to the ferry." And, by golly, we did it. We got every wounded man
and every man with trench foot out. Never lost a single soul and didn't have a single casualty.
There was shooting all over the place and it was as scarey as the devil, but it was so dark that
nobody could see enough to engage. It was 2000 meters back to where the buildings were. And,
all these fellows, this gaggle of soldiers, went down in the dark and did exactly what they were
told to do. And, they all got back again. It was a central idea and totally decentralized execution.
So, I felt I learned another principle which is — be very specific as to what you want them to do
and if you are, they'll do it. Keep it simple!

INTERVIEWER: So, each squad was briefed in the battalion headquarters?

GEN DEPUY: No, at the company. I might just give you one other example of this kind of thing.
The town of Maizieres-les-Metz, six miles north of Metz, was a place where we fought a lot.*
General Patton got so fed up with reading about it in the Stars and Stripes that he ordered us to
take it once and for all. He just didn't want to read about it anymore. So, we put two battalions in
there, the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Colonel Mason, assigned a house to each squad — he
actually assigned a squad to each house. He gave them a full day to figure out how they were
going to get to their assigned house and what they were going to do once they got there. Well,
some of them had it all figured out — "Well, Mullen is going to throw a hand grenade in that
window, then Brownlee is going to jump in that window." That was okay; that was good. But,
some of the squads hadn't figured out who was going to do what. The companies made them

Tor the 90th Division Headquarters' perspective, see Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, 276-280.

58

plan it all out and build a little sand table or mockup and tell them, "Who goes first, who runs
where, who shoots, and who throws?" Well, this attack jumped off at three o'clock in the
morning. In five to ten minutes the battle was over. In five minutes the whole thing was finished.
We had, oh, I don't know, 200 prisoners — a small battalion. We lost maybe, two or three men.
[See Map 12 below and Maps 13 and 14, page 60]

INTERVIEWER: The unit history states that that attack was made by the 2nd Battalion, 357th.

XX CORPS

SITUATION, NOON 6 SEPTEMBER I944

Map 12 — The 357th Infantry Regiment poised for its advance on Maizieres-les-Metz

59

Map 13 — 90th Division's advance to the Moselle River

THIRD ARMY FRONT

Evening, 25 September I944

Map 14 —

Third Army's Front

on the evening of

25 September 1944

60

GEN DEPUY: The attack was made by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. I was the regimental S-3 at
the time. That's when Colonel Barth was wounded. In fact, just before the attack Barth was hit by
a mortar fragment while standing under a concrete ramp which ran up to the Bessemer converter
of the Herman Goering Reichwerk. [See Photo Map 15, page 62]

INTERVIEWER: When I read the history, I made a note which states: "2-357 fight for town of
Maizieres-les-Metz included new tactics, limited objectives, calculated, each officer and each
enlisted man knew his job and his objectives, four groups of ten each went after the City Hall."
Then I've got, "above smacks of General DePuy on control and specific guidance."

GEN DEPUY: We had the two battalions. We had the 2nd that attacked from the north against
the city hall and business district, and the 3rd which attacked from Herman Goering Reichwerk on
the west, into the southern two-thirds of the town. And, it was marvelous. We had fought in there
for weeks and had all sorts of casualties trying to get that damn city hall, or school building, or
whatever it was. And, we just fiddled and fiddled and took casualties. John Mason, the 3rd
Battalion commander, later the regimental commander, was the genius who figured it all out. He
was going to grab that thing the way it ought to be grabbed, and it was a howling success. But, it
was the instructions at the squad level that made the difference. It was totally decentralized in
execution and totally centralized in planning. Now, there has got to be a lesson in that
somewhere, right?

By the evening of 30 October 1944, the 357th Infantry
Regiment controlled what was left of Maizieres-les-Metz.

61

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INTERVIEWER: Right. Now, with regard to combat service support, is there anything exciting or
significant about what occurred to keep you going?

GEN DEPUY: No, I don't think so. The war was so linear in nature that we didn't have any
serious problems. I am sure that the maintenance and supply people did a good job but we didn't
see much of it. We had all we needed.

INTERVIEWER: In September, when the Third Army really ran out of supplies, where was the
90th located?

GEN DEPUY: Well, when the Third Army really ran out, we were at Metz.

INTERVIEWER: How did that happen? Did the S-4 just come in one day and say that there was
no more gas?

GEN DEPUY: Well, what really happened was that the 7th Armored Division had gotten out in
front and actually had gotten into Metz just at the time when we ran out of gas. They couldn't get
enough strength into Metz to hold it. So, 7th Division came back out, and we, the 90th and the
5th, slid up to the river. There wasn't enough POL for the tanks to go any further. There hardly
was enough to move the artillery pieces. So, the Third Army simply had to stop for awhile and let
things catch up. The supplies were coming all the way from Normandy. Ammunition and gasoline
were being flown into Etain, between Verdun and Metz, by C-47 troop-carrier aircraft. So, we
bellied up to the Moselle and stopped. Now, there were still infantry actions on the front, but the
Army as a whole, was no longer attempting a big offensive. When it did try, it had two big
offensives, one that Abe Abrams and the 4th Armored Division were in down south, east of
Nancy, and the one where we went across the Moselle at Koenigsmacker, and then went on to
the Saar.* We went north and the 5th went south, and we met behind Metz. The 95th came in
and took over at Metz proper. That was in November, but we first came up to the Moselle in early
September. [See Maps 16 and 17, pages 64 and 65]

INTERVIEWER: As the Third Army rolled across France, the Germans seemed to be able to
stymie the advance of the division in this sector from time to time. From reading the division's
history, it looks like it was the sort of thing that you were talking about earlier, where they almost
seemed to be fighting by using what you later called the active defense. They had all these little
positions and they'd move from position to position launching brief counterattacks, and that kind
of thing. Is that a correct description of what the Germans were doing?

GEN DEPUY: Well, across France we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent
insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well.
So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple tanks here, and an assault

*At this time, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton William Abrams, Jr., commanded the 37th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored
Division. General Abrams, a celebrated World War II Armor officer, later served as the Commander, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (1968-72), and as Chief of Staff of the Army (1972-74).

63

Map 16 — 90th Division crosses the Moselle River

64

Map 17 - The Battle of Metz

65

gun or two there. But, whatever it was that they used, it meant that we would have a little fight.
Normally we could either overrun it or outflank it. It just took a little bit of time, but there was very
little serious fighting. We didn't have a serious fight until we turned north and got up to Argentan.
There was a serious fight there between Alencon and Argentan. The 2nd French Armored Division
was involved in that. And then, we had another big fight in the town of Le Bourg-St. Leonard
with, I think it was the 2nd Panzer Division that was coming out. But, there were some fair, small
fights right up there on the southern flank of the pocket, mostly with German units that were
trying to move to the west. But, there weren't any large battles. You know, there weren't any real
linear, coherent battles across France. There was always an open flank so you could always just
move around whatever you ran into.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that the Germans were pretty good at using all of their vehicles
but that they really didn't employ big tank assaults like we might visualize. Was there anything you
learned during this period that you could apply today in fighting armor, things that would be
meaningful?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I think the first thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a
handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by sighting their weapons properly. If they had two
assault guns and 25 men, they put one assault gun on one side of the road, perhaps on the reverse
slope firing through a saddle, and put another one behind a stone house, firing across the road.
They protected them with some infantry and had a couple of guys with Panzerfausts up on the
road itself, or just off the road in pits or behind houses. Now, here comes the point of an American
unit roaring down the road, a couple of jeeps or maybe a tank, and bang, you lost a tank or two.
The company commander then decides to maneuver a platoon around and boom, he loses
another tank. So, the commander decides to wait for the battalion commander to come up. And,
the battalion commander, if he is very imaginative, might say, "All right, while I'm trying to solve
this thing, "C" Company go wide around to the right and come up behind this town." Those were
the tactics which kept the thing moving. But, sometimes a unit would stay there and fight all day
against 25 men and two assault guns. And, that happened all too often.

Commanders would too often attack the enemy head-on, whereas if they could just screen that
position, just block it with something and find another way around, then they could keep going.
Eventually, that is what almost always happened. They found their way around. Some units
would find their way around in a matter of minutes and hours; other units couldn't find their way
around except after having lost a whole day fiddling with one of these little things. Now, what one
learned from fighting a lot of these things, is an understanding of tactics. The big lesson is not to
take him head-on. Anything is better than that. And, you get an understanding of sighting
weapons. The Germans were just superior at that. And, to this day, they are very good at it.

INTERVIEWER: About the middle of October, General Van Fleet came in and took over
command of the division from General McLain. I assume that there was no change in the quality
of leadership in the division, but I'm sure that there was a personality change.

66

The German 88mm tank destroyer

known as the Rhinoceros, was
able to engage tanks at long ranges.

Panzerfaust 60 — one of four
different models of a highly
effective German recoilless
antitank grenade launcher.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. By that time the division was quite confident, and General Van Fleet was a
very seasoned soldier. We hated to see McLain go but Van Fleet was recognized as a fine fellow,
and he was. Van Fleet got around and talked to people; he wasn't a command post general. He
was not as articulate as McLain. He was a massive man; and, he knew what he was doing. There
wasn't a ripple when he came in. He didn't change anything. He expected success and he got it!*

*Major General Raymond Stallings McLain, later promoted to lieutenant general, was originally an Oklahoma
National Guard officer. He first saw action in World War I as a machine gun officer in the Champagne and Meuse-
Argonne offensives. General McLain left the 90th Division and assumed command of XIX corps. Following World
War II, General McLain, National Guard, was commissioned as a brigadier general, Regular Army, by Presidental
appointment, the first National Guard officer to be so honored. General James Alvard Van Fleet later served as
Commander, III Corps (1945), and as Commander, Eighth Army, Korea (1951-53). Since his retirement in 1953,
General Van Fleet occasionally has been recalled to active duty to serve as a special advisor to the President or to the
Department of Defense.

67

CHAPTER III
Across the Moselle And Into Germany

INTERVIEWER: So, the division crossed the Moselle and the Saar Rivers, and then had to pull
back in order to participate in the Battle of the Bulge?

GEN DEPUY: That's right. We went to Metz, and then went up and crossed the Moselle north of
Thionville, or Diedenhofen as the Germans called it. Then we crossed the Saar and conducted
that operation which I talked about earlier. Next, because of the Battle of the Bulge, we pulled
back just before Christmas. It took several days to pull ourselves together, get some replacements
and conduct some training, and then we took off and headed north, toward the Bulge. *[See
Maps 18 and 19, page 69 and 70]

INTERVIEWER: Did you actually go into Bastogne?

GEN DEPUY: No, we didn't go into Bastogne, we went just between Bastogne and Wiltz, in
order to cut the highway between Bastogne and St. Vith, up near the little town of Trois Vierges,
or the Three Virgins. As a matter of fact, General Patton gave General Van Fleet a very unusual
option. He said, "Here is the southern edge of the Bulge. The 4th Armored has just gotten into
Bastogne and here are the divisions on-line." The 26th was in one place, the 4th was way over
there, and the 80th was somewhere along there. He said, "You pick the area that you want to
attack in. There was a ridge that ran north just to the west of Wiltz, which incidentally had been
the location of the 28th Division headquarters in the early fighting. And so, we came up from the
south, and attacked with two regiments abreast, the 359th on the right and the 357th on the left,
through the 26th Division. Our objective was to destroy German forces in the salient which
protruded south and east between Bastogne and Wiltz. Our attack began about four o'clock in the
morning. It was mid-winter in that part of Europe, so the days were very short.

Anyway, I attacked in the dark and got through. I had a theory which, I think, worked every
time. The Germans always defended on the tops of the hills and in the valleys. If you went to the
top of the hill, you would find a German position; if you went to the bottom, you would find a
German position. But, there was never a defensive position on the hillsides. Every time we made
an attack in that area of high forested hills, the whole battalion would go single file. We'd go
around the side of the hill and right through the German positions and get behind them. We never
had to fire a shot. The Germans would be down on the bottom, or up on the top, so they couldn't
see us. There was snow and it was quiet. We'd go right through. We did that three times in that
particular fight. So, we didn't have to fight to penetrate. It was something we learned in
Normandy — don't fight them head-on; find out where they are and go someplace else. Of
course, it was even easier at night.

*For a discussion on the Battle of the Bulge, see Hugh M. Cole, United States Army in World War II: The Ardennes:
Battle of the Bulge (Washington: USGPO, 1965), and Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story
of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985).

68

THIRD ARMY

LAST PHASE OF LORRAINE OFFENSIVE

3-19 December 1944

_ _ _ Front line, evening 2 December
___ Front line, evening 19 December
"i/ / /,/ / Maginot line
SXQOVX WEST WALL
O 6

Map 18 — 90th Division prepares to crack the "West Wall"

69

WESTERN FRONT
20 December 1944

' Allied front line, 1200, 20 Dec
•Axis of German counteroffensive
:west Wall
German front line, 5 September

<o «o

MILES

Map 19 — The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes

70

INTERVIEWER: That reminds me of something else. It may or may not be directly related but it
pertains to being located on the forward slope. They obviously were not. As you said, they were
either on the top or down at the base, and yet, when I entered the Army, we were being taught to
defend on what was called the military crest of the hill, which is, in fact, the forward slope. Maybe
that was a result of the Korean War.

GEN DEPUY: That was the Korean syndrome.

INTERVIEWER: And, I think it still affects us today.

GEN DEPUY: And badly, particularly if you are putting infantry there; they can only get killed.

INTERVIEWER: Right. I think you once mentioned that an incident like that happened in Europe.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. After the Bulge had collapsed and we started back to the east, we crossed a
series of rivers. When we got up between the Prum and the Kyll Rivers, we encountered a very
high open ridge. One of my company commanders put his "C" Company out in the snow on a
bare forward slope. They dug in and everyplace they dug they made dark doughnuts in the snow.
On the other side of the river there was another ridge. On top of that ridge were some German
assault guns, and they waited until the company commander had all of his troopers scattered
around in their foxholes on the forward slope, and then, they just started firing with their two
assault guns. It was murder. Finally, after they killed and wounded maybe 20 men in that
company, the rest of them just got up and bolted out of there and went over to the reverse slope,
which is where they belonged in the first place. So, being on a forward slope when the enemy has
direct fire weapons, high velocity direct fire weapons, is suicide. And, every time I went to
Germany, I tried to convince Blanchard and the 1st Armored Division, the 3rd Armored Division,
and the 3rd Division, at Hohenfels, of that. But, time after time, I'd find them all lined up in
exposed, uncamouflaged, half-finished positions right within the sights of a Russian T-62 tank. It's
suicide unless they have frontal cover and are camouflaged. A trench is better. You see, a trench
is a superior solution to that. And, a lot of people, the North Koreans, the South Koreans, the
North Vietnamese, the Russians, and some Germans, use trenches. The Arabs, the Egyptians, the
Syrians and the Israelis, sometimes use trenches. Why? Because you don't know where they are
when they're in the trenches. When you are trying to shoot at people in a trench line, you have to
ask yourself, "What part of a trench line do I shoot at?" You can waste a lot of ammunition trying
to suppress a trench. But, trying to suppress clearly visible American foxholes or bunkers with
high velocity weapons is a Cakewalk. It's suicide to go into battle like that. But, our Army as a
whole, doesn't know that.

INTERVIEWER: I'm afraid that we still are doing what people like myself were taught right after
the Korean War. Apparently that's how it was done on the hills of Korea. That's how people dug
in and fought.

71

GEN DEPUY: They were mostly dug in against mass Chinese infantry assaults. There weren't
any large direct fire weapons, or only a very few. They weren't using tanks to snipe. So, you could
say that that approach was partially justified, but, even then, they should have had frontal cover
and have been totally invisible from the front. They should have been firing at angles, covered
from the front, and totally camouflaged. If they had done all of that, then it would have been all
right.

INTERVIEWER: But, in fact, they were in bunkers, which I imagine were very obvious.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. They were little forts like the Special Forces forts in Vietnam. Or, like the
positions I didn't like in Europe. People always were trying to build a fort. But, they would only get
it half done, and a half finished fort is an easy target for a tank gun. So, that's not very good.

INTERVIEWER: Please compare for us the Saar River crossing with your first crossing of the
Moselle conducted in mid-November shortly after General Van Fleet assumed command of the
division. I believe you were confronted not only by the enemy, but also by the elements.*

GEN DEPUY: Yes. The XX Corps wisely decided to forgo a direct assault into the fortifications of
Metz and instead envelop from both north and south. The 5th Division crossed south and the 90th
north of Metz with the object of meeting about 10 miles or more east of Metz while the 95th
Division held the sector around the fortifications themselves.

The 90th Division crossed north of Thionville near Cattenom, with the 358th Regiment on the
right and the 359th on the left. The 357th then came across the center at the village of
Koenigsmacker, which was located just where the Maginot line crossed the Moselle from the
northwest to southeast. Thus, the 90th had a single division bridgehead.

Unfortunately, the river was at flood stage. Worse yet, the flooding grew progressively worse as
time went on. At the time of the assault crossing, the river was flowing at seven to ten miles an
hour but was generally within its banks. Two days later it was over one half mile wide and a raging
torrent.

The plan, as usual, was to put in a bridge and bring over the armor. But the engineers were
unable to keep a bridge in place and the approaches were so far under water that 2Vz ton trucks
flooded out. Jeeps were submerged.

To make the whole thing even more interesting General Hermann Balck, the German Army
Group commander, seeing our difficulties, sent a heavy tank battalion, the 555th I recall,
consisting of King Tiger tanks, against the bridgehead through the 359th Infantry. As part of a
Kampfgruppe, the Germans penetrated to the river in the center of the sector and shot up the
engineer ferries and partial bridge segments. Through substantial heroics the 359th finally ejected
the Kampfgruppe.

The 358th finally captured Fort Koenigsmacker which loomed over the bridgehead. A second
armored thrust against the bridgehead was also defeated at Distroff by a spirited counterattack by

*For a thorough discussion of this river crossing see Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 380-416.

72

the 358th Infantry. The 357th fought its way down the ridge in the center which was heavily
combed with the Maginot forts and tunnels and infested with Germans.

All three regiments and the engineers were hard pressed in this operation. But each crisis was
met. Somebody or some group rose to the occasion. The division had matured. It was no longer
awed by the Germans.

General Patton called this operation one of the epic river crossings of all time. Ever afterwards
the 90th was one of his favorite divisions.

Just three months earlier the 90th was a candidate for inactivation and disgrace. Under the
leadership of McLain and Van Fleet it had found its company and battalion commanders from its
own ranks. It had learned how to fight through on-the-job training. That process was long and
bloody, but in the last analysis, it was a tribute to the American spirit. It was not a triumph of the
"system".

In any event, the 90th meet the 5th behind Metz and together, we proceeded east to the Saar
and another adventure.

«*e^e

Company L, 357th Infantry Regiment, shown
in assault boats crossing the Moselle River.

73

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The flooded Moselle River presented many difficulties
for the 90th Division during its crossing operations.

74

INTERVIEWER: Now, the Germans didn't have very many Tigers, but I guess what they did have
they used well. Could an infantryman knock out a Tiger, or did it take a tank or a tank destroyer to
do that?

GEN DEPUY: The 2.36-inch Bazooka could defeat a King Tiger only by a shot into the engine
compartment from the rear, which was a difficult thing to do. The 75mm tank gun and 3-inch gun
on the tank destroyers could not penetrate the turret or the front of the King Tiger. At short ranges
they could penetrate the side armor.

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The 2.36-inch Antitank Rocket Launcher or "Bazooka"

INTERVIEWER: Another problem that you faced during this particular time of the year was
inadequate clothing. Could you comment on that?

GEN DEPUY: Well, the main thing that we really missed were the shoe packs. I received several
hundred replacements in my battalion just after the Saar River operation, but before we went up
to the Bulge. I think they were all from the 65th Infantry Division, which was located somewhere
down in the Vosges Mountains. They were all equipped with shoe packs. But, none of our people
were, and we had been in that water over across the Saar. We had disastrous losses due to what
we called trench foot; later, they called it immersion foot. We got some of those men back, but
not many. A lot of them lost toes and others probably had trouble for the rest of their lives. By the
time I brought our "B" Company back across the Saar and put it into a rest camp, I think there
were only about ten men left in it. All of the rest were either wounded or killed, or had immersion
foot. That's why I got hundreds of replacements in one day. We had good raincoats. In fact, I had
one of those raincoats until very recently — a marvelous, rubberized coat that was kind of a grey-
brown. We wore those over a lot of clothes, over a lot of field jackets, and so on. During
November and December that was the typical garb of fighting infantrymen.

75

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier about moving the battalion along that hillside. How did
you normally move a battalion? Would you normally be leading it like you did on that occasion?

GEN DEPUY: In that particular case I simply put them in a column of companies, a column of
platoons, and a column of squads, in a long line, and told them what to do in case we got all
scrambled up. The rendezvous was always the objective. The rendezvous shouldn't be back
where you started. That way, if something goes all flooey, then everybody proceeds to the
objective independently; but, if it doesn't all go flooey, then the best way to go is to move a
battalion single file. The company commander of the first company and the platoon leader of the
lead platoon would be with me, plus the scouts.

INTERVIEWER: Did you move primarily at night?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, and that's one of the reasons. You see, that way, if we got lost, we were all
lost together.

INTERVIEWER: And, you didn't have people stumbling around trying to find each other.

GEN DEPUY: Right. We didn't have any, "Where's 'A' Company," or "Where's 'B' Company?"
On one occasion, while going through the Siegfried Line at the end of the Bulge, the line broke. I
got up on the objective with only one and a half companies. I was standing there watching the
guys come by in the middle of the night; it was kind of a bright night with a lot of snow around, so
I could see pretty well. All of a sudden, there wasn't anybody else going by. There was just the
first platoon of "B" Company, and that was it. The rest of the battalion was back about two miles
at the very point where we had started. So, I left the S-3 up there on the objective, and went back
with my radio operator and my little man, "Friday," and found them. They had turned back and
were right back where we had started. A lieutenant had broken the line, turned around, and went
back. Then, he got scared and disappeared into the aid stations; we never caught that son-of-a-
bitch. So, I grabbed part of that bunch and started for the objective again; but, by this time, it was
getting light. Anyway, we started out and it got very light and we came under fire. I realized then
that we were never going to make it to the objective in the daylight. At night we had just gone
right across the open fields. So, there I was, I had a company and a half on the objective, and
myself and a company and a half back at the starting point. Well, the next night we all got back
together.

Still, the column is a good night control measure. I never have agreed with the doctrine for night
attacks that calls for all of those release points and getting on line and attacking. I feel you have to
do one of two things in a night attack. You either infiltrate to the objective, and for that you have
to have control, and single file provides the best control that you can get. Everybody holds on to
the guy in front. And, you go in the darkest, worst part of the place, and get there by sneaking.
Or, you do what we did in the middle of the night at Maizieres-les-Metz, where every squad knew
what the objective was. So, you have the two extremes. One is when you don't want to fight at
all, you are just trying to gain a piece of high ground. Then the enemy has a problem because you

76

Typical view of the Dragon's Teeth positioned along the Siegfried Line.

have gotten behind him. Or, if you have to fight, then you have to have centralized planning and
decentralized execution. And, every squad leader must look in daylight at what he is going to
traverse and seize at night. That means that you are never going to go more than a couple of
hundred yards, maybe 1,000 yards at most. So, again, a set piece night attack should be of short
range; if you try to do it the way the manual used to prescribe, it's hopeless.

INTERVIEWER: But, there still are people who remember that kind of stuff.

GEN DEPUY: I know, but I think it's all out of the manual, now. I think the manual now says
what I just said — at least, I hope it does.*

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned all of the replacements that you received just before you moved
north to participate in the Battle of the Bulge. Was there time to give them any kind of training or
orientation once you received them?

*To analyze how conducting night operations has changed over time, compare Field Service Regulations 100-5,
Operations (Washington: USGPO, 1944), 241-246, with Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: USGPO, 1982),
9-15 - 9-16. See Field Manual 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington: USGPO, 1944), 135-150, and Field Manual 7-20,
The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault), (Washington: USGPO, 1984), 4-42 - 4-48. See also,
Field Manual 7-10, Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment (Washington: USGPO, 1944), 62-74, and Field Manual 7-10,
The Infantry Rifle Company (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), (Washington: USGPO, 1982), 3-33 - 3-44.

77

GEN DEPUY: I took the period around Christmas, and put them all in a defensive position up on
the Maginot switch position that I talked about earlier, so that they could get to know one
another. Then, we took every company through an attack sequence. By that time, we had learned
one great lesson — you either infiltrate or you bypass. The best way to bypass is a wide swing.
But, if that is impossible, then you place a high volume of direct fire on him and envelop the
position. That is, you go around him. Penetrate by infiltration and bypass. That is what the
Germans learned in World War I. In the west we called it von Hutier tactics.*

INTERVIEWER: Remember the regimental treatment rule in Vietnam — if it sounded big, you
treated it as big? Later, after you left, we received instructions that if we ran into something, even
if it was just a little something — one or two guys shooting rifles — we were to stop, pull back,
bring in the air and artillery, and then, move forward. It was very frustrating because we could not
develop any momentum even when we felt that we could easily handle the situation. The guy on
the ground sort of knows best whether or not he can handle the situation.

GEN DEPUY: Here are some of the rules that we had — if you heard a machine gun, it was a
company; if there was also mortar fire, then it was a battalion; if it was just a few riflemen, then it
could be a platoon or less. If you encountered machine gun and mortar fire, then you ought to go
at it the right way. Don't piecemeal your platoons or you will lose each platoon one at a time.
Under those circumstances, the platoons ought only to probe the area to find out where the
enemy is.

INTERVIEWER: Well, that was a very sensible rule based on sound principles and thinking the
thing through; but, later on, people forgot the key part. They just went with rules such as, "When
you hit something, we'll overcome it with fire." As a result, maneuver became very, very slow.
People forgot what you were trying to do, which was not to move slowly, but to move securely by
knowing what you were up against while still moving as fast as you could.

GEN DEPUY: That's right. It got all out of whack. The one thing that I really wanted to avoid
wherever possible, was to fight all the action on ground chosen by the enemy. If the enemy is in
bunkers and has prepared the killing ground, you ought to stay out of it. Now, if he's got a 360
degree killing ground, you still don't want to go into it if you can avoid it. If you can drop a 2,000
pound bomb in the middle of it, then that's what you should do.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN DEPUY: But, if he has a flank, then go around it, get around to his rear. Do something, but
don't keep sending rifle platoons into the killing ground. He probably has his bunker with small
firing slits, and he'll just cut your legs off as you come in. Then you'll try to evacuate casualties,

*For a discussion on the development of German tactics in World War I, see Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks:
The Battle in Depth in the West, (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1940); reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1976.

78

and suffer even more casualties; we know all about that. It's terrible. I hope the Russians always
try to come into our killing grounds, hoping, of course, that we've got them organized.

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything special that you did with your battalion during World War II
when you moved at night in a mounted configuration? Were you ever mounted when you moved
at night?

GEN DEPUY: Once in a great while we were told to continue a pursuit at night because our
higher headquarters just didn't want to lose the momentum. Frankly, in those cases, we just
continued at night with the same formation that we had had during the day, which normally was
with some tanks up front.

INTERVIEWER: An area where I feel that we are lacking doctrinal knowledge is in the area of
conducting mechanized night attacks.*

GEN DEPUY: I think there is a difference of opinion. In a night pursuit, which is done only when
the enemy is retreating and is disorganized, you're just trying to take advantage of his confusion.
But, you can have a bad accident while you're doing that — you can run into a hornet's nest.
Still, on the average, if everybody's pursuing, and the enemy is in bad shape, it's a worthwhile
tactic. It's not very scientific, and if you run into some fire, again, you have to decide if you're
going to fight or bypass. Mostly, you would like to bypass, but bypassing at night is hard. You
lose control because you have to move off the road. The best way to maintain control at night is to
go down the road. So, generally speaking, in the night pursuit, if you run into something tough,
that's the end of movement until morning. By the time you're able to do anything about it, it's
already daylight.

But, with regard to a night attack, a night mounted attack, again, I would say that if it's against
serious opposition, meaning an organized enemy position, it seems to me that unless you have
overwhelming superiority, you would try to bypass and get way behind it and force the enemy to
move the following morning. If you were going to make a deliberate night attack it would be
because you were going to use some infantry at night to seize a critical piece of terrain that
maybe, is occupied by enemy antitank guided missiles, which you want out of the way so that in
the morning, when you move ahead with your armor, you're not going to be hit by them.

INTERVIEWER: You're talking now, about dismounted infantry?

GEN DEPUY: Dismounted infantry, absolutely.

INTERVIEWER: You do it to facilitate what you are going to do later, right?

*See Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Washington: USGPO, 1977),
4-47 - 4-51.

79

GEN DEPUY: That's right. But, in respect to mounted action at night — attack or pursuit —
once all of the vehicles have night vision devices it may be possible to fight at night as we do now,
in the daytime.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier about a fellow who didn't sleep, or didn't eat, while there
was a battle going on. While you were an S-3, and later on, when you were a battalion
commander, how did you regulate your eating and sleeping? Obviously, you were doing a lot of
planning, and you took a very active role even in the execution part of a lot of things. So, how did
you regulate your time? Did you have a schedule that you tried to follow?

GEN DEPUY: Well, as far as being the S-3 was concerned, I could pace myself, and would try to
be at the critical places at the critical times. War isn't one pellmell, mad fight, anyway, as you
know. There are long periods of boredom, interspersed with moments of horror and terror —
that's what war is. But, there's a lot of waiting time and a lot of coordination time and normally, at
night, the fighting dies down unless you have a night attack. When you're a battalion commander,
you're really in control because there is nobody out there but you. There's nobody up in the
helicopters. None of that. So, you do everything you can. You fight as long as you can, and when
you have to have some sleep, you get some sleep. It's just that simple. You have to plan and
control each critical operation. So, if you and your guys have to get some sleep, then you just
don't take the next step. You've got control of the situation. When you're young and under 30,
you can do fairly well. You can go quite a long time without sleep, and you can bounce back with
just a little bit. If you're much older than that, then you have a lot of trouble. I guess the Arab-
Israeli War was an example in which some Israelis fought for about four days without sleep, at the
end of which, you know, they were just finished. At the end of WWII my regimental commander
was 27 years old; I was 25. The other two battalion commanders were 28 and 26.

INTERVIEWER: Going back to the Second World War, General Weaver, who was the assistant
division commander of the 90th, and later commanded the 8th Division, wrote a book about his
experiences as commander of the 8th Division. In it he discussed getting ready for a river crossing
operation, and mentioned that the preparations for conducting the crossing were very thorough.
How much of that did he bring with him to the 8th Division from the 90th?*

GEN DEPUY: I don't know, but we did cross a lot of rivers. The main thing to remember about a
river crossing is the coordination with the engineers, the coordination between the combat
engineers and the assault rifle battalions. We became very good at that. Normally, we had
different engineer battalions because we had to use corps engineers. You see, it takes a lot of
engineer battalions to support a river crossing. In fact, it takes an engineer battalion to support an
infantry regiment. You have got to have at least an engineer company to take an infantry battalion
across, and we had one engineer company on the Saar. That meant two or three echelons or
waves per battalion were required. If the river is flowing fast that can cause problems.

*For a discussion of the 8th Division's river crossing preparations see William G. Weaver, Yankee Doodle Went to
Town (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1959), 383-418.

80

I'll give you an example. Later on in the war, we crossed the Moselle for a second time, this time
near Koblenz. It must have been in March of 1945. The Moselle is very wide there; it's very close to
where it spills into the Rhine. I should say that it's a couple hundred yards across and flows
through a chasm. So, it was flowing, oh, six to seven miles an hour. That's fast. That meant that
the boats would strike the far bank about a quarter mile downstream. Now, by the time they
returned to the near shore, they would be a half mile downstream from the original launching area.
But, you wanted to land at a particular place on the far side. So, I demanded enough engineers so
that I could get my entire battalion together on the other side, all at the same place. We started
almost a half mile upstream, and finally, we just drifted across diagonally. But, we made it. Now, a
few boats drifted on beyond but mostly, we landed where we wanted to land. But, it was very
expensive. I used a whole engineer battalion. I put a company of engineers with each rifle
company, and that enabled us to do the crossing in a single lift.*

In crossing the Saar, after that first schmozola where we lit up the valley and everybody opened
fire, the first two companies got across. The boats came back further downstream, and a lot of
the engineers abandoned them and wouldn't go across again. So, my guys had to scarf up the
boats and drag them up the bank right across from the pillboxes, in the middle of the night. I'd
already gone across. My S-3 stayed and he put guys in the boats. They went across and then, just
let the boats go; I guess some went all the way to the Rhine.

■■"-:-.::,.■.

'm***,

:,3ss**

A typical scene as the 90th Division crossed the Moselle River for the second time.

*For a discussion of the 90th Division's March 1945 Moselle River crossing operation, see Charles B. McDonald,
United States Army in World War II: The Last Off ensive (Washington: USGPO, 1973), 246-249, 259.

81

This particular engineer battalion was not brilliant. The two Moselle crossings were super, but
the Saar crossing, I have to admit, was a little hairy. Those engineers had never seen anything like
it, that is, being driven into the boats at the point of a pistol. They probably thought they were in
with a bunch of madmen. Remember, we were crossing into the Siegfried Line — into a line of
pillboxes which were manned. But, generally speaking, the engineers were good. They laid out all
the tape and had all the boats in the right place. That tape is very important. About a half mile
behind the river, at the end of each tape, was a big white placard with a black number on it. So,
the first squad went to number one, the second squad went to number two, the third squad to
three, and then, the first squad of the next platoon went to number four, and so on. This is very
helpful at night.

INTERVIEWER: Another aspect of tactical operations is close air support. Was there anything
unusual or noteworthy about how you coordinated the close air or marked your positions?

GEN DEPUY: You mean in World War II?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir.

GEN DEPUY: Well, generally, we didn't have any close air support. They didn't have a system
back then like we have now. There was no tactical air control system. When we first went to
Mayenne and to Le Mans, they had Air Force officers in trucks with radios with our two lead
battalions. That was the only time in the war that I saw that — the only time! They talked to the
fighters, the P-47s and P-51s, and got them to attack the German tanks and troops that the
column ran into. It worked pretty well. In fact, it worked very well. I think flights were rotated over
the head of the column, more or less, as a result of preplanning, and when they got there the Air
Force officers on the ground would pick them up by radio and direct them in on the target. This
was Task Force Weaver. We had priority because this was the breakout from Normandy.

Another story. Across the Saar, I needed some emergency resupply. In order to do that I had to
call back to my regiment on the other side of the river and have them go to division. Division went
all the way back to the XIX TAC, which was a part of the Ninth Air Force working with Third
Army. They launched fighters that had ammo and medicine packed in the wing tanks. They flew
up to where we were and found the corner of the woods where we had put out a couple of
fluorescent panels in the form of a cross. We had asked that they drop it in the corner of the
woods, northwest of the panel, and they did. So, that was sort of remote control. But, other than
that, I don't remember any close air support. The first real use of close air support was in Korea.
The Air Force made its money in WWII by armed reconnaissance. It just went out and killed
everything it saw.

INTERVIEWER: Did the Germans have any close air support?

GEN DEPUY: Apparently they did in Russia, particularly with the Stukas. The Stukas had radios
that could talk to a regiment on the ground. They did that a lot, which was closer to close air
support than what we had. But, they didn't use Stukas against the Western Allies because Stukas

82

couldn't survive against our fighters. Stukas could survive against Russian fighters but they
couldn't survive against P-47s, P-51s, Hurricanes, and Spitfires. So, they didn't use them at all
against us.

INTERVIEWER: Toward the end of the war, was there any point during the campaign when you
noticed that the quality of the German soldier or his will to fight just evaporated? Did it occur when
they collapsed, when they were in a rout, or when the end was near? Could you pick a place?

Republic P-47 Mustang "Thunderbolts'

North American P-51 Mustang Fighter

British Supermarine Spitfire

German Stuka dive-bombers on a mission

83

GEN DEPUY: Well, I really don't know if I should try to do that. Obviously, the cohesion of the
Germans disappeared after the Bulge. Now, that doesn't mean that there weren't isolated German
units that fought, but they lost coherence. There was no longer a continuous front. There was no
longer any chance that they could do anything serious. We could always find a flank, and we
always outnumbered them. My memory of it isn't so much that the Germans lost heart, but that
they lost organization . They just finally fell apart. They were strained beyond the elastic limit.

INTERVIEWER: Now, when the Third Army ran out of fuel and you bellied up to the Moselle, the
Germans had a chance to regroup. Then you smashed through them again.

GEN DEPUY: We never smashed through them down there around Metz. We smashed through
on the Moselle, but we were never able to continue that drive past the Saar. The Bulge
intervened. The real breakthrough was in the Bulge.

INTERVIEWER: Again, after the Bulge, you had a breakthrough, you had the momentum, and
you were rolling. You continued to roll right up until the end of the war and the American Armies
were ordered to stop, which, in turn, permitted the Russians to drive on into Berlin. Could the
Americans have gone on further, at least as far as the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry Regiment was
concerned?

GEN DEPUY: Well, at the end of the war we were in Czechoslovakia. Sure, we could have gone
further. We were stopped every night at a phase line, but we could have gone on. It was agonizing
because there were POW camps out in front of us that were crying to be liberated. Yes, we could
have gone on. It was just an effort to manage the collision with the Russians.

I suppose the best tactical training that people ever got without any great jeopardy and just
enough casualties to make it exciting and serious, was as a result of the fighting we did from the
end of the Battle of the Bulge to the end of the war.

There were many actions, all fought at the company and battalion level. We were mounted in
trucks and had five tanks and five tank destroyers. Hopefully, the direct support artillery was in
range. It was a small self-contained battalion task force. You were expected to pursue the
Germans, and you fought a lot of small engagements. Each one was different. The terrain was
different, the enemy weapons and strengths were different, and the circumstances were different,
but the mission was always the same — to go.

Now, to me, that's the best training anybody ever got in the world. You can almost tell which
people had that experience, particularly the people who were battalion commanders and had
enough force to play with, and who had an independent mission in a zone of their own. The
company commander was under the control of the battalion commander, right? The regimental
commander just assigned zones. So, it was a battalion commander's war at that time.

Well, one of the things that had been impressed upon me by that time, was that we weren't
getting any direct fire suppression. We just weren't very good at that, and by that time, you see,
we were outrunning much of our artillery. We never had more than about one battalion of artillery
available because we were moving too fast. So, we no longer tried to suppress only with indirect
fire. My heavy weapons company, "D" Company, had six mortars and eight heavy machine guns.

84

I didn't think that was enough so I took .50 caliber machine guns from the trains and made a big
.50 caliber platoon. Then I would attach the three heavy machine gun platoons to a single
company. And, every time we would become involved in one of these little battles, wherever it
was, I'd put that company in an overwatch position. I didn't call it overwatch then. I didn't know
that word at the time. I put it in a base of fire. The commander had eight heavy machine guns, six
.50 caliber machine guns, and the light machine guns of that company, and he had the company
to protect it and to help move it. So, two companies were my maneuver companies, and one
company was my fire support company, my base of fire company. I'll tell you, it really was
marvelous. They just overwhelmed anything that we ran up against. My regret is that it took so
long to figure that out.

Pin him down with direct fire and move around him by maneuver. The serious war was really
over by the time we got smart. I always used to maneuver with the tanks and overwatch with the
tank destroyers. If it was a little village, if it was the corner of the woods, if it was a hill with brush
on it, whatever or wherever it was, we'd just smother it with fire and get total fire superiority.
Then, we'd move around the flank and go get 'em — usually from the rear. Almost without
exception they'd all come out yelling "Kamerad, Kamerad." It was the only way I could figure out
how to get firepower out of a light infantry battalion.

I would have loved to command a tank battalion or an armored task force. That's why the
mechanized infantry squad, which we were discussing earlier, can be very small, because it can
operate in the fire envelope of the armored task force. If it's a tank company with a mech platoon,
we're only talking about 15 or 20 men who are going to get out on foot to fight, but what we've
got is about 10 or 12 tanks and about four Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) with automatic
weapons on them that can totally suppress that woodline or those buildings.

Now, against Russians I don't think that we ought to fight by platoon. We ought to fight at
battalion level, which would mean a whole battalion worth of tanks. That would be 30 tanks, and a
whole infantry company, maybe 15 IFVs, firing in support of 60 dismounted troops who are going
to get close enough to throw hand grenades. And, you're not going to use those 60 guys outside
of that fire envelope. You can't, because if you do, they'll get bogged down in some little
miserable fire fight. Then you'll have to go and rescue them and get them back out of there while
suffering a lot of casualties. So, you don't want to send them deep into the woods; you want to
send them right down the woodline so that you can fire right in front of them as they go.

That tactic, which is a real Panzer-grenadier tactic, is something that the Germans understand,
but one that has been very difficult to introduce into the US Army. It is an appreciation of heavy
direct fire suppression, which most of our light infantry has never seen done. It's not in their
bones. Some have seen it, but very few. It's very impressive to see 30 tanks firing, 15 halftracks
with machine guns on them, and the tanks firing their .50 calibers — in those days, also the bow
gun — the coax and the main gun. There are very few enemy companies, even battalions, that
can stand up to that kind of firepower. That's how you have got to engage the enemy if you have
to move somewhere. Maneuver supported by heavy firepower — that's the ticket.

For instance, the enemy is sitting in a village that blocks the route through a valley and you've
got to move down that valley. Or, they're in the woods on the side of the valley, and you've got to
get them out of there so that you can go down the valley. There are times when even with
armored forces somebody has to clean them out. Now, one thing an armored force can do is just

85

go down the valley and suppress as it goes. But, the valley is still closed to supply, POL, ammo
trucks, and so on. So, somebody has got to go in and clean it out. Toward the end of the war,
while going across Germany, I watched the 4th Armored Division. We opened up river crossings
for the 4th Armored. I watched them conduct what they called reconnaissance by fire, but, really,
what it was, was suppression. They suppressed everything that looked suspicious and kept on
going, whether it was at the edge of the town, or the edge of a woods, a farm house, or two
barns — anything they thought might give them trouble. They turned everything on it like a
hose, and if there was anything in there, this technique would shut it down.

Now, that's fighting by using firepower, and that's why at the Combat Development Experi-
mentation Center, two squads suppressing and one moving, was 60 percent better than one
suppressing and two moving. What bothers me is that the US Army has been led mostly by light
infantry generals like myself, for a long time. Thank goodness for the General Starrys. We always
had a few. We had Abe and Polk, and so on, but we've never had a majority. We've always had a
heavy majority of light infantry soldiers, and Vietnam produced a lot more. If you look at how
many generals we have, and we have quite a few — what, maybe 400? I'll bet you that 50 percent
of them were light infantry commanders. Well, 40 percent of them at least. They were the ones we
were trying to make heavy infantry commanders.*

INTERVIEWER: Well, the same is true of our group, too. Most of us are light infantry
commanders.

GEN DEPUY: Sure. The point is, you have to learn, and it takes a little mental work to get there.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask one last question. When you finished up in Germany at the end of
World War II and reflected back on your experiences, what do you recall were your first thoughts
as to what your battalion had accomplished and how?

GEN DEPUY: One of the comments that I've made has infuriated the Infantry School. Now, I
don't blame them for being infuriated, but I honestly concluded at the end of World War II, when I
soberly considered what I had accomplished, that I had moved the forward observers of the
artillery across France and Germany. In other words, my battalion was the means by which Field
Artillery forward observers were moved to the next piece of high ground. Once you had a forward
observer on a piece of ground, he could call up five to ten battalions of artillery and that meant you
had moved combat power to the next observation point — more combat power than the light
infantry could dispose of. Now, you needed the infantry to do that. You needed the infantry to
protect them, but the combat power came from this other source, and I think that trend has

*General Donn A. Starry, USA, Retired. General Starry was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1948, and later
commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1970), and V Corps (1976-77). General Starry also served as the
Commanding General, TRADOC (1977-81), and Commander in Chief, Readiness Command (1981-83). General
Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. See note, page 61. Genera/ James H. Polk, USA, Retired. Commissioned in 1931 in the
Cavalry, General Polk commanded the 3rd Cavalry Group, Mechanized, during World War II (1944-45). Later, he
commanded the 4th Armored Division (1961-62), and V Corps (1965-66). General Polk also served as Commander in
Chief, US Army Europe, during the period 1967 to 1971 .

86

accelerated ever since. I think the infantry has the dirtiest job of them all. But, if you want to be
rigorously analytical about what you're really trying to do, it's trying to move combat power
forward to destroy the enemy, and the combat power that you are moving forward has been, in
the past, mostly artillery, and that is even more true today. The infantry has a lot of ears and a lot
of eyeballs. Now, it can call forward even more artillery fire and different kinds of munitions —
Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles (CLGPs), the Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAMs),
Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs), high explosive (HE), smoke, and
illumination, and soon they will also have terminally guided anti-armor munitions. The infantry is a
sensor. It's a sensory organization that works into the fabric of the terrain and the enemy, and can
call in all of this firepower — including artillery and TAC air that can really do the killing.

INTERVIEWER: I've got two questions to ask the answers to which will be of benefit for the
historians who read this transcript. First, what happened to the 90th when the war ended?

GEN DEPUY: Well, the 90th was supposed to go to Japan so it was held over. All the old 90th
troopers went home, but a lot of the officers stayed, and it was filled up with the short-termers.
They had a point system, so it was filled up with the people who had just come to Europe in the
late arriving divisions, and we started to train for Japan. We had a regiment at Grafenwohr. I was
the G-3 of the division at that time. We were starting all over again, to train those regiments to go
to Japan, and then, of course, in August, the war was over. So, I came home and the division
came home and was disbanded.

INTERVIEWER: When did you become the division G-3?

GEN DEPUY: June, maybe the end of June. Something like that. I was G-3 over there for, oh,
maybe two or three months.

INTERVIEWER: My last question has to do with the treasure that the 90th found at the end of the
war. Can you tell us about that?

GEN DEPUY: The Third Army was headed for Leipzig and Dresden through Thuringia. The First
Army was headed for the Elbe. The Ninth Army and others were farther north. So, everybody was
headed toward Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, and the northern half of Germany. I think there was a
rumor that the Germans were going to create a redoubt near Berchtesgaden. The Third Army was
stopped and turned to the southeast. Well, I had just reached the top, the absolute geographic
peak, of the Thuringian Mountains, and was looking down into the valley at Eisenach. I was just
about ready to go down the eastern side when I was told to stop and pull back. We pulled back
and each unit was given an assembly area.

My assembly area was at Merkers. So, I put the battalion in the town, and was told, "You're
going to get new orders in a couple of days." We had some parties and just had a hell of a good
time. In the middle of the night, probably the first night we were there, a German woman started
having a baby. Well, we had a curfew so the midwife couldn't get to the woman; rather, the
woman had to go out in the street. The MPs stopped her, and she said, "I'm about to have a baby,

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a kinder," and swore at them. And, she said, "Dummkopf Americans! You don't know anything.
You're right on top of all the gold of Germany." The next day, the Counter Intelligence Corps
found it down there, in this vast salt mine. It was so large we drove jeeps 40 miles an hour through
the main tunnels. So, we were kept there for about a week, to guard it and get it out. That was a
welcome change. The war was essentially over by this time. Anyway, we guarded it and helped
haul it up on elevators. All the top generals of the Army — Bradley, Eisenhower, Patton —
everybody I can think of, went down on one elevator operated by a German to see it. They went
down and played with all the gold. Also, the Germans had all of the art treasures of Berlin stashed
down there.

View of the Reichsbank wealth discovered by the
90th Division in the salt mines near Merkers, Germany.

88

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander,

General Omar N. Bradley, Commanding General, 12th Army Group,

Major General Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General, XII Corps,

Colonel Bernard Bernstein, and others shown touring

the salt mines where the German treasure was hidden.

Among the treasures discovered in the salt mines
was this Durer Engraving taken from the Berlin Museum.

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CHAPTER IV

The Need For Change:
Reflections On World War

INTERVIEWER: The first question I would like to ask relates back to your World War II
experiences. Please summarize for us some of those experiences.*

GEN DEPUY: My experiences were just part of the larger experience of the 90th Division. It is
hard to overstate how ineffective that division was at the beginning, and how very effective it was
at the end and how that enormous change related directly to the quality of its leaders. The natural
leaders for company and battalion command were there all the time, as they are in any division,
but their emergence and selection for key jobs did not occur until McLain and Van Fleet came
along. This whole process remains something of a mystery but perhaps the best way to describe it
is in terms of its opposite — the situation which existed at the beginning. Under the first three
division commanders — one in the States and two in England and Normandy. There was no
apparent effort to evaluate and eliminate poor leaders. It must have been either that the top
commanders didn't know a poor leader when they saw one, didn't understand enough about war
to provide a basis for evaluation, or were indifferent. In any event, we went to war with a batch of
incompetents in charge. That incompetence trickled down and caused the tactical failures I have
described and the incredible casualties. All this was indelibly stamped on my mind and attitude
ever after for both good and bad.

I want to make it very clear that I considered the 90th a very gallant division which started to
emerge from the doldrums during the Falaise encirclement, matured during the Moselle and Saar
operations, and reached its peak efficiency during the Bulge.

I also came away from the war with a very strong impression that most of the fighting was done
by a very small percentage of the soldiers. But, as you would expect, by and large, the officers and
the sergeants performed better than the privates. Now, that isn't to say that there weren't some
natural leaders who appeared amongst the privates and corporals. But, in a pinch, then, as now, I
would rely on officers first, sergeants second, and privates third; that is, if I didn't know them
individually ahead of time. I still feel the Army needs a lot more leaders in proportion to followers,
particularly now that war is more dangerous, and equipment is more complex. That means smaller
companies. The larger companies of WWII exposed too many reluctant soldiers to enemy fire.
Smaller companies and smaller platoons and squads means more leaders. Such smaller units
would achieve a much higher percentage of active participation in the battle.

Another very strong impression that I came away with has to do with what Liddell Hart called
the indirect approach. I mentioned in our last interview, the last thing you want to do is to attack

*This is the second interview conducted on 26 March 1979, with General DePuy, USA Retired. This interview was
conducted at his home in Highfield, Virginia. The interviewers were Lieutenant Colonels William J. Mullen and Romie
L. Brownlee.

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the enemy head-on, or where he wants you to attack him.* In Vietnam we again learned that
lesson the hard way. If you choose to attack the enemy head-on, you have to get through the area
that he has prepared for you — the killing zones, or whatever you want to call them. He has his
fires registered, he has his fields of fire cleared, and he has his bunkers or his positions sited to
take advantage of you. So, it's almost the height of stupidity to let that happen. Almost anything
is preferable to that. Now, in World War II, when we fought the Germans, they were already very
much on the decline. Their strength was low. So, usually, it was relatively easy to find a way
around or through them at night. That's one of the reasons why toward the end of the war almost
all of our units operated a great deal at night. They did that for two reasons. First, it was easier to
penetrate, or bypass, or sneak through without being shot at while en route. Then, once you got
through and grabbed a piece of ground that was important in that particular area, the other side
had to react. Also, as I said before, this allowed you to get your artillery observers up on the high
ground so that the combat power of the artillery could be brought to bear on the enemy.

I really believe, based on my experience, that the combat power provided by the artillery, I'm
sorry to say, probably represented 90 percent or more of the combat power actually applied
against the enemy. That's why I say that getting a forward observer to a high piece of ground and
protecting him was the most important function that the infantry performed in that war. That's
not to degrade the infantry, it's just objective analysis.

Lastly, I have spoken frequently about the importance of direct fire suppression. There are times
when it is not possible to bypass. Sometimes it is necessary to go straight in on the enemy. In
these cases the only solution is very heavy suppressive fire and an attack on a narrow front
through a favorable and protected piece of terrain like a narrow draw or other covered approach.
We went into Berle, Luxembourg, during the Bulge, with A Company in the assault and B
Company in overwatch. However, A Company quickly masked the fires of B Company and B
Company was not well disposed or instructed. We were in a hurry. It turned out all right and we
picked up a reserve company and a German headquarters in Berle, but we didn't do it very well.
When General Rommel was a first lieutenant in WWI he developed the overwatch and penetration
technique into a fine art. All American commanders should read his account in Infantry Attacks.**

INTERVIEWER: Would you tell us the circumstances under which you earned some of your
decorations in World War II?

GEN DEPUY: All right. Let me say first of all that as you fellows know, having fought yourselves,
decorations go to the wrong people. The privates, the sergeants, and the lieutenants, who do the
real fighting, normally perform where there is nobody around to observe it, or they observe one
another; but, they are not the people who write up the citations. So, the colonels and the generals
get more decorations than they should. I hope they all realize that.

*See B.H. Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929), and Strategy, 2nd
ed., revised (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

**See Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks. Translated by G.E. Kidde. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1944; reprinted as
Attacks, by Athena Press, Inc., in 1979. See also, William E. DePuy, "Reexamining an Old Law 'One-Up and Two
Back'?" Army 30 (January 1980), 20-25.

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Well, the Distinguished Service Cross I received for the crossing of the Moselle River at
Brodenbach. In this case, it involved crossing the Moselle, climbing up the river's very steep
banks, some vineyards, and then, going down and across one of the deep ravines that led down to
the river. It was there that my S-3 and I encountered some German machine gun people. Next, we
climbed back up to the high ground in the rear of the town of Brodenbach. We had a number of
minor encounters while all of this was happening from 2 o'clock in the morning until we took the
town of Brodenbach about 7 o'clock that same morning. That action didn't justify a decoration,
but I received one, anyway.

One Silver Star was for an action which involved going through the Siegfried Line at Habscheid
and Brandscheid shortly after the Battle of the Bulge. Now, although I tried to lead my battalion
single file, I think I told you that it got split in the middle and unfortunately, A Company, which
was at the tail of the column, wandered off into a little valley in the middle of the Siegfried Line.
So, they were in the bottom of a saucer surrounded by pillboxes, which were occupied by
Germans. The company commander, who was new, was rather upset and nervous, and he was
taking casualties. Anyway, I grabbed a tank platoon, which was not my tank platoon. That was
the problem. The platoon leader refused to go, so I relieved him, took command of the platoon,
and took it over into that little valley and got A Company out. The first tank that I climbed on ran
over two stacked Teller mines and blew me off of the rear deck. I got on a second tank and we
exchanged rounds with a German tank at the bottom of the valley. I was standing on the back
deck, shooting a .50 caliber machine gun at the pillboxes near A Company. Anyhow, we managed
to get A Company out of there.

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy shown receiving

the Distinguished Service Cross from

Major General S. LeRoy Irvin,

XII Corps Commander.

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy

shown receiving one of his

three Silver Stars awarded

during World War II.

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I received three Silver Stars. Another was for an action which took place between Metz and the
Saar on the Nied River. We had broken out of our bridgehead, the one I mentioned where the
enemy heavy tank battalion came through and shot out the bridges at Koenigsmacher. We came
down to the Nied River, and the assistant division commander, "Wild Bill" Weaver, was standing
up on a hill looking down on the river. We had a battalion that had started down. I was still the
regimental S-3, and General Weaver said to me, "We better go down and grab that bridge down
there." The Nied is a very small river, but nonetheless, it's swampy. So, we really needed a bridge.
I got in my jeep and went down to catch the battalion and have it move directly over to take the
bridge. There was a small hill just on our side of the river, and the battalion went around the right
side of the hill, which was away from the river, because that's the way the road went. [See Map
17, page 65]

When I was halfway there we came under fire, so I got out of the jeep and went on foot. I could
see the tail of the battalion going around the right side of the hill. I decided that I would intercept
them, so I went around the left side of the hill with my radio operator. When I had gotten all the
way around the left side of the hill and to the bridge, there wasn't anybody there. The company
had yet to come around from the other side of the hill, so I went across the bridge into a little town
the name of which I can't remember. As I was standing in the street over there waiting for the
company, a couple of German soldiers came out and surrendered. I went looking for some more
and before I was through, I had collected quite a few. I then decided that I had better take them
back over to our side of the river. So, I started walking back across the bridge with them when our
battalion suddenly came around the corner and opened fire on them. They scattered all over the
place, but we collected about, oh, 10 or 15 of them. Our company stopped firing and came across
the bridge. That was kind of a silly action. But, that was that, and that's enough of war stories.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned previously that it was really your preference to fight as a
battalion and not in smaller units. I wonder if you might like to expand on that a bit?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, I do have a personal preference for fighting at battalion level, because I really
believe that if it's heavy combat involving large forces, then companies, particularly infantry
companies, are too fragile. It was my observation that companies sent on independent
missions — that is, in a separate terrain compartment — normally bogged down. Now, I also
have come to the conclusion more recently, that not only would I like to fight at battalion level, but
I'd like to have the battalions be smaller. That's simply to increase the ratio of leaders to followers
and to get the quality of the battalion up. You've heard me say. a lot about that. I'd like to have a
battalion that has a larger percentage of those kinds of people who fight. And, you get that, I
think, by having more officers and more sergeants. So, the associated reason is not just battlefield
leadership and courage, but also its effectiveness. We now are going to have million dollar tanks
and half-million dollar infantry fighting vehicles. We need quality in those tanks. It's absolutely
ridiculous to have a million dollar tank in the hands of the survivors of a tank platoon. You need
more than that. We are going to have very powerful fighting machines. The Air Force wouldn't
think of putting just anybody in the cockpit of an F-15, and we have to think that same way about
our fighting vehicles.

93

Now, the other thing is that more and more, the infantry becomes the agent for firepower and
support from the rear, whether that's artillery with six or seven kinds of sophisticated ammunition,
or attack helicopters, or tactical fighters. They also must use engineers and sometimes air defense
weapons. The coordination problems are enormous. But a company commander is alone. He's on
his own. Maybe he's got a radio operator with him, but he has to do it all. He could well be under
fire, personally, and he just hasn't got the people available to help him.

At least a battalion commander has a little staff. He's got an S-3 who is his right-hand man. He's
got an exec who can go back to the rear with the S-4 and make sure that the replacements and the
ammo get up. He's got an S-2 who tries to see to it that he knows as much about the enemy as
possible, and he's got a lot of radios, whereas his company commanders have only one or two.
He's got officers up to the ranks of captain and major to help him. So, he's in a much better
position to coordinate the application of all that combat power and to synchronize the actions of
his battalion and all of its supporting elements. If you rely on a company commander to do that,
it's almost inevitable that not every time, but most of the time, the company will not develop all
that combat power. That's why I want to see the Army move that way, toward smaller battalions
as the basic fighting unit.

I'm sure that in the long run they are going to do it. Right now there is great resistance to it. It's
a new idea. It offends peopie. Lieutenant colonels don't want smaller battalions. They don't want
to be told that they can't control a big outfit. Company commanders don't want smaller
companies. They don't want to be told that they are too busy to develop the combat power. But,
the fact is, that's all true.

We've got to get these battalions smaller, better and smaller — and more of them. Then, we
have to fight so that the battalion commander coordinates the infantry with the tanks, the artillery,
the air, the air defense, the helicopters, and the engineers. He's in a better position to do that than
is anybody else. He has to fight within what I call a single terrain compartment. If he has to send a
company over into another valley to operate independently, where he can no longer control it,
then that company must have tanks, infantry, and artillery observers, and the company
commander must coordinate the combined arms team. But, I don't want them to do that very
often because if the fighting is serious in the other valley, the company isn't big enough to do it.

INTERVIEWER: Recently we asked you about the ROTC training program. Please briefly
describe the program of instruction for the pre-World War II ROTC*

GEN DEPUY: Well, in the academic environment of the school, as I recall, there was a little bit of
military history. There was a lot about how an officer behaves, how you got calling cards printed,
about "Rank Hath Its Privileges," and things like that. There was a lot of drill. Because we had a
small regiment of cadets there were a lot of the cermonial type things — how to stand up
straight, how to salute, how to march, and all of that sort of thing, and everybody liked it. Then,
we had the six-week summer camp at Fort Snelling, where the 3rd Infantry was in charge. It was a
very old regiment, filled with a lot of fine sergeants. It didn't seem to me that the officers spent

*For an overview on typical ROTC training during the mid and late 1930s see, The R.O. T.C. Manual: Infantry, 21st
ed., 4vols(Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1939).

94

very much time with us, but the sergeants were great. It was all "nuts and bolts" type training. It
was a squad level, machine gun level, rifle level type of training — by far the best training we got.
That's about it. I might go on to say something about the ROTC right now, if you don't mind.

INTERVIEWER: Please do.

GEN DEPUY: Not without a lot of controversy, several years ago, based on our appreciation of
Israeli training and our general feeling that officer training in our Army was pegged several notches
too high, General Gorman and I decided that the goal of ROTC plus the basic course should be to
qualify all lieutenants for lieutenant's jobs. A lieutenant in the combat arms graduating from ROTC
should be between skill levels 2 and 3 in terms of the Skill Qualification Tests. That would mean
that in the Armor, for example, he would be qualified as a tank commander. In the Infantry he
would be qualified as a squad leader. The basic course which he then attends after graduation,
could pick up on that level of expertise and make him a lieutenant platoon leader. Now, I think that
that's right, and I wish that it had been that way back when I was in ROTC. I never went to a basic
course nor did ROTC teach us to be platoon leaders.

INTERVIEWER: Could you give us your significant impressions on German and US equipment,
weapons, vehicles, and tactics?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I thought the German machine pistol, which was an area suppression
weapon, had great advantages, whereas we were trained for point targets with rifles. So, the
Germans, it would seem to me, were ahead of us there.

Also, their tank guns and antitank guns were superior to ours. If you'll read the history, you'll
find that the Germans were behind the Russians at the beginning, but they then caught up and
surpassed everybody at the end of the war, in terms of the size of their antitank and tank guns up
to 88 millimeters. Their weapons were manufactured in such a way that they were easier to
maintain and they operated better in the mud, in dampness, and in cold weather. You asked a
moment ago whether or not we used their equipment or they used ours. We really didn't use their
equipment very much because we had such a plentitude of our own, and our supply system was
geared to our types of ammunition, and so on. Most units picked up a few German Volkswagens
and trucks and things for fun, but not very seriously. I might say that we did, in fact, like the
German Panzerfausts and that was because our 2.75-inch rockets didn't have the penetration
capability of the Panzerfausts. A lot of units did pick up and carry the Panzerfausts with them.
[See photo, page 67]

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression
that our tactics didn't. They didn't have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we
did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement. They also
did a lot of talking. You could hear the German sergeants, Feldwebels, shouting to their men all

95

the time during an attack, giving instructions, "Go this way, go that way, more fire over here, put
fire by the corner of the field." Our fellows didn't talk it up very much. If you don't talk it up, it
means that nothing much is going to happen.

INTERVIEWER: Last week we discussed what the soldiers carried with them into Normandy and
I forgot to ask you how they had streamlined their loads by the end of the war. What were they
carrying when the war ended?

GEN DEPUY: I'm not sure that I can answer that question. I think that one thing they carried
more of was grenades, because as infantrymen season themselves, they begin to be impressed
with the value of grenades. We probably carried less small arms ammunition, which isn't
necessarily good, but it's undoubtedly true. But, we carried a lot more machine gun ammunition
of all kinds, because we tried to emphasize direct fire suppression with machine guns. So, we had
to carry that. Whenever we went into an area where our tanks couldn't go with us — crossing a
river or conducting a night attack in a forest — we usually carried mines. I guess, also, we
probably paid more attention to making sure that we had pyrotechnics. The better we got with
them, the more we used them.

INTERVIEWER: In the area of command and control, please comment on how you controlled
your companies as a battalion commander, and how you controlled the battalions as a regimental
S-3.

GEN DEPUY: Our squads were not well-trained. Sometimes the platoon sergeants would take
one element, one good sergeant would take another element, and the platoon leader would take
the third element, and that's about the way they operated. Now, this caused me to use companies
a little bit like the Army tends to use platoons today. In other words, I would give a whole
company a rather simple mission, with the objective being located not too far away — a "Go take
the three buildings at the edge of the village" type of thing. I usually commanded from the vicinity
of the lead company, and almost all of the orders were issued eyeball-to-eyeball — direct orders.
I would call it positive control. I'd go along with the lead company and when they ran into trouble,
I'd have the second company commander right with me, and usually the third company
commander overwatching somewhere. I then would tell the company that was behind me, exactly
where to go, and go with them. In other words, if the first company ran into trouble and dropped
down into a base of fire, then I'd go with the next company and, maybe, the tanks. The tank
destroyers would be overwatching. So, with one company and the tanks, we would try to go
around a flank or try to get behind them.

So, it was all a very direct, close type of coordination. Infantry radios didn't work too well, but
we used them whenever we had to. When we were mobile and going cross-country, I always
moved in a column. I never went on two routes. I didn't like that technique because I didn't think
that I had good enough control. We often used artillery radios for command and control because
they were much better than ours.

96

INTERVIEWER: As the regimental S-3, did you do the same sorts of things as you did as a
battalion commander?

GEN DEPUY: In all cases where there was a deliberate action, like a river crossing or a deliberate
attack as around Metz, most of the coordination was done eyeball-to-eyeball with the battalion
commanders. But, it wasn't a question of drawing up a plan on paper and carrying it out to them.
That never happened. The paper plan, to the extent one existed, consisted only of an overlay. I
guess we wrote a few regimental orders for the history book, but it was almost always going out
and talking to a battalion commander and agreeing with him, usually on the ground, about how
we were going to do something, then going to another battalion commander and agreeing with
him on the ground as to how we were going to do it. So, they had total participation, which is
really the only way to do it. When we were going across France, we occasionally did go on parallel
routes. Once in awhile we'd have to call a battalion commander on the radio and tell him to go
someplace else. But, when it was serious fighting, it almost always involved face-to-face
coordination.

INTERVIEWER: During the Second World War you encountered a number of people who, for
one reason or another, were either famous and/or colorful. One such individual that I can think of
is General Weaver, who was the assistant division commander and later, commander the 8th
Division. Please comment on such people who stand out in your mind.

GEN DEPUY: Well, "Wild Bill" Weaver was much loved by everybody. He was a tall, thin, rather
worn looking chap, who apparently had been an absolute tiger in World War I. He was an
eccentric. I'll tell you two little stories about Wild Bill.

The first one occurred during the Falaise Gap action when he was with another regiment. This
regiment went into the town of Le Bourg-St. Leonard, which was just southwest of Chambois,
where the cork was finally put into the bottle. Anyway, in the middle of the night, I think it was the
2nd Panzer Division, or the 2nd SS Panzer Division, decided to get out of the trap by going
through Le Bourg-St. Leonard. So, a quite exciting fight took place in the town during the middle
of the night. Wild Bill, who always wore a nightshirt, was aroused from his bed in Le Bourg-St.
Leonard. He slapped on his steel helmet and his pistol belt, grabbed his aide, and took personal
command in the streets of Le Bourg-St. Leonard, while still in his long, white nightgown. Well,
believe me, the division remembered that. He was an utterly fearless man.

While at Maizieres-les-Metz General Patton got tired of reading about it, and ordered us to take
the town. We held the northern third of the residential area, and the entire industrial area, which
included a large steel plant. In addition to some very large Bessemer converters, there was a tall
water tower. Occasionally, we would sneak our artillery observer up the water tower at night, and
then he would set up on our side of the water tower and peek around and adjust artillery fire. Wild
Bill came to visit one day and wanted to go up the water tower. He later had a heart attack when
he was with the 8th Division, but he obviously was already suffering from heart trouble because he
tired very easily. So, he said to me, "Come on, DePuy, we're going to go up on that water tower."

97

I said, "That's a dumb thing to do, General." Anyway, we started up and got about halfway when
he just ran out of steam. Of course, I was behind him. So, we had to wait there, halfway up, for a
long time while Wild Bill caught his breath. I thought he wouldn't make it, but he finally did. Like a
bulldog, he got to the top. By this time, of course, we had attracted quite a bit of attention. And,
while we were up there, a German assault gun fired a round through this empty water tank. Well,
if you think you've ever heard a large bang-clang and resonating sound, you should hear an armor-
piercing round go through an empty water tank. That encouraged us all to leave and we scurried
back down. But, anyway, he spent almost all of his time while he was up on the water tank around
on the front side where he got a very good view of everything. That gives you some flavor of the
man. He was clearly the most colorful and, I would say, the most loved old codger we ever had in
the division.

Major General
William G. Weaver

Major General
George Bittman Barth

INTERVIEWER: Would you say a few words about your regimental commander, Colonel, later
Major General, George B. Barth?*

*Major General George B. Barth was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry in 1918, and later branch
transferred to the Field Artillery. Assignments after World War II included service as Commanding General, 25th
Infantry Division Artillery (1950-51), Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (1952), and Chief, Joint Military
Assistance Group, Greece (1952-55).

98

GEN DEPUY: Well, Bittman Barth was an artilleryman. He was Chief of Staff of the 9th Division
before he was sent to the 90th after Colonel Sheehy was killed. He was a marvelous and strong
man. He was my favorite. I cannot say enough about the integrity, the quality, and the strength of
the man. He was wounded very seriously in Maizieres, just at the end of that night attack I
mentioned. He was underneath an overhanging concrete ramp in the steel plant, but the round
landed right in front of him and practically blew off his leg. But, he pulled himself back together at
Walter Reed after a long, long time, and then, went on to become a brigadier, and eventually went
to Korea. He commanded the initial task force of the 24th Divison in Korea. He ended up
commanding a division at Indiantown Gap, the 5th Division, I think it was. He was a splendid man.
You see, he had a regiment in which there was only one other Regular officer, Buddy Ryder. So,
the leavening of the professional army was pretty thin. There may have been one or two
lieutenants from the Military Academy, but, if so, they went unnoticed among the general herd.
Barth was the soul of the Army in the 357th Infantry. He was the rock on which we rebuilt a
fighting regiment. It was all because of his strength of character — compassion mixed with
firmness.

INTERVIEWER: Two names that we picked up in reading about the division surface significantly
in your later career, General Talbott and General Stilwell. Did you know General Talbott at the
time, and if so, what was your relationship with him?*

GEN DEPUY: Well, I knew General Talbott only in the sense that he was the S-3 of the 359th
during most of the time that I was the S-3 of the 357th. Then, we both went on to command
battalions. So, I didn't really know him well at the time; I just knew of him. He was clearly a
superior officer. Since the war, as you know, General Talbott and I have become great friends.
We both commanded the 1st Division in Vietnam, and both of us have been presidents of the 1st
Division Society. We also served together at TRADOC. General Talbott was and is, a splendid
soldier.

General Stilwell was the division G-3, and as a regimental S-3, I saw quite a lot of him. We've
been close friends ever since, and have done a lot of things together. He came up and pinned on
my lieutenant colonel's leaves in the little town of Binsfeld, in Luxembourg, in the middle of the
Battle of the Bulge. He later became G-3 of XXII Corps, commanded by Ernie Harmon, who
previously had been the 2nd Armored commander. Of course, from an operational standpoint,

*Lieutenant Genera/ Orwin C. Talbott, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant, Infantry, in the
California National Guard in 1941, and a year later, received a Regular commission. During the Battle of the Bulge, he
commanded the 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry Regiment. Later assignments included service as Executive Officer to
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer while Chief of Staff of the Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in
Chief, European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1959-63); Commanding General, 1st Infantry
Division (1968-69); Commanding General, US Army Infantry Center and Commandant, US Army Infantry School
(1969-73); and Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (1973-75).

General Richard G. Stilwell, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers in 1938, and later transferred
to the Infantry. Following World War II, General Stilwell served as the Chief of Staff, US Army Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (1963-65); Commanding General, 1st Armored Division (1967-68); Commanding General, XXIV
Corps (1968-69); and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea. Since 1981, General Stilwell has served
as the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense.

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Dick Stilwell really ran the 90th Division during the whole time that he was there, certainly during
McKelvie and Landrum's time. McLain was a fine, great leader, a wise man, and just. He and Dick
Stilwell worked magnificently together. But, under the first two generals, Dick ran the division.
Dick had to do it there wasn't anybody else to do it except, perhaps, for "Hanging Sam" Williams
before he was unfairly removed. I think it was while Van Fleet was the division commander that
Dick left. Actually, it was Dick Stilwell who brought me into the Central Intelligence Agency to
work for him in 1950, and then, brought me over to become J-3, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV), when he became the MACV Chief of Staff. Then, we were together in the
Pentagon, again. He is, of course, really a splendid man. A very, very, smart, tough, professional
soldier, I'm one of his greatest admirers.

Lieutenant General
Orwin C. Talbott

General
Richard G. Stilwell

INTERVIEWER: You completed your tour in Europe as the G-3 of the 90th Division. Is there
anything significant about that assignment?

GEN DEPUY: No, not really. When I became the G-3 right after the war, the division was
designated to go to Japan, so we were filled up with low point men. We sent almost all of our own
people home, received low point fillers, and started to train at Grafenwohr. We had a regiment at
Neustadt, one at Grafenwohr and one at Amberg. At first, we had an exclusive franchise on
Grafenwohr — no other division used it. We opened it up, had the first exercises there, and
planned to train for Japan there. We planned to use everything we had learned. I wrote the
training programs with the help of the staff and consultations with a lot of people. But, I'll tell you,
they bore no resemblance to the training programs that we had had before the war. Our training
programs were very practical with lots of live fire and lots of direct fire suppression — at all levels.

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INTERVIEWER: Well, when World War II came to a close, you were the G-3 of the 90th Division.
We'd be interested in what your thoughts were regarding a career in the Army. Did you have any
thoughts about getting out? What led you to stay in the Army and make it a career?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I assumed that I would get out. I didn't realize that there would be an option
to stay in. I came back to the United States very shortly after our victory over Japan because I was
a "high point man." There is a small story here. In August of 1945 General Herb Earnest who
commanded the 90th Division at the end of the war, took a party of battalion and regimental
commanders to Bad Tolz to spend some time with General Patton in a seminar to review lessons
learned. I was then G-3. General Earnest and I stayed with General Patton in his house on the
Tegernsee. His aide, Codman, was going home and General Patton asked me if I would like to be
his aide. I was astounded. I told him I would do whatever he wanted but thought he should know
that I had orders to Leavenworth. He told me I should go to Leavenworth and stay in the Army
which is what I did.

Lieutenant Colonel DePuy during
a reprieve from combat in May 1945.

Major DePuy while the S-3,

357th Infantry Regiment,

near Metz in October 1944.

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CHAPTER V
Education Of A General Staff Officer

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask you about your impressions of the Command and General Staff
College at that particular point in time. You were a combat veteran who had commanded a
battalion and had been a S-3 at every level. What did Leavenworth have to teach you in 1945?

GEN DEPUY: Well, the atmosphere was a peculiar one since everybody there considered himself
to be an expert. So, the poor instructors had a very hard time. The classes were very large, 500 in
a one room type of thing. But, the fact of the matter is, that I learned a lot. I learned the right
words and terms to explain a lot of things that we had done, but had never taken the trouble to
define. The one part where I did poorly was the G-3 part, just because I thought I knew it. I did
better in the G-1, G-2, and G-4 areas because I didn't pretend to know much about them. Now,
the course I went to was only four months long. It was one of two interim courses; it was the
wartime course slightly expanded. It was much like the CAS3 Course which is now so popular.

It was very much a regimental and division level course with a little bit about corps, with a heavy
emphasis on operations. There was also a logistics course going on, but it was entirely separate.
So, we didn't get much of that, and they didn't get much of ours. Both courses were about the
same size in terms of students. The logistics course, called the service course, was run by the
Army Service Forces. It was just as large and located in the big riding hall. They just had a partition
down the middle, and half of it was the ground course and the other half was the service course.

Following Leavenworth, I assumed that I was going back to Europe because they weren't
letting everyone out quite yet. On my way back to Europe, I went to the Pentagon to see a
hometown friend of mine, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Wilson, now a retired major general. He was
working for Colonel Michaelis. Mike Michaelis was in the 101st during World War II and was now
running the procurement branch of G-1.* They asked me how I felt about being integrated. I
applied for the Regular Army, and they gave me a job. So, I didn't go back to Europe. That's the
reason I went into the G-1 shop of the War Department. George Forsythe was there, Art Collins
and a lot of others were also there, and Mike Michaelis was the boss. I worked there for a couple
of years. During that time I was integrated into the Regular Army. It was always an attractive thing
to me. Also, the pay was a lot better than teller's pay in my father's bank. In fact, it was $535.00 a
month plus allowances. I believe bank tellers in South Dakota at that time, were lucky to make
$150.00, and that's about where I would have started. So, number one, I enjoyed the Army and

*GeneralJohn H. Michaelis, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1936. During the Korean War he
commanded the 27th Infantry Regiment ( 1 950-51 ) . Other assignments included service as the Commanding General,
US Army, Alaska (1959-62); Commanding General, V Corps (1962-63); Commanding General, Allied Land Forces,
Southeastern Europe (1963-66); Commanding General, Fifth Army (1966-69); and Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command, US Forces, Korea, and Eighth Army, Korea (1969-72).

102

felt comfortable with it, and secondly, I really didn't want to go back to South Dakota. I found
Washington to be an exciting place for a young fellow right off the reservation, so I decided to
stay. That's about how complicated my decision was.

I worked in G-1 of the War Department. My job there was the All Volunteer Army. I arrived just
at the time we went off the draft. There were three officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels,
involved in enlisted procurement in the whole Pentagon, and I was the only officer involved in the
enlisted volunteer program. The only one! I went up to New York with Major General St. Clair
Street from the Air Force. The Air Force was still part of the Army at that time, and he was the
head of the recruiting service. I went up with him, and he signed a $1,000,000 contract with N.W.
Ayers Co., for recruiting advertising. We have the same company today. But, we didn't do very
well. We had a very small Army in those days. I had a graph right behind my desk and, as I recall,
we needed to recruit about 15,000 men a month in order to meet our requirements, and that graph
on my little chart ran around 12,800 to 13,000, maybe 13,500. Every month we were falling a
couple of thousand men short. So, by the time the Korean War came along and Congress
reinstituted the draft, we were very much understrength. We tried all sorts of inducements but
none of them worked very well. The general atmosphere right after World War II was that the war
was over, enlisted salaries were very low, and there wasn't anything very glamorous about military
service. So, it just didn't work.

INTERVIEWER: Were you inflicted with the same reduction in rank that a lot of officers suffered
at the end of the war, or were you able to retain your rank of lieutenant colonel?

GEN DEPUY: Most of the colonels were reduced. Dick Stilwell reverted back to lieutenant
colonel. I just happened to be under the wire. I was promoted in January of 1945, and I believe if I
had been promoted a month later, I would have been reduced back to major, but I just missed it.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, according to your biographic sketch, the next significant step is your tour at
the Army Language School learning Russian but then being posted to Hungary as the assistant
attache. Is there anything that you would like to tell us about that?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I can only say that I went to the Army Language School to study Russian
because I thought that Russia was important. I was a little bit tired of the tactical side of things at
the moment, and I thought that that would be a good thing to do. It was — and I learned it. But,
unfortunately, as I was about to go to Russia to become assistant attache, all of the American
attaches in Hungary were ejected, and I was diverted. So, all of my Russian went for naught and
Hungarian is an impossible language. I never did learn to speak it. It was rather an exciting time in
that the Communists were in the process of consolidating their power. Cardinal Mindszenty was in
the legation. Laszlo Rajk was arrested and all sorts of things were happening during that time.
But, it all culminated when I broke my leg while skiing and had to come home. I first entered a
Hungarian hospital, but they did such a bad job on my leg that I had to come back to Munich
where the Americans redid it. I then came back to Walter Reed and was in Walter Reed when the
Korean War broke out. So, there is not much more to be said about that.

103

INTERVIEWER: At one point, though, you actually became the acting attache.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, that's right. The attache had left. There was a very rapid turnover in Hungary
in those days.

INTERVIEWER: Was that because the Hungarians were heaving the Americans out of the
country?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. The Hungarian Communist regime was hostile to the Americans at that time,
so there was a high turnover. Personna non grata was the term they used, and I guess about four
attaches and assistant attaches were ejected from the country.*

INTERVIEWER: Well, you must have been unique then, getting booted out because of a broken
leg.

GEN DEPUY: I think if it hadn't been for the broken leg, I probably would have gone the same
route as the others. I did have one experience in Hungary which almost changed the whole pattern
of my life. It almost turned me into the intelligence game permanently — something that I did not
want. We really were not trained to collect information in a clandestine manner although at the
time, Eastern Europe was a boiling pot of clandestine activity. We military chaps were amateurs.
But, one day we received a message from Washington to go to Mohacs to report on the Danube
bridge which the Germans had dropped in late 1944, as the Russians started their envelopment of
Budapest. Some intelligence analyst in Washington was trying to complete the book — there
was one being complied on each country — and there were reports that the bridge was being
rebuilt. So, one sunny autumn day in 1949, I put on my Air Force fur collared flight jacket — no
hat — civilian trousers and shirt, and stirred up my Hungarian jeep driver — a blond crew cut
chap in a field jacket with no hat — and we drove south to Mohacs.

Mohacs, by the way, is the site of the defeat of the Hungarian Army by the Turks. It lies 10 miles
or so west of the main highway into Budapest from the southeast, which is the link with Rumania
along the north bank of the Danube, and with Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. It is about 75
miles south of Budapest. The trip down was uneventful and the bridge, it turned out, was not
being rebuilt. As we returned to the main road leading north to Budapest, we encountered a
Russian military convoy proceeding north. It consisted of US jeeps, 21/2-ton trucks, stake and
platform 10-ton trucks, plus artillery and towed antitank guns. The convoy seemingly was endless.
So, as we sat there at the road junction, we counted the vehicles and recorded bumper numbers.
The march units were closed up but there were gaps between serials. After an hour we became
impatient and pulled into a gap. The only identification on our jeep was a small 6 by 8 inch enamel
US flag on the right base of the windshield. Fortunately, we looked like all of the Russian jeeps in
the convoy. Anyway, about 30 miles up the road, the column turned into a huge forested area on

*For an overview of the political situation in Hungary during this period, see Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 103-158.

104

the right or east of the highway. A large group of officers and MPs were on the road and there was
no way we could avoid turning in so we tucked up close behind a 21/2-ton truck and scooted in
with the convoy. The delegation on the road looked at us hard but didn't stop us.

Inside the forest the road swept around in a large circle. We were moving counterclockwise. To
the right, at intervals of perhaps 200 to 300 yards, were parking areas and bivouacs, most of them
occupied with Russian troops and equipment. After about a mile, the element we were following
turned into one of these areas and we were alone on the circular inner road — and a bit nervous I
might add. Soon we came up behind a Budapest municipal water sprinkler wetting down the
road. We could see no way out except to follow the circular road. It led us by tank parks, artillery
parks, and command posts with lots of radio antennae, etcetera. I kept notes and counted
everything. Lo and behold, we finally came back to the point near the main highway where we had
entered. The MPs were still there and we chose not to exit through them so we started our second
trip around the cricuit. After more counting and more nervousness we reached the far side of the
circle and found a small firebreak road which we followed to the east. It finally took us out of the
forest and we found back roads which led to the main highway north of the Russian encampment.

In the legation I stayed up most of the night preparing a very voluminous and detailed report. In
those days we had a book of Russian bumper numbers which identified divisions and regiments. It
turned out that we had seen ninety percent of the 17th Guards Mechanized Division moving from
the USSR to Hungary in preparation for the invasion of Yugoslavia from the north. In those days
we had no satellite photography or other coverage. My report on a scale of A to F for reliability of
the source, and 1 to 5 for accuracy of the information, was rated A1 . For a short time I became the
darling of the US intelligence community. It nearly did me in professionally. It nearly sucked me
into the intelligence business permanently, but after one tour with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I was able to squirm out of an assignment to G-2, US Army, Europe (USAREUR), in
1952, and resume my career as a tactical officer with infantry units and staffs.*

INTERVIEWER: After recovering from leg operations, you put on a cloak and dagger and went to
work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Would you comment on what your duties were?

GEN DEPUY: Well, let me say that my leg was really banged up very badly. They had to operate
on it and put in a lot of screws, wrap wire around it and so on. So, I was at Walter Reed in June,
when the Korean War started, and about September, I was able to get around a little bit on
crutches in a half-shell cast. I really wanted to do something. Dick Stilwell was just starting up an
element in the CIA, which had to do with functions such as guerrilla warfare and things like that. It
became the active part, not the clandestine intelligence part, of the Agency. So, as my leg slowly
got better, and without any previous experience of any kind, I was placed in charge of China
operations, believe it or not.

For a couple of years, I busied myself with those kinds of things which took me to the Far East
on many, many trips. I guess that's really all I want to say. I was to spend a lot of time around the
periphery of China, and in Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, and Okinawa. It was a very active life and

*For a discussion of the events surrounding Stalin's deployment of troops into Hungary for possible use against Tito,
see Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 60-72.

105

rather exciting. I have to say in retrospect, that it was not all that productive, but everybody was
working hard. At that time, you see, China was clearly the enemy. Remember, it wasn't long after
the Korean War began when China intervened. So, I'll go this far, we were involved in very active
covert operations against China. You asked how I felt about sitting out the war in Korea. Well, I'll
have to say that I was actively employed in government service. When I left the Armed Forces
Staff College in 1953, even though the war was nearly over, I tried very hard to get to Korea. But,
instead, they sent me back to Europe for the third time. I went back for a fourth time, later. There
is just something about Europe; I just seemed to go that way.

INTERVIEWER: Was the Armed Forces Staff College merely a repeat of what you had done
previously at Leavenworth, or was there a different curriculum?

GEN DEPUY: Oh, there was an entirely different curriculum. It was all "joint," and there was a
fascinating group of people in that particular class. Fred Weyand was there. He was the best golf
player. Jack Norton and George Forsythe were both there, as was Harry Kinnard who was on the
faculty. Chesarek was there, and so was Dutch Kerwin.* It was a very relaxed kind of a course. I
lived in Washington and commuted with Colonel Art Allen and Chesarek, and played golf
everyday. I have to tell you, I didn't get much out of that course; I don't think anybody did. It was
a six month course. Joint doctrine is so vague because the really important things are done by the
service elements, not by the joint elements. We didn't get into joint operations except at the joint
planning level, and that's pretty thin gruel. So, I did not hold the Armed Forces Staff College
course in very high regard. The Navy held it in such low regard that they sent mostly supply
officers and people like that, although they did send Admiral Nimitz's son, who very shortly
thereafter, left the Navy. But, by and large, they sent the second team, and so did the Air Force.

INTERVIEWER: Was the Armed Forces Staff College in the normal progression, or was it a little
sideshow in the Army's educational system?

*General Frederick C. Weyand, USA Retired, was commissioned through ROTC at the University of California, in
1938. During World War II, he served in the China-Burma-India Theater. Other assignments included commanding
the 25th Infantry Division (1964-67), II Field Force, Vietnam (1967-68), and the US Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (1972-73). General Weyand also served as Chief of Staff of the Army (1974-75). Lieutenant Genera/ John
Norton, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1941. During World War II, he commanded a battalion in
the 82nd Airborne Division in the European Theater. Other assignments included commanding the 1st Cavalry
Division (1966-67), and the Combat Developments Command (1970-73). Lieutenant Genera/ George I. Forsythe, USA
Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1939, through ROTC at the University of Montana. During World War II,
he served in both the Pacific and the European theaters. Other assignments included commanding the 1st Cavalry
Division (1968-69), and the Combat Developments Command (1969-70). General Forsythe also served as the Project
Manager, All-Volunteer Army (1970-72). Lieutenant General Harry W.O. Kinnard, Jr., USA Retired, was
commissioned in 1939, in the Infantry. During World War II he served with the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment.
Other assignments included commanding the 1 1th Air Assault Division, Test (1963-65), the 1st Cavalry Division (1965-
66), and the Combat Developments Command (1967-69). Genera/ Ferdinand J. Chesarek, USA Retired, was
commissioned in the Field Artillery in 1938. During World War II he commanded the 28th Field Artillery Battalion in the
European Theater (1944-45). Other assignments included commanding the 5th Field Artillery Group (1954), the 4th
Logistics Command (1961-62), and the Army Materiel Command (1969-70). Genera/ Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., USA
Retired, was commissioned in the Field Artillery in 1939. Duty assignments included commanding the 3rd Armored
Division Artillery (1961-63), II Field Force, Vietnam (1968-69), the Continental Army Command (1973), and the Forces
Command (1973-74). General Kerwin also served as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (1974-78).

106

GEN DEPUY: Well, I don't really know what the career managers would say, but I think in the
current parlance, it was one of the "brownie points" that you were supposed to get.

INTERVIEWER: So, it was one of the holes in your ticket that had to be punched.

GEN DEPUY: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: We would now like to talk about your next tour in Europe, which occurred in late
1953. You were on the V Corps staff, but you also commanded the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry
Regiment. We're interested in your impressions about the soldiers, the equipment, the state of
training, and how you found this Army compared to the one you had left in 1945. What kind of
war did you believe that we should be preparing for, and how did you go about doing that.

GEN DEPUY: When I left the Armed Forces Staff College, I went to Europe and was assigned as
head of the counterintelligence branch of G-2, at US Army, Europe (USAREUR) headquarters,
which was a legacy of my Hungarian and CIA experience. This horrified me so much I went to the
general and told him that I didn't want the job. I used even stronger language than that. Though
he didn't like it very much, he let me out. It just so happened that in V Corps, the lieutenant
colonel in the G-3 section who had been conducting the infantry battalion Army Training Tests
(ATTs), had been relieved. So, they were looking for someone, and Colonel George Forsythe
recommended me to General LP. Swift, the V Corps commander. He was a fine soldier. He was
also an irascible but marvelous sort of a fellow, and he gave me the job. So, I went up to V Corps,
specifically picked by Swift to do that job, and for two years I was the Assistant G-3 for Training.
General, then captain, Bob Fair, by the way, was one of my assistants. For two years in a row I
tested all of the infantry battalions in the 1st and 4th Divisions, and in the 350th Infantry from
Austria. I did not test the armored infantry of the 2nd Armored Division. Well, let me tell you, I
learned a lot doing that.

That was probably the best training I ever got in the Army. It was very strenuous because each
one of those tests lasted for a day and a half. We didn't get any sleep and then, after one day of
rest, we would test another battalion. I went through a little over 20 battalions each year. I
watched people do it right, and I watched people do it wrong. I saw a lot more do it wrong than I
saw do it right. I was struck by the fact that those who had commanded battalions in war were
something like five times as good and those who hadn't. I blamed a little of that on Leavenworth,
because the ones who hadn't commanded in war, more or less took a passive attitude, and waited
for voluminous recommendations from their staff. With all of that going on, there was never time
enough to move the troops, or to let them dig in, or to do all of the things that they had to do.
They were always late, or lost, or mixed-up in one way or another. Now, the guys who previously
had commanded battalions, more or less made up their own minds, and the staff ran around
behind them and made it work. They gave the troops plenty of time to move and to dig in, which
made it a lot better. So, after two years of testing battalions, there was very little I didn't know
about the infantry in Europe, including the personalities as well as the good things and the bad
things.

107

From there I then went to the 4th Division which was commanded by General Eddleman. They
had a battalion of the 8th Infantry stationed all alone in Budingen, which I asked to command —
and I got it. When I arrived there, it was just as if it was the day after World War II. Nothing had
changed. The weapons were the same and the terrain was the same. So, I just felt very much at
home. As I looked at the training of the battalion, which was as good as any of the battalions over
there, I found that at the squad level it was a shambles, just like my battalion had been in World
War II. At the platoon level, it was a little bit better. The company commanders were better. They
had good potential. So, I decided to spend my time at the bottom. Now, that is when I first
applied the overwatch — at least under that terminology. I had an opportunity when I was at
corps to go over and watch 2nd Armored Division tank training under General Howze.* In my
opinion, General Howze was the best trainer in the Army. Unfortunately, he wasn't appreciated
the way he should have been. Everything that he had written about how to train a tank platoon
struck me as precisely the way to train a rifle squad since each of them have two operating
sections or teams. So, I wrote up several little booklets which we used as training manuals and
doctrine in that battalion. I trained all of the squads and platoons uniformly. I personally tested
them all. I tested every squad three or four times. I used to spend days and weeks out there with
those squads. I knew every squad leader well — both his good points and bad points. They got
very, very good.

The other thing I brought with me from World War II was that I insisted that when the battalion
was dug in, you couldn't see it from the front. All of my colleagues had come from Korea, and
they built big forts. When you got out in front, you could see everything. Well, one of the
problems that I had was that the umpires who came to test me thought I was crazy. They didn't
understand why I hadn't built Korean pillboxes on the military crest or at the bottom of the hill.
Instead, I had my guys behind rocks, trees and bushes. I wouldn't let them disturb the bushes, but
made them dig in behind them, so you couldn't see a thing from the front.

Well, to make a long story short, when I took my first annual training test at Wildflecken, the
first thing we did was the defense, and all of the company and platoon umpires ran back to the
battalion umpire and said, "This battalion is totally unsatisfactory. They don't know how to dig
in." So, the battalion umpire came and told me that, and I said, "Okay, stop. Go and get the
regimental commander, we're going to have a little talk." This was very ironic because the fellow
testing me, Colonel Claude Baker, was the man who had previously commanded my battalion. I
had taken over from him, and now he was testing me. But, he was a hell of a good man. He had
been in the 5th Regimental Combat Team in Korea and was a terrific fighter. We talked it over,
and he agreed one hundred percent with what we were doing. He got all his umpires together and
instructed them. They also were skeptical about the overwatch, and bounding, and all of that.
Anyhow, we took the test, and we got a low score. We got 80 on a scale of 100. Well, it turned
out that when the year was over, 80 was the high score in the corps, but it was a hard way to get
started.

*General Hamilton H. Howze, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1930. During World War II he
commanded the 13th Armored Regiment in the Mediterranean Theater (1943-44), and Combat Command A, 1st
Armored Division, in Italy (1944-45). Other assignments included command of the 82nd Airborne Division (1958-59),
and the XVIII Corps (1961-63), and Eighth Army, Korea (1963-65). He also served as Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command, US Forces, Korea, and Eighth Army, Korea (1963-65).

108

The point of all this is, that if your squads are well-trained, and you know that they are doing
one of three things, then you can visualize how much space they take. And, if the platoons are
trained the same way, everything is uniform. Now, there is plenty of room for initiative on the part
of the leaders to adapt this to the terrain and to the enemy, but at least you know what it is that
they are working with. And, the battalion ran just like a clock. The problem was that it was about a
decade or two ahead of its time. That sounds a little egotistical, but that's exactly right, because if
you went out and looked at a rifle squad or a platoon today, you would see exactly that. If you
looked at the defensive positions, you would see what you knew in Vietnam as the DePuy foxhole,
where they all had frontal cover and were all camouflaged. So, that's what happened to the 2nd
Battalion, 8th Infantry.*

INTERVIEWER: In the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, you commanded soldiers a generation
younger than the soldiers you had commanded in World War II. Although they apparently were
similar in many respects, please compare the quality of the soldiers in the mid-1950s with those of
the mid- 1940s.

GEN DEPUY: Well, of course, it may have been a generation or a half generation later, but they
were the same age at the time, so they had the same characteristics. I thought the quality was
pretty good. In fact, I thought the quality, if anything, was better. There was, however, one big
difference — we had a lot of blacks. We didn't have any blacks in World War II. But, this time I
had blacks, and I thought they were fine. However, we were beginning to have some racial
problems even then, in that they divided up the gasthauses. All the blacks went to one, while all
the whites went to others, and once in awhile they would fight over a gasthaus. Now, in the early
1950s, when I was in the 8th Infantry, the Korean War was just over. So, there was a wartime
mentality in the Army. A wartime mentality means that you get a lot of soldiers furnished to you
who do what they are told. So, back then, there wasn't the concern that the Army shows for its
people today, although we had some education programs. But, we spent almost all of our time
training, and most of that training was done in the field; yet, the soldiers accepted that. We didn't
have any particular problem. You asked me if I thought the soldiers liked it. I don't suppose they
did. I don't think they liked it any more than wartime soldiers liked it. However, the soldiers
responded to pride of unit. They knew they were better trained than the other battalions and took
great satisfaction in that. By the way, my company commanders were superb. Only one was a
Regular. The others were products of Korea — enlisted men promoted to officer. One, Joe
Hackett, was the best I've ever had — tough, demanding, autocratic, but incredibly effective.

INTERVIEWER: What was the mission of the 8th Infantry?

GEN DEPUY: The 4th Division had responsibility for the sector now held by the 3rd Armored
Division, and part of the 8th Mechanized sector around Fulda and over to Bad Hersfeld. In those
days we were very thin on the ground. There was no German Army. You ran up to get into

*For a discussion of the DePuy foxhole or "1st Division Bunker," see "Combat Notes: Bunker Building," Infantry 59
(September-October 1969), 46-50.

109

The DePuy foxhole was also called (for test
purposes) PARFOX or parapet foxhole. The hole
was either dug behind a large rock, mound or
tree so that it afforded frontal protection.
If no natural feature was available, the
soldiers placed the spoil in front of the hole
in the form of a berm high enough to cover the
heads of the occupants from frontal observation
or suppression. The soldiers fired at 45° angles
from behind this camouflaged frontal cover.
If time allowed, camouflaged overhead
cover was added. Interlocking fields of fire
covered all the killing zones and the position
could not be suppressed by direct fire. One
such position at Loc Ninh prepared by the 1st
Battalion, 18th Infantry in 1967, caused an
exchange ratio of enemy to friendly killed of
198 to 1.

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position depending upon how much warning you had, and then, you delayed back toward the
Rhine. We had about one platoon for each paved road. That's all! So, it was going to be a platoon
battle, and each platoon had a recoilless rifle. Maybe a platoon would have a section of tanks but
normally not. They had their 106mm recoilless rifles on jeeps; they had a machine gun or two, and
a 3.5-inch Bazooka or two. They scattered a few mines out across the road, and there would be a
mile or two between platoons. That's one of the reasons why I concentrated on squad and
platoon training, because it was going to be a squad and platoon war.

INTERVIEWER: Was your battalion foot mobile or motorized?

GEN DEPUY: We were a foot mobile division, but there were enough truck companies around so
that when necessary, we could mount up on trucks.

INTERVIEWER: After your command of the battalion you became Deputy Chief of Staff at V
Corps for awhile.

GEN DEPUY: Yes. I was promoted out of the battalion. That's why I left. I was promoted to
colonel, and they didn't have a job for me in the division, so I went back and became the Deputy

110

106mm Recoilless Rifle (top photo) and 3.5-inch "Bazooka" in action (bottom photo).

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Chief of Staff at V Corps. That was a holding job and during that time, the most interesting thing I
did was act as the deputy director for a couple of big Seventh Army exercises. I then came back to
the United States to work in the Chief of Staff's office.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, at this particular point in time, as you prepared to return to the United
States, you had been on active duty about 15 years or so, and were at mid-career. From a
personal point of view, did you see yourself as a man with a future in the Army? In terms of
comparison with your contemporaries, how did you size up the situation?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I was right with my contemporaries, but my contemporaries were well ahead
of the pack. When I say contemporaries, I'm talking about Chuck Wilson, George Forsythe, Art

111

Collins, and people like that. All of us had been lucky enough to command battalions when we
were very young and retain our lieutenant colonel's rank. We were on the forward slope of the
"hump" and were all moving along together. We recognized that we were in a fairly advantageous
position because we were being promoted to colonel at a reasonably young age, although we had
all been lieutenant colonels for about nine years. But, about then, promotions began to move
again. So, in those days, my attitude was that I was right on par, but on par with a group that was
strategically well-placed in the race, age wise.

INTERVIEWER: Upon your return from Europe in 1956, you were assigned to the Office of the
Chief of Staff in the Pentagon. You were there for almost four years. What went on while you
were there? What things were you working on, and what things were you thinking about?

GEN DEPUY: The reason I went to the Chief of Staff's office was because of General Forsythe.
George Forsythe was working there, and he needed to find somebody to take his job so he could
go down and take command of a battle group in the newly activated 101st Airborne Division. So,
he arranged for my immediate transfer to take care of his little problem. When I arrived there, I
found a rather amazing situation. You may not recall, but the Chief of Staff of the Army was Max
Taylor, Eisenhower was the President, and massive retaliation was the strategy. The Air Force
was riding high. The Army was feeling sorry for itself. Because Ike thought that he knew all about
the Army, it was getting short shrift. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was Admiral Radford.
Admiral Radford, I think, despised the Army even more than most admirals. General
Westmoreland was the Secretary of the General Staff and the coordination group was the Army's
response to the inter-service war. It was formed under Brigadier General Lyle Metheny, a
marvelously leathery, former cavalry sergeant. He was both brilliant and combative. He
surrounded himself with some bright young colonels, at least that was his idea — Mel Coburn,
Don Yuell, George Forsythe, a fellow named Pickell, Lieutenant Colonel Grant, and later, Ham
Twitchell and others. Their job, without it ever being put into a charter, was to assist the Army in
surviving the regime of Eisenhower and Radford, and the era of massive retaliation.*

This little office became very active in trying to influence members of Congress and members of
the press. They became a little overactive and went a little bit too far at one point, and some of the
papers they had written were exposed to full daylight. So,, they were, to put it kindly, dispersed.
Colonel Forsythe went to the 101st, which he wanted to do anyway, but the timing was
fortuitous. Yuell went up to the War College, and the others went elsewhere. Anyway, there was
some slight embarrassment, and I arrived just at that time..

The question then was what would we do? For awhile we wrote learned papers. General Taylor
was the leading advocate of the concept of flexible response. He also came up with the Pentomic
Division. This was his response to the fact the Army seemed to have been left out of the atomic
age and needed to sound and appear very modern. Pentomic was thought to be one way to do
that. Actually, I think the Pentomic idea has more merit to it than it was ever given credit for
having. So, we worked the inter-service beat. Oh, we did all sorts of things. We started the Army
Association at that time. I was, for about three years, the Chief of Staff's man for the Army

*For an overview of this particular period, see Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper &
Brothers, Publishers, 1960).

112

Association. We helped organize and put on the first annual meeting and the initial symposiums.
When I say "we," I really mean more than anyone else, Bob Cocklin. He was then, as now, the
primary power behind the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). It was pretty small.
General Gavin was very instrumental in getting it started, along with Cocklin, Forsythe and others.
We wrote some speeches. I contributed to one of the chapters in General Taylor's book, The
Uncertain Trumpet, which had to do with the tactical air forces. We regarded it as regrettable that
they had been split from the Army. You can still make a good argument for that today, but they
are split and that's that. We generally watched over the interservice battles that went on. Now,
this was rather an awkward thing to do, because General Eddleman, for example, was the
DCSOPS, and if you asked him who was responsible for all of these matters, he would have said
that he was. So, it was not always a comfortable place to be. It was one of those little groups that
is often resented, sometimes does some good, sometimes doesn't do much at all, but often does
some things that need to be done which the large formal staffs either don't want to do, can't do,
or don't do. That was a rather strange career interlude. By the way, the officer who sat right next
to me for two of those four years was Bernie Rogers. He then went over and became General
Taylor's executive officer. So, I guess that explains the coordination group.*

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Lieutenant General
George I. Forsythe

* General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA Retired, was commissioned in 1922, in the Corps of Engineers. Transferring to the
Field Artillery, General Taylor commanded the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery (1943-44), in the European Theater
during World War II. Other assignments included command of Eighth Army, Korea (1953-54), and Army Forces, Far
East (1954-55). General Taylor also served as Chief of Staff of the Army (1955-59). Retiring in 1959, General Taylor
was recalled to active duty to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-64). Retiring again in 1964, General
Taylor served as Ambassador to South Vietnam (1965), and as Special Consultant to the President (1965-69). general
Bernard W. Rogers, USA, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1943. General Rogers has commanded the 5th
Infantry Division (1969-70), and Forces Command (1974-76). General Rogers also has served as the Chief of Staff of
the Army (1976-79). Since 1979, General Rogers has been the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

113

INTERVIEWER: Could you say a few more words about the Pentomic Division? We noted in one
of your letters that you took exception to the Pentomic Division.

GEN DEPUY: Well, of course, one of the great flaws of the Pentomic Division was the fact that
there weren't any jobs for infantry lieutenant colonels. The armored division stayed aloof from it
throughout, as did the armored infantry. So, in an infantry battle group you had a colonel dealing
directly with captains. You had a lieutenant colonel as the deputy commander, and you had
majors as the principal staff officers, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4. So, there wasn't any career
progression. What happened to this captain after he relinquished command of his company while
waiting to become a colonel? You can't train an Army that way. You need a lieutenant colonel
level command for sure, in order to keep them current and give them command experience. So,
that was bad. Also, the companies were too large and unwieldy. However, other than that, I had
fun with it because commanding a battle group was really like commanding my third battalion. It
was just a great big battalion. And, having commanded two battalions previously, I really like to
think that I handled the battle group very well. The span of control wasn't too much. I have to say
that some battle group commanders who had not had a lot of experience with battalions found it
cumbersome. But, they tried to do it through the staff like a brigade or regiment rather than
command it directly like a battalion.*

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hSee Field Manual 7-100, Infantry Division (Washington: USGPO, 1958), 6, 8.

114

INTERVIEWER: With regard to the 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry, please comment on your
training program based on your assessment of what you needed to do, what you did, and how
you felt about the results.

GEN DEPUY: Well, you may remember that while I commanded the 1st Battle Group, 30th
Infantry, it was mechanized. In fact, the 30th was the first mechanized battle group in Europe. So,
actually, I guess I could divide the training that we did there into two periods and two different
subjects. The first period was when I again trained all of the rifle platoons in the three types of
overwatch and the platoon techniques, dismounted. Incidentally, I had some marvelous young
fellows there. George Joulwan and Jim Madden were both there, as was Charlie Getz and a
number of other chaps who have done rather well. So, anyway, I started out again training from
the bottom up, and did all sorts of testing of squads, platoons, and companies. Then we were
mechanized and were able to operate like armored forces, which I liked. But, you have to train
very carefully to do that. You've got to have companies that can be underway in five minutes —
max! I mean, the whole company must be moving in the direction that you want it to move, and
doing what you want it to do as a result of battle drill type command and control.

To this day, most units in our Army can't do that. Generally speaking, the tank battalions do
better than the mech battalions. If you have, as I did in the 30th Infantry, five maneuver elements
and often more than that, with one or two tank companies or sometimes a cavalry troop attached,
it is necessary to go to checkpoint-type command and control and mission-type orders. We
trained very hard to be able to do that, to be able to call up "Charlie Six" and say, "Move to
Checkpoint 55." That's all I would have to tell him! Within a matter of a minute or two, I'd get an
"on the way," whether he had tanks with him or not. And, he knew what to do when he got to
Checkpoint 55. That was part of our Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). You go there, you
occupy a battle position, you look around and see what's going on, you contact any friendlies in
the area, you sight your company in the direction that you think the enemy is coming from, and
you prepare to move again. Now, if I wanted him to do more than that, I could tell him to go to
Checkpoint 55 and put in a strong point, which meant, "Dig in; you are going to be there a long
time." Or, I could tell him, "Go to Checkpoint 55 and be prepared to move on order to Checkpoint
56." But, very few things had to be told to these people. So, the alacrity of the organization was
very high while still maintaining squad and platoon battle drill.

In fact, that makes it easier because you know exactly what they look like on the ground — how
much space they take and how much time. I think it was about a month after we were
mechanized, that I took the battle group into the field in January, when the ground was frozen,
and just stayed in the field from then until early April, training tactically. We could go anywhere.
We went down and played games with the 2nd Cavalry, the 4th Infantry, and the 15th Infantry. In
fact, we went right through that training into our Army Training Test at Hohenfels, without ever
coming back. Now, the wives didn't like that, but it was absolutely super training. It was the kind
of training that you would do if you knew you were going to go to war. The troops were dirty. I
mean, their clothing was torn and dirty. Also, their vehicles were dirty, but they had learned how
to maintain themselves in the field. They were not eating candy bars anymore. They were eating
Army food. The replacement system, the maintenance system, the supply system, and the
tactical system, were all working in the field.

115

It was very interesting when we went into the training test. Andy Goodpaster gave it to us.*
When we went into it, the umpires all looked at the battle group and then reported immediately to
me and to Andy that they were disappointed because the soldiers didn't appear to be "up" for it;
they didn't seem to be "high" for this training test. Well, they weren't. I mean, this was just
another day. Eventually, the soldiers became enthusiastic. It was a three or five day test, and they
just steadily gained enthusiasm from the competition, and they hit the high point at the end
instead of at the beginning. But, our vehicles were running 90 to 95 percent operational all of the
time. We had absolutely no trouble of any kind. We were ready for war.

One of the reasons that the battle group experience was interesting was that in the beginning I
was also the commander of a task force. I had the 30th Infantry, the 38th Infantry, a tank
battalion, and a cavalry squadron. That got to be so interesting that Goodpaster came up and took
over. I had responsibility for the Meiningen Gap. When we weren't out training the individual
elements, we'd take the whole task force out and train up there by Munnerstadt, Neustadt and
Konigshofen. So, I would say that the 30th was the practical culmination of my experience as an
infantry unit commander. I felt like I was able to put it all together, make it work, and really move it
around tactically.

■■■■ ^

General
Andrew J. Goodpaster

Colonel DePuy, Commander, 1st Battle Group,

30th Infantry, shown briefing the Commandant

of the German Infantry School in 1961 .

* General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers in 1939. During World
War II, General Goodpaster commanded the 48th Engineer Construction Battalion in Italy (1943-44). Other
assignments included command of the 8th Infantry Division (1961-62), service as the Director, Joint Staff (1966-67),
and a tour as the Commandant, National War College (1967-68). General Goodpaster also served as Commander in
Chief, Europe and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1969-74). Retiring in 1974, General Goodpaster was recalled
to active duty in 1977 and served as the Superintendent, United States Military Academy (1977-81).

116

INTERVIEWER: It appears that you felt very good about the quality of the soldier that you had
then. Would you compare them with the World War II variety?

GEN DEPUY: I am led to believe that that was the time when the Army had the best people it has
ever had. I say that because I read a book recently that said the Selective Service System rejected
about 35 percent, and in 1960 and 1961, the Army rejected 78 percent at the Armed Forces
Examination and Entrance Station (AFEES). This means that the Army was getting roughly the
top 20 percent of the physical and mental specimens in the country. In short, the troops were
super. Of course, they were not volunteers.

INTERVIEWER: Before taking command of the 30th Infantry you were a student at the British
Imperial Defense College. Please tell us about your experiences there?

GEN DEPUY: I'll just say that it was a very pleasant interlude for me and the family. I happen to
enjoy the British. The course lasted for a year and was a very high level type of thing. We were
concerned about things like the Commonwealth and the world, and we travelled around a lot,
including a trip to the Middle East. Also, I met a lot of people who are still friends. It was the most
relaxing year of my life; it was a very nice sabbatical.

INTERVIEWER: In the spring of 1962 you became the Director of Special Warfare in the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), in the Pentagon. What happened
during the time you were there?

GEN DEPUY: That was an interesting period. I came back there under the auspices of General
Bill Rosson, who had been the Assistant Division Commander of the 8th Division, and had been
the director of an exercise in Germany, which is what brought the two of us into close contact.*
He was appointed the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Counterinsurgency. Then, within
a month after his return from Europe, he sent for me and I came back to take the job as Director of
Special Warfare. Needless to say, I didn't know anything about it. We had some interesting
people in there. My deputy was George Blanchard; Bill Bond, who was killed in Vietnam, was
there also. But, counterinsurgency was all the rage in Washington because the Kennedys had
come into office pledged to "help any friend." The Vietnam War was still at a relatively low level at
this time. The Army was trying to find, as were the other services, a role in this new and exciting
high-priority national endeavor. I had just one year of that.

In retrospect, I have a couple of feelings about it. We were rather mechanistic about the whole
thing. I guess I'm using the same words that I used to describe the training for World War II, but I
think in some respects, the situations were not dissimilar. None of us were experts. The subjects
were guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, political action, and

*General William B. Rosson, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry through ROTC at the University of
Oregon in 1940. During World War II, General Rosson commanded the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, in the European
Theater. Other assignments included command of the 30th Infantry Regiment (1946-47), the 39th Infantry Regiment
(1955-56), and I Field Force, Vietnam (1967-68). General Rosson also served as Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific
(1970-72), and as Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Panama (1972-75).

117

General
William B. Rosson

General
George S. Blanchard

civic action. I think those are the functions that fall under the general rubric of Special Warfare.
We were trying to organize Special Forces units around the world — a group in Okinawa, a
group in Panama, a group in Europe, plus another reserve group or two at Fort Bragg — and
combine them with other experts in civil affairs, and be ready to do whatever the President said
this country was going to do anywhere in the world. The whole thing, of course, eventually was
sucked into the maw of Vietnam, but it was an activist philosophy. It was premised on the
assumption that if we were smart enough at all those things then we could somehow thwart the
efforts of the communists to subvert the Third World through wars of liberation. We thought we
could bring up some disadvantaged country in the image of America. Well, now, after all these
years, we know better. We have a much more modest view of our capabilities. So, I look back on
all of that as a period of fumbling — national fumbling. A lot of rather important people in the
Administration were behind it, including General Taylor. He left the Pentagon and became an
advisor to the President and then came back as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because
he was, indeed, first of all, a flexible response man, and counterinsurgency was regarded as a
component of flexible response. There was a great deal of confidence in Washington, naive
confidence, that we could do anything we set our minds to. What we discovered in Vietnam and
are discovering again in Central America is that the political dimension of an insurgency is central
to the outcome. On the political side we are really amateurs. Our belief in political freedom —that
is, one-man-one-vote — ties our hands in the rough and tumble politics of dictators and
communists.

The reason I left Special Warfare was that I was promoted. I want to add one thing that I just
thought of. In 1962, I went over to Vietnam with Colonel George Morton to establish the Special
Forces headquarters at Nha Trang. The Central Intelligence Agency had taken over a number of
Special Forces "A" Detachments and had inaugurated a program up at Ban Me Thuot, with the
Rhade tribe of Montagnards. It had worked rather well and the history of Vietnam is that anything
that worked well with ten good men, we tried to expand to 10,000 men right away. We thought
Special Forces had a role to use its own troops, but we didn't want them to play it under the
Agency. The Army wanted to play its own game. So, that was the beginning of setting up the
Special Forces Command in Vietnam, a command which grew to at least 10,000 at its peak. In
fact, the whole operation had the moniker of "Operation Switchback," which meant the switch of

118

Special Forces and
Vietnamese soldiers during

a combat patrol into
Vietcong infested territory.

the Special Forces from the Central Intelligence Agency back in the Army. That's just another
footnote.

INTERVIEWER: Following your tour as Director of Special Warfare you spent a year as the
Director of Plans and Programs, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force
Development (ACSFOR).

GEN DEPUY: Well, let me say that that experience was a very important one to me, and really
was most beneficial in terms of preparing me to later take over the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff's
job, which was also primarily a programming job. The job in ACSFOR was an interesting one. You
know, George Blanchard, Fritz Kroesen, and Donn Starry had that same job.* To this day all of us
speak the same language and have the same strong feelings about the necessity for what we then
called a Force Development Plan. Donn Starry calls it the Battlefield Development Plan, which is
simply the Force Development Plan transplanted down to the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), because they are no longer doing it up in the Pentagon. Fritz Kroesen understands all
of that. Paul Phillips happened to be another one of the people who held the job. So, it's a special
little club that we have. Basically, we were trying to do force planning at the departmental level so
that weapons development, organization, training, tactics, and resources were all synchronized. It
was a big step to take and it was only partially successful. After ten years of existence General
Abrams eliminated ACSFOR and the force development function went to DCSOPS where it has

* Genera/ Frederick J. Kroesen, Jr., USA Retired, enlisted in the Army Reserve in 1942, and was called to active duty
the following year. General Kroesen was commissioned in 1944, following completion of the Infantry Officer
Candidate School, at Fort Benning, Georgia. During World War II, General Kroesen served with the 254th Infantry
Regiment in the European Theater. Other assignments included commanding the 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team, Korea (1953), the 2nd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, Japan (1953-
55), the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Vietnam (1968-69), the 23rd Infantry Division, Vietnam (1971), VII Corps (1975-
76), and Forces Command (1976-78). General Kroesen also served as the Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe and
Seventh Army (1979-83).

119

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ACSFOR)

SPECIAL ASSISTANT
FOR TACTICAL MOBILITY

ARMY
AVIATION

CBR &

NUCLEAR

OPERATIONS

DOCTRINE,

ORGANIZATION

& TRAINING

MATERIEL
REQUIREMENTS

PLANS &
PROGRAMS

ACSFOR Organizational Chart as of July 1963.

not prospered. So, TRADOC has taken over half of the function and the other half of it is done by
DCSOPS and the Director of the Army Staff's Program and Analysis Office.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think it's now appropriately placed at TRADOC, or should there still be
something like that in the Department of the Army?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I think that it's very difficult for TRADOC to do it because TRADOC is one of
several subordinate commands, and the Force Development Plan should have a great deal of
executive power. Frankly, it also had difficulty in ACSFOR for the same reason. You had force
development planning in ACSFOR, operational planning in DCSOPS, and then you had program
planning up in the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff. The higher you go, the more power you have.
Programming at the Chief of Staff's level, feeds the budget directly, whereas the Force
Development Plan was a supporting document that didn't feed the budget quite as directly, but
was used by the staff in formulating their portions of the program. As I said, it was difficult to
accomplish in ACSFOR. It will be even more difficult to do down in TRADOC, and I think it is still
an open question about whether or not a reincarnation of it is needed up at the Department of the
Army level. The symptoms of the problem are visible in the Army's efforts to cope with the "tank
program" and the "force modernization" problem.

120

CHAPTER VI
Early Days of the Second Indochina War

INTERVIEWER: At this point in your career you again were assigned to an active theater, this
time as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) J-3. Please give us a brief description
of your duties, the projects, you were working on, and the activities that were going on at that
time.*

GEN DEPUY: When I arrived General Harkins was still in command but General Westmoreland
had already arrived. He was the deputy and was obviously being groomed to take Harkin's job.**
General Stilwell the former J-3, became the Chief of Staff. It was a deceptively quiet atmosphere.
Militarily it was not terribly active in the spring of 1964, when I arrived. People were still very much
concerned about the overthrow of the Diem regime and were trying to pick up the pieces. I might
add that political turmoil continued with a series of almost comic opera coups. Then in the fall of
1964, the Vietcong launched a coordinated effort to topple the Government of Vietnam (GVN)
through a series of large battles which we can talk about later.

General Westmoreland then assumed command. MACV changed from a staff that originally
was very much concerned with advisory duties and the support of the ARVN in terms of training,
to a staff that was increasingly concerned with operations. There was still a Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG), when I arrived, but it then was absorbed within MACV. We soon had
about 13 companies of helicopters deployed throughout the country, and we had an Air Force
Advisory Detachment with the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), some Navy elements, and the
Special Forces. Incidentally, the first Ops Center at MACV consisted of one officer and one
sergeant who were located in a large closet. It contained a single sideband radio used for
communications with the Military Police in Saigon, and some commercial telephones for
communications with the corps. That was it. That was the Ops Center. We ran the US effort
through the senior corps advisors. They were the subordinate echelons. And, they had
operational control of the helicopters unless we took them away.

What operational influence we had was generally based upon deciding which battles were the
most important, allocating our intra-theater airlift accordingly for moving Vietnamese troops, and

*For background on the US Army's early involvement in Vietnam see Ronald H. Spector, United States Army in
Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Washington: USGPO, 1983). See also, William E. DePuy,
"Vietnam: What We Might Have Done and Why We Didn't Do It," Army 36 (February 1986), 22-25, 28-40.

** General Paul D. Harkins was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1929. During World War II, General Harkins served as
the Deputy Chief of Staff, Seventh Army (1943-44) and Third Army (1944-45), in the European Theater. General
Harkins also commanded the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1962-64). General William C. Westmoreland,
USA Retired, was commissioned in the Field Artillery in 1936. During World War II, General Westmoreland served in
the European Theater with the 9th Infantry Division. Other assignments included command of the 187th Regimental
Combat Team, in Korea (1952-53), the 101st Airborne Division (1958-60), the XVIII Airborne Corps (1963-64), and the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1964-68). General Westmoreland also served as Chief of Staff of the Army
(1968-72).

121

%i?

General Paul D. Harkins

General William C. Westmoreland

■ ' :^H^S:^;B:':"iL;"i; ■ .. ■'.

US Army advisors working with the South Vietnamese.

assembling helicopters companies wherever the battle was taking place. To indicate what a one-
horse operation we were running we kept a Caribou (C-7) out at Tan Son Nhut loaded with hand
pumps. These were needed to pump fuel out of 55-gallon drums into helicopters. There was a
sergeant whose name I think was Smith, who was CINCPUMP. The problem was always the time
it took for refueling. If you could refuel rapidly near the battle site, you didn't need as many
helicopters and vice versa. If I decided to move some helicopter companies from the Delta up into
the III Corps, we immediately dispatched Sergeant Smith with the hand pumps and we got the
tactical airlift to begin flying in 55-gallon drums of fuel.

My close friend and constant companion was Brigadier General Thang, the J-3 of the
Vietnamese Joint Staff. He controlled ARVN to the extent that there was central control. The
corps commanders were political-military feudal lords.

INTERVIEWER: You have characterized or at least painted a picture showing the Vietnamese
government to be on the verge of losing control. I wonder if you would comment on your
appraisal of the government, and on the effectiveness of its organization?

122

GEN DEPUY: Well, there wasn't a Vietnamese government as such. There was a military junta
that ran the country. Most of the senior Vietnamese officers, as you know, had served in the
French Army. A lot of them had been sergeants. Politically, they were inept. The various efforts at
pacification required a cohesive, efficient governmental structure which simply did not exist.
Furthermore, corruption was rampant. There was coup after coup, and militarily, defeat after
defeat. General Westmoreland indicated in a message that he sent after the battle of Binh Ba, up
in Quang Ngai Province, that he gave the Vietnamese government six months to live at most,
because they were losing a battalion a day, and a district town a week, something like that. The
situation was very critical. That was the assessment in MACV at the time that recommendations
and decisions were being made concerning the introduction of US Forces. To coordinate the
entire US effort General Taylor, who was then the ambassador, formed a mission council
consisting of himself as chairman, General Westmoreland, and the AID, CIA, and USIA heads.
Many subcommittees were formed and much paper generated. The J-3 was drawn into this effort
in support of General Westmoreland. This was the beginning — a belated beginning I might
add — in the integrated pacification effort which finally congealed under Mr. Komer and was
placed entirely under MACV. In the beginning there were endless jurisdictional disputes.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of the ARVN, was there any single thing such as the way they did
business, or the way they controlled their fires, or the intelligence they had, that you could point at
and say, "This is where they need help. If we fix this, then the ARVN will be a lot better."

SSSSnSra^*? -«■

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) elements conducting area sweeps.

GEN DEPUY: The basic motivation of the ARVN seldom equalled the motivation of the VC and
NVA. On the technical side, the ARVN was losing the war just the way the French had lost the
war, and for many of the same military reasons. They didn't have the mobility to react rapidly to a
Viet Cong attack, so the attacks, almost without exception, were successful and the attackers
withdrew before any substantial reaction could take place. It was like the French on Route 19

123

when they were defeated at the Mang Yang Pass. The French soldiers fought well, but if you look
at it from an analytical point of view, from the moment the first shot was fired, the force ratios
moved progressively against the French because they could not be reinforced while their
casualties mounted. The Viet Minh were already there in strength.* Now, the same thing was
happening to the ARVN in the days just before our rather massive intervention. Even with a few
helicopter companies, it wasn't enough to allow the ARVN to react quickly enough. Not only that,
but the ARVN commanders hadn't tasted success for a long time, so they had become
pessimistic. They expected defeat. They conceded to the enemy superior tactics, superior
indoctrination, and superior will power. And, they lost all of the battles they thought they were
going to lose, just as most troops will under those conditions. Just to jump ahead and finish this
sort of tactical train of thought — in every operation fought over there by American forces, and
certainly when you and I were together in the 1st Division, from the time the first shot was fired in
any battle, from that minute on, the combat power ratio turned in our favor. The situation was just
the reverse from what had occurred before, because we brought in artillery, we brought in air, and
then, we brought in more troops. Now, the ARVN eventually tasted success; it was able to move
with our help, and began to achieve victories. There is nothing that helps an Army like victories.
The ARVN got fairly confident, and it was winning battles. And then, we vietnamized.

So, they again lost their ability to concentrate. The name of the game in a war like that is that
the insurgents have the advantage of picking the time and the place to attack. They can decide to
fight only when they are going to win. The only antidote for that is to be able to react faster and to
put more on the battlefield than they can. By and large, the American Army did that, and, by and
large, it won battles. So, when you strip away all of the politics and everything else, that is the
tactical story of Vietnam.

INTERVIEWER: In your role as the J-3, I imagine you had a lot of contact with the various US
agencies that either were present or were coming into Vietnam during that period. Please describe
your perception of the role and the interface between these agencies during that period of time.

GEN DEPUY: Well, as I said earlier, they had what was called the Country Team, sometimes
labeled the "Mission Council." General Westmoreland was a member; the local heads of the CIA,
USIA, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), were members; and then,
there was a political officer representing the State Department. The ambassador was chairman of
the group. It met once or twice a week while General Taylor was in Vietnam as the ambassador. It
met formally at least once a week. They decided how to coordinate the activities of the various
agencies represented. Everything considered, I believe they did a pretty good job. To be frank,
there was a certain amount of bickering. There was this feeling of which element was really the
most important element. They would argue about how big the police force should get under the
auspices of AID, versus how big the regional forces should get under the auspices of MACV. But,
all of the arguments were eventually resolved by reasonable men.

The Country Team caused a lot of things to happen long before Komer came along with Civil
Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Everybody recognized that there were

*For an account of the battle of Mang Yang Pass, see Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy , 4th ed. (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Co., 1967), 182-225.

124

several levels of war going on simultaneously, ranging all the way from the very quiet, subversive
political war and use of terror down in the hamlets and villages, up to the use of main forces, with
everything in between. The political actions of the Vietnamese government, the nature of the
economy, prices, the building of roads — there was nothing that happened in Vietnam that
wasn't relevant to the total outcome. So, the agencies began to reinforce their efforts. Each
agency brought in more people and more money, and initiated new activities. The US and the
Vietnamese organizations were sort of parallel hierarchies, with the US trying to help at every
level. Eventually, we were helping in all of the provinces and districts, at all of the corps and
division headquarters, in every department and ministry of the government, at all of the ports and
airfields, with the intelligence and police services, and with all of the social welfare services. You
can go on, and on, and on. I believe that by the time of TET, under Komer's "blowtorch"
treatment, that effort was moving along quite well.

INTERVIEWER: This was TET of what year, sir?

GEN DEPUY: TET came in 1968. TET was the watershed. Before TET, I would say that the
military battle wasn't won, the subversive battle wasn't won, and the economic battle wasn't
won; but, the other side wasn't winning either. It was a stalemate. The enemy couldn't take over
South Vietnam and we couldn't defeat the enemy who controlled his casualties by pacing his
operations — by controlling the tempo. Then TET came along and showed that in that kind of a
war, the guerrillas, the enemy, can make a sudden effort and go anywhere, including in the
nation's capitol or in the American Embassy, if they are willing to pay the price. But, people back
in the United States still thought of war in terms of lines, and concluded that if the enemy could
get into Saigon, then we were losing. So, TET struck a deathblow in Washington, even though
the VC were decisively defeated and never recovered. After TET it was a North Vietnamese war.
TET was a military disaster and a political triumph for the other side. The North Vietnamese lost
the battle but they won the war as a result of TET, no question about it. It terrified and horrified
the people in Washington. Eventually, however, historians will write about the Vietnam War and
say, "The kind of things we were doing in Vietnam before TET were right for that kind of war. But,
it would have taken a very long time."

However, considering the attitude in the US, the effort was too expensive, lasted too long,
became too frustrating, was too complex, involved too much television, resulted in too much
gore, and required too much patience. In short, the American people decided that Vietnam wasn't
worth it. The other way to have won the war was General LeMay's concept — "Bomb North
Vietnam back into the stone age." In retrospect, his solution was more American than the
sophisticated counterinsurgency efforts which couldn't finish the job within the tolerances of the
American people and their political leaders.

INTERVIEWER: Concerning the Vietnamese National Police Field Force, at one point there
seemed to be some controversy over just how extensive its role was going to be, or just what it
was going to do, at least as far as the Vietnamese were concerned. I wonder if you would care to
comment on that?

125

GEN DEPUY: Yes. That has an interesting origin. The British in Malaysia were prohibited by
treaty from having an army.* So, the British had to create a large police force. The police force
was, in fact, an army. Most people don't understand that. It was organized into companies and
battalions, and was armed just like an army, and it fought just like an army. It had two branches, a
special branch which was concerned with intelligence activities, and a combat branch which
exploited the intelligence. Well, people who were only casual students of that whole thing,
thought that the solution in Vietnam was to do just as the British had done in Malaysia. Well, there
were several other factors to consider. One was that we didn't have to call the army a police force.
Another consideration was that there was no American "El Supremo" the way there had been
when Templar was in Malaysia. A third consideration, and perhaps the most important one, the
communist terrorists were Chinese, not Malayans. That really helped in the identification of friend
and foe, in the creation of patriotism, and with everything else. But, I only mention this because
repeatedly, the AID people would bring up experts from Malaysia, including Sir Robert
Thompson, and an Australian who worked with the police, Ted Serong, both of whom
recommended that we recreate the winning combination that they had had in Malaysia, which
meant creating a very large combat police force.**

Now, the mission of that combat police force would be indistinguishable from that of the
regional forces. The only difference was going to be who commanded it. They wanted to
command it from Saigon, the way the police field force in Malaysia had been commanded from
Kuala Lumpur, whereas we were trying to decentralize the political/police action down to the
province and to the district levels. And so, the police field force was simply a jarring note in the
great symphony that was going on in Saigon, and those of us in MACV fought it and contained it.
We didn't see how we could tolerate it. You can always have a few independent folks floating
around, intelligence people like the CIA, but you cannot tolerate having little feudal armies running
around in a district or in a province while getting their orders from Saigon. So, that's the
background.

INTERVIEWER: So, the national police force would have been in addition to all of the other local,
regional, and regular forces in an area.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, but the concept was very fuzzy.

INTERVIEWER: Another interesting occurrence during this period of time was the difficulty that
the Vietnamese had with the Montagnards. Would you comment on that, both in terms of it being
a long-standing problem, and what was finally worked out?

GEN DEPUY: The Vietnamese word for the Montagnards is "Moi," which means savage. The
Vietnamese are a proud race, and are very conscious of their long cultural history, and successful

*For an overview of the Malayan insurgency, see Noel Barber, War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency:
1948-7960 (New York: Weybrightand Talley, 1972).

**For an overview of Sir Robert Thompson's ideas on dealing with an insurgency, see Robert Thompson, Defeating
Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966).

126

military history. And, they really regarded the Montagnards as aborigines, which, in fact, they are.
Now, the Americans, on the other hand, have always had a love affair with the Montagnards.
Scholars of various kinds found their way up into the mountains and lived with and studied the
tribes, and became fascinated with these aborigines. They noted that the Montagnards were pure,
simple, mountain folk, and not very guileful. So, we had to like them. Meanwhile, we were having
a lot of trouble with the more sophisticated Vietnamese in the lowlands. So, the Americans, from
the very beginning, were emotionally linked with the Montagnards against the Vietnamese. And,
for that reason, the Vietnamese distrusted the Americans.

Well, there were some rather sophisticated Montagnards, one of whom was Y Bham. Y Bham
was the hereditary king of all the Montagnards. He was a Rhade who lived in Ban Me Thuot, and
was serving as the assistant province chief of Darlac Province at the time of the Montagnard
rebellion, the first Montagnard rebellion. He ran off into the forest and the Montagnards attacked
a number of Special Forces camps. They left our chaps alone but they killed the Vietnamese
Special Forces troops, and threw their bodies into the garbage pits, or otherwise treated them
badly. This caused quite a problem for the Americans because the Vietnamese government
naturally wished to take severe reprisals against the Montagnards. But, the Montagnards were the
darlings of the State Department, and the CIA particularly, didn't want them massacred. Anyhow,
I had a personal involvement in this situation. I was sent up to Ban Me Thuot by "Westy" to take
charge of the situation there. The situation was that there were about five Special Forces camps
around Ban Me Thuot that had been taken over by the Montagnards.* However, their attempt to
take over Ban Me Thuot had failed. The countryside was filled partly with VC and partly with
hostile Montagnards. Around the Special Forces camp of Buon Sar Pa, located south of Ban Me
Thuot, the Montagnards had seized two district chiefs and a number of other officials and their
families, and had them locked up. The government of Vietnam sent two of the Dalat generals up
to Ban Me Thuot to take charge of the situation or to take the blame. You may recall that the Dalat
generals had been incarcerated at the time that General Khanh took over. He was the little chubby
general who smoked Salems all the time. Tran Van Don did not come up. Kim came up, as did the
former III Corps commander, Ton Tat Dinh. Although Kim was the most brilliant of them all, and
was fluent in French, nobody trusted him. Anyway, he came up as the foreign policy advisor. Tan
Tat Dinh served as the military advisor. Now, General Lam, an inscrutable Chinese-looking chap,
who later commanded I Corps, was the 23rd Division commander, and I was the MACV player.
We had a lot of American advisors in Ban Me Thuot, working with the 23rd Division and assisting
with the administration of the province.

Well, finally, after a lot of palavering both day and night, we got it all settled in all of the camps
and got all of the remaining Vietnamese officials and Special Forces personnel back, except at
Buon Sar Pa. At Buon Sar Pa there was a chap named Y Tlur, who later became a Kit Carson
scout with the cavalry, who was the leader of the rebels. Colonel John Speers, who commanded
the 5th Special Forces in Nha Trang, flew in by helicopter to visit his Special Forces personnel,
and Y Tlur had him arrested. Then, Colonel Fritz Freund who was the deputy corps advisor at
Pleiku, flew in and they also arrested him, but only halfheartedly — he kept his weapon. So,
there we were, with the US Special Forces Detachment, the commander of the 5th Special Forces

*For an overview on the Special Forces working with the Montagnards and on the rebellion, see Francis J. Kelly, U.S.
Army Special Forces: 1961-1971 (Washington: USGPO, 1973).

127

Group, a senior advisor, two district chiefs, and a lot of other officials and their wives, all locked
up by the Montagnards. General Khanh flew up and said that he was going to take the place by
force and then was going to try the Montagnards for treason. I exacted a promise from General
Khanh and from Generals Kim, Dinh, and Lam, that they would give me one more day to try and
somehow solve this situation. I already had made all of the arrangements for a rescue operation
for the following morning and had obtained the necessary permission from Saigon. We were
going to circle the camp with US A-1s, and have a Special Forces ad hoc battalion loaded in
helicopters ready to go in and rescue everyone.

At 11:00 o'clock that night one of the advisors called to say that the 23rd Division was on the
move. If the division had attempted to seize the camp it would have resulted in a real massacre,
probably of our people as well as everyone else. So, I dashed over to General Lam's house at 2:00
o'clock in the morning, and confronted him with the fact that he had promised me as one soldier
to another, not to do that. I told him that he couldn't do it — it was against the honor of a soldier.
And, my God, he called it off. Well, the next morning at H Hour, 0900, it was foggy. Finally, at
1000 hours, the fog lifted. We had arranged that as soon as we circled the camp, Fritz Freund,
who I must say is a brave man, would get Y Tlur to line up all of the Montagnards on parade, a
whole battalion of them. Freund, even though technically under arrest, was still carrying his
Swedish K, and he thrust it into the hands of Y Tlur and said, "If you're going to kill me, kill me
now with my own weapon in front of your troops." Very dramatic. He's a big ham. Since Y Tlur
didn't say anything, Freund spun on his heels and went down and clipped the lock off of the
prison compound and let all of the prisoners out. We had passed him a pair of clippers through a
liaison officer that we had sent into the camp everyday. He then marched the prisoners to the gate
while all of the troops still were standing in formation.

We then landed some helicopters and the prisoners all got aboard the helicopters and took off.
The Montagnard troops and Y Tlur were so astonished that they just stood there, still in their
formation, with their mouths hanging open. Then Fritz, not knowing when to let well enough
alone, said to me, "Come on, give a speech to the troops." So, I went in. They couldn't
understand me, and I couldn't understand them, but I gave them a rousing speech and told them
they had made all the right decisions, and so on and so forth. I shook their hands, inspected them,
congratulated them, and then, I wheeled around and went down and got on the helicopter with
Fritz and John Speers and flew away. About an hour later, the Vietnamese 23rd Division entered
the camp. All was sweetness and light, and nobody got killed. So, anyway, that's the sort of
comic opera "Perils of Pauline" stuff, that went on with the Montagnards. They had another
incipient rebellion later on, but it was a lesser problem. Now, Y Bham never did come back. He
stayed in Cambodia and started a thing called FULRO, which was the Unified Front for the
Liberation of Oppressed People. We never knew, or at least I never knew, whether it was
communist-inspired, Cambodian-inspired, or genuine, but I think it finally petered out.

INTERVIEWER: Thanks for sharing that story with us.

GEN DEPUY: That's more, probably, than you had in mind.

128

General DePuy preparing to encourage
some 400 Montagnard "rebels" at the
Buon Sar Pa Special Forces Camp to
release their South Vietnamese and
American "prisoners" in September 1964.

INTERVIEWER: At this particular time the government of the United States was making the
decision that led to the introduction of significant US ground forces into the conflict. Please
comment on that decision, particularly in terms of the timing, the quantity of forces involved, the
missions that the American units were assigned, and the organizations involved in terms of
whether or not we brought in the right kind of folks to do what you thought needed to be done.

GEN DEPUY: This is as good a point as any to tell you what I believe to be the structure of the
Vietnam War. By structure I mean the organization and objectives of both sides and the way they
interacted in each phase of the war. This will take a little time.

The first phase of the war was a classic Asian insurgency patterned after the Chinese experience
as explained by Mao and after the experience of the Viet Minh in their successful war against the
French. It was classic in that it was both a military and political effort at every level. There were
guerrilla squads in the hamlets, platoons in the villages, companies in the districts, and battalions

129

in the provinces. At each level decisions were made by a committee involving political and military
leaders controlled by the party cell. The party, in turn, was controlled by Hanoi. From about 1957
until the end of 1964, the main effort was carried by South Vietnamese Communists. The
command of South Vietnam was divided into two sectors. The southern half of the country was
controlled by the National Liberation Front from a headquarters on the Tay Ninh/Cambodian
boundary called COSVN. The effort in the northern half of the country was controlled directly by
Hanoi through military regions.

By 1960 an echelon of military force above the province level appeared in War Zones C and D.
These units were of regimental size and were employed by COSVN. We called them Main Force
units. By 1964 the regiments in War Zones C and D combined to form the 9th VC Division. That is
the unit, you will recall, that received the bulk of our attention in 1966 and 1967.

It was against the insurgency that the US directed its early efforts in support of the ARVN and
the GVN. We only vaguely understood the organization of the Viet Cong in 1960, and knew even
less about its operating practices. But, it is essential to an understanding of the war to understand
how this structure operated.

The higher echelons supported the lower by attacking the popular or regional forces in the
hamlets and villages in order to gain dominance over the region so that the guerrilla units could
operate freely and the political apparatus could organize the people. On the other hand, the lower
echelons supported the higher by recruiting for them, by providing intelligence and guides, and by
stockpiling food and ammunition where it would be needed. The whole organization was mutually
supporting, both politically and militarily.

The best example of the early counterinsurgency effort was an operation launched by General
Westmoreland in 1964 called HOP TAG. It was targeted against each echelon of the Viet Cong
structure simultaneously. The overall objective was the security of Saigon and the surrounding
area.

Visualize a target on the rifle range. The bull's eye was Saigon proper. In this central area the
Vietnamese police and intelligence agencies sought to uncover and eliminate the Viet Cong
terrorists, guerrillas, and political cells. We called this function "securing". In the secure inner
zone the government would conduct education, information, health, and economic programs to
secure the loyalty and ensure the prosperity of the inhabitants. The GVN wasn't very good at this
in the early days, as I have said.

In the next ring of our target the object was to clear out the Viet Cong guerrillas and the district
companies and provincial battalions so that the secure area in the center could be expanded. We
called this function "clearing". It was done by the ARVN, and as it progressed, security would be
provided by locally recruited and organized popular and regional forces.

Of course, one danger to all of this was the intervention of the Viet Cong Main Force regiments
which from time to time, would move into the "clearing zone" and destroy ARVN battalions,
Regional Force companies or Popular Force platoons. That, of course, would move the whole
process back to square one.

Therefore, in the outer ring of our target, we provided for an effort by the elite and more
effective elements of ARVN to operate aggressively against the Main Force units, keeping them
on the run, and destroying them whenever possible. This was the origin of the term, "Search and
Destroy". It was a perfectly logical description of the function — search for and destroy the Viet

130

Cong Main Force units. Unfortunately, television coverage of a Marine putting his cigarette lighter
to a thatched roof in a small hamlet turned "Search and Destroy" into a dirty word.

Now, so long as the insurgency was primarily a South Vietnamese affair, this was about all that
could be done. However, unbeknownst to us at the beginning, the high command, I guess the
Politburo, in Hanoi decided in late 1963 or early '64, to reinforce the Main Force war. They also
ordered the Viet Cong to take the offensive in the fall of 1964. [See Map 20, page 132.]

In October and November of 1964, the 9th VC Division, then consisting of two regiments, went
to the coast of eastern Phuoc Tuy Province, and received from NVN trawlers a full array of new
weapons — AK-47s, RPG-2s, 80mm mortars, 12.5mm antiaircraft machine guns, claymore
mines, and etcetera. In December, the 9th occupied the Catholic hamlet of Binh Gia in Phuoc Tuy
Province. Then, in rapid succession, they destroyed four battalions including ARVN Rangers and
Marines. This action sent shock waves through the GVN, MACV, and the US government. The
Main Force offensive utterly destroyed the pacification effort in Phuoc Tuy. No HOP TAC could
survive such an incursion. By May of 1965 the 9th VC Division had mounted equally successful
attacks against the district town and Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai, and against the capital of
Phuoc Long Province, Song Be. ARVN infantry and airborne battalions were wiped out in these
actions.

In the north the 1st and 2nd VC regiments conducted a similar operation against the district
town of Binh Ba, 20 miles west of Quang Ngai. Again, several ARVN battalions including a
Ranger battalion, were totally destroyed.

It was in this environment that the first deployment of US combat forces occurred. General
Westmoreland wanted some US troops to reverse the disintegration of ARVN. He gave them no
more than six months unless the US intervened.

The first batch of US troops were used as a fire brigade rushing to threatened areas and
pursuing the VC Main Forces. That level of effort would have been about right except that as the
US troops arrived so too, did the first NVN Army forces. Not only did NVN reinforce the VC Main
Forces — for example, the 101st NVN regiment joined the 9th VC division in late 1964 — but
also, entire NVN divisions began to fight for border areas inside South Vietnam as early as 1965.
The battle of the la Drang by the 1st Cavalry was just such a fight involving three NVN regiments.
The Marines had a battle in 1965 just south of the DMZ with an entire NVN division. The battles of
Khe Sanh and in the A Shau Valley, and those north and west of Kontum, were border wars.

General Westmoreland found the game changing under his feet. Washington was almost
always one phase behind in its understanding. The media had the same problem, and still has.

So, to wrap up this discussion, I believe there were five wars, not one. I believe they changed
over time and in geographic focus:

War #1 — 1957-64: An insurgency of the classic Asian variety, focused on the Delta and on the
lowland coastal areas where the population was centered.

War # — 1965-71: A reinforced Main Force war still related to the insurgent structure and
focused in or near the populated areas.

War #3 — 1965-72: Concurrently with War #2, a border war between the NVN Army and the
US Army in the Central Highlands and in the northern provinces, especially north of Da Nang.

War #4 — 1965-72: Concurrent with Wars #2 and #3, a retaliatory and interdiction war against
NVN by the Air Force and Naval Air.

War #5 - 1972-75: The outright invasion of SVN by NVN after the US had withdrawn.

131

Map 20 - The Ho Chi Minh Trail
132

Most Americans who served in Vietnam observed or participated in just one or two of these
"wars." The press formed its basic opinions during "War #1" and largely ignored the rest. Bill,
you and I fought mostly in War #2 and perhaps at Loc Ninh and An Loc, in War #3.

It is my absolute conviction that US forces fought extremely well in Wars #2, #3, and #4. With
respect to War #1, I have always felt that regular US Army troop units are peculiarly ill suited for
the purpose of "securing" operations where they must be in close contact with the people. They
can, of course, conduct "clearing" operations, and are perfectly suited for "Search and Destroy".
The closer one moves toward the political and psychological end of the spectrum, the more
inappropriate is the use of foreign troops who don't speak the language, and who may well have a
negative effect on pacification efforts.

Against this background and structure the argument about priorities as between the
pacification effort and the big unit war or arguments about the uncounted enemy seem trivial to
me.

It was also against this background that the various decisions were made about troop
deployment and rules of engagement. By the time this government began to realize what it was up
against — for example, there were about 20 NVN Army Divisions in SVN at the end (more
divisions than we had in the active US Army). It was too late. Once more we were one or two
steps out of phase with reality.

INTERVIEWER: What thought was given to the sanctuaries?

GEIM DEPUY: At one time General Westmoreland had the brilliant idea of putting the 1st Cavalry
Division into Thailand, and operating across the narrow panhandle of Laos, from the west, and
interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We even made some of the coordination necessary to do that.
By that time Dick Stilwell was in Thailand. However, that concept wasn't approved. The State
Department didn't like that idea. Then, Westy wanted to put them right into Laos astride the Ho
Chi Minh Trail. Harry Kinnard, who I still see from time to time, and I were talking about that just
the other day. He told me how he had been directed to plan for that contingency. The division
would have gone in about where Lam Son eventually went in toward the end of the war. Too bad
they didn't because that trail could have been physically cut. Hell, later it became a pipeline and a
highway. It would have been one big battle and it would have required a lot more than one
division, but it was the way to go. But, General Westmoreland was not permitted to do it. At that
time we were captives of our own emphasis on counterinsurgency which blinded us to the
escalating dimensions of the war. We fought continuously to get permission to put recon and
targeting teams into Laos and Cambodia. It was like pulling teeth. Ambassador Sullivan in Laos
fought us every step of the way. Finally, Nixon started bombing in Cambodia and finally invaded.
That caused a firestorm in the US. Neither the public nor the media had the slightest conception
of the scope or intensity of the war. We in the military failed miserably in portraying the war for
what it was. Of course, there is some question as to whether or not that is a military responsibility.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I wonder if you would describe what "Apache Forces" were?

133

GEN DEPUY: Well, I can't remember much about the details. The idea was to get Montagnards
or Nungs who were willing to fight on our side, and put them with US units. Some of them were
called Kit Carson Scouts, and some were called Apache Teams.

INTERVIEWER: What was the attitude of the Vietnamese government toward refugees which,
by this time, were being generated all over the country?

GEN DEPUY: The American AID people and the American mission, the Country Team, were
always very much concerned about refugees, and spent a lot of time with the Vietnamese
government worrying about them, taking care of them, putting up refugee camps, getting rice for
them, and so on. I wasn't involved directly in that so I don't have any useful memories to recount.

INTERVIEWER: What was the Navy doing at this time? The 7th Fleet was certainly involved in
the area throughout the war, but at this particular point in time what were they doing?

GEN DEPUY: In the beginning, of course, the Navy advisory effort was involved in organizing
the Vietnamese Navy into a coastal patrol designed to prevent infiltration along the coast. Later,
the US Navy came in and augmented that effort with their own people. They really thickened it up
and made it pretty good. The last big infiltration along the central coast occurred at Vung Ro, in
1965. Later, from time to time, they caught trawlers, and so on, down off the U Minh Forest. The
rest of the Navy, the big Navy, of course, was on carriers bombing the North. The Navy also
provided the boats for the Riverine force in the Delta. This could be described as the extension of
the reinforced Main Force war into the Delta. Because of 9th Division operations the NVN also
sent troops to reinforce the Delta in 1968.

INTERVIEWER: What constraints did you encounter in building up US forces? Were there any
problems in terms of the combat service support structure, or with places to put them, or with the
availability of supply lines?

GEN DEPUY: The real problems associated with the Vietnam buildup were basing and logistics.
The deployment of forces was really determined by those two factors. For a year and a half we
went to countless force planning and deployment conferences in Hawaii and in the United States,
and drew up an infinite number of alternative force plans, together with the infrastructure plans
that went behind them. US Army, Vietnam, under a lot of different people and during those
critical times under Jack Norton, was marvelously resilient and never said no when we wanted to
bring in another unit. Lots of interesting problems came up. One was when we deployed the 1st
Cavalry Division.* [See Map 21, page 136]

There we ran into an unexpected problem with Admiral Sharp. It may be true of all admirals, I
don't know, but Admiral Sharp had a deep fear of the dangers associated with land warfare. He
had a Dien Bien Phu syndrome. He didn't want to put the 1st Cavalry Division very far inland. We
wanted to put the unit at Pleiku so that it could operate both north and south, and dominate the

*For a discussion on developing bases and on logistics, see Carroll H. Dunn, Base Development in South Vietnam:
1965-1970 (Washington: USGPO, 1972), and Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Logistics Support (Washington: USGPO, 1974).

134

high plateau. But, Admiral Sharp said that Pleiku was too far inland and that we would have
another Dien Bien Phu. We pointed out to him that we had small detachments of advisors all over
the highlands, including a number of them who had been in Pleiku for years. But, he wouldn't let
us do it, so we compromised on An Khe, which was halfway between Qui Nhon and Pleiku. I went
up there myself with a party from the 1st Cavalry and picked the place out. But, it was a lot more
difficult to go into An Khe than it would have been to have gone to Pleiku. So, that's just one
example.

We had a difficult time in determining exactly the sizing of our logistic forces because it was
hard to predict what the consumption of gasoline, diesel, and ammunition would be. Generally
speaking, though, during the time that I was there, we were a little thin on the logistics side. The
best example of that came from a meeting I used to chair every morning in Saigon. The first report
I always got was on the backlog of our tactical intratheater airlift, C-130s and C-123s. That backlog
would go up, and up, and up, whenever we ran an operation. Then, we would work that backlog
back down by stopping all major operations. After doing that, we again would be able to move the
173rd or the 101st, or the Vietnamese, and support another operation during which the logistic
backlog once again would grow. So, all in all, it was a very fine tuned thing.

135

Note:

Arrows indicate flow of supplies
from major support commands
to field support commands.

U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
DA NANG

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
DA NANG

U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
QUI NHON

U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
CAM RANH BAY

US. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND- SAIGON
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY- SAIGON
ISJ LOGISTICAL COMMAND

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES

AND

SUPPORT COMMAND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

— — —Corps tactical zone boundary

Map 21

136

CHAPTER VII

Introducing Agility:
The First Division

INTERVIEWER: After serving as the MACV J-3 for a period of time, you were reassigned in
March of 1966, as the commander of the 1st Infantry Division. By this time you had extensive
command experience, particularly at the battalion and battle group levels. You had commanded
previously in combat, and you had been able to observe the war in Vietnam for a couple of years.
Now you were taking over a large organization. What were your objectives for the division, and
your philosophy of command?*

GEN DEPUY: The greatest influence on me was the impact of my two years as J-3 MACV. It was
a period of transition from counterinsurgency support to direct American combat involvement. I
had a unique opportunity to learn about the organization and tactics of the VC. Also in that period
we developed together with the GVN a pattern of response to that particular threat — an Asian
insurgency organized and executed by World Class revolutionaries. We didn't know at the
beginning that the North Vietnamese Army would intervene massively. We saw three levels of
threat. At the bottom the guerrillas in the hamlets and villages. In the middle the local forces such
as the district companies or battalions, and at the top the Main Force regiments and divisions. In
late 1964 through '65, we helped the GVN organize a multi-layer attack against this structure in the
area of Saigon. Called HOP TAC (cooperation/coordination), it involved three kinds and levels of
operation. At the center the police and intelligence agencies sought to root out the VC infra-
structure — the terrorists and subversive cells and the VC political organization. This operation
was called "securing." Around and outside the secure center was an area shaped like a doughnut
in which the ARVN regular battalions and regiments sought to destroy or chase away the VC
guerrillas and local forces. This was called "clearing". The idea was that once the area was
cleared, Popular and Regional Forces would be organized at the village and district level to
maintain security and the central secure area would be expanded. Thus, pacification would be
extended throughout the country. But, the VC Main Forces were organized to defeat this
concept. For example, VC provincial battalions like our friends in the Phu Loi battalion or
regiments like the 271 and 272 from War Zones C and D, would move in on short campaigns or
single battles to tear up the Popular and Regional Forces and defeat the ARVN. They did this often
and well. These attacks demoralized the entire GVN civil and military structure, and defeated
pacification efforts. Indeed, by late 1964 and early '65 they had nearly won the war. Therefore, the
third element of the HOP TAC plan was for the elite units of the ARVN — airborne, marines, and
rangers — to operate outside the doughnut area, and to go after the Main Force VC to destroy or

*For additional information on the 1st Infantry Division during this period see Jimmie E. Wilson, ed., First Infantry
Division in Vietnam: July 1965 - April 1967 (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Printing Company, Ltd., 1967), and Brigade
Information Office, A Pictorial History of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Printing
Company, Ltd., 1966).

137

to disrupt their operations and thus protect the pacification effort. These operations were called
"Search and Destroy." I tell you all this because the original purpose and mission for US troops
was this third mission. All this was not without controversy. The Chief of Staff of the Army
thought he was sending the 1st Division to practice counterinsurgency — that is, clearing and
securing, civic action and Psy Ops. MACV wanted the 1st Division for Search and Destroy. We
did not do a good job in MACV in explaining this to incoming divisions. For example, the Marines
came in and started securing and clearing and practicing pacification operations under the
tutelage of Lieutenant General Krulak, the Marine counterinsurgent. Soon, of course, they were
drawn into a brutal Main Force war with the North Vietnamese just south of the DMZ.

When the 1st Division came in, it began to patrol its area. It had some very big fights with the
9th VC Division which contested the area. These were single battalion battles on our side — like
the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry at Lo Ke and the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry at Long Xuyen.

It was my idea to go after the Main Forces wherever they could be found and to go after them
with as many battalions as I could get into the fight — what was later called "pile-on".

To do that required a very agile and fast moving division, a division which was, in fact,
airmobile. My initial efforts were to create just such a division. I took it as my main mission to
defeat or disrupt the activities of all the VC Main Forces north of Saigon in the III Corps zone. As a
minimum it was essential to keep the 9th VC division entirely out of the populated areas. [See Map
22, page 139]

General Westmoreland also wanted the 1st Infantry Division to be mobile. His idea was that he
was bringing in US troops to turn the war around. He wanted them to go into Tay Ninh Province,
and up to Song Be, and down to Xuan Loc, or Wherever it was likely that the VC/NVA main force
units were operating at the time. His philosophy, with which I entirely agreed, was that the US
units were there to fight the enemy "big boys," the big regiments that were tearing up the ARVN
and destroying the pacification effort. I knew the difference between what the division was doing
and what was expected of it. Now, if you ask me if General Westmoreland told me precisely to do
these things, he didn't. But, we had worked together closely for two years. It was clear to me that

General William C. Westmoreland,
Commander, US Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV),
and United States Army, Vietnam (USARV)

138

TAY NINH

1STDIVTA0I

TAN SON
NHUToi

RUNG/ SAT

SPECIAL I ZONE

SAIGON

Map 22 — 1st Infantry Division's Area of Operations

139

he wanted me to get cracking. So, as soon as I got there, I moved the division around a lot. I even
moved it sometimes when i really didn't have very good intelligence on which to base the move. I
just moved it to get it moving. I moved my CP to Phuoc Tuy, then to Tay Ninh, then to An Loc and
Quan Loi, and then to Dau Tieng, because I wanted the division to be mentally mobile as well as
physically mobile. I wanted a division that could pile-on. I visualized a division commanded from a
helicopter in flight. And, I looked for people who could do that, and for people who thought that
way. Also, I looked for people who couldn't think that way so that I could send them on to other
duties.

INTERVIEWER: I infer from your comments that your philosophy was pretty simple. You were
going to get the division moving, and in terms of being the commander, you were going to tell
people what was expected of them. To be on your team they had to be folks who felt the same as
you did about getting on with the job, wherever you put them. Is that right?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. I wanted people who were flexibly minded, didn't need a lot of instructions,
would get cracking, and would get out and do something useful on their own once they were
given a general direction. Of course, I was also interested, as I always have been, in the problems
down in the squads and the platoons, because I realized that I was seeing the same problems
occur all over again. They just weren't trained and were stumbling into battles. Mind you, they
stumbled into battles under me, too, but I wanted to try to help all I could in that respect. So, I
started putting out instructions on overwatches and on finding out where the enemy was by using
only a small number of people, but using lots of firepower and frontal parapet foxholes, and things
of that nature, which, I guess, was really a culmination of everything we've been talking about.

INTERVIEWER: After you took command and had a chance to look at the soldiers function
during a couple of operations, how did you find their morale and willingness to fight?

GEN DEPUY: I thought the soldiers were just like soldiers always are, everywhere — they were
fine. They were just as good as their leaders. In fact, when you compared division personnel at
that time with those of a later period, the division was lucky. It had a lot of good long-term,
experienced sergeants. It also had the 1st Division spirit. It would do anything it was asked to do.

INTERVIEWER: It wasn't long after you assumed command that the division was involved in a
major operation, Operation BIRMINGHAM, in which you had a lot of success. You also had one
or two really mean fights, the battle of Lo Go being one of them. But, it was a division level
operation in which you had little influence in terms of the tactical planning, or in terms of support
planning. Would you comment on that?

GEN DEPUY: We sent two brigades to Tay Ninh. I exchanged one brigade for another because
one brigade didn't do very well. One brigade was slow on the uptake so I replaced it with the 2nd
Brigade commanded by Ernie Milloy. We hopped all around War Zone C, but we didn't find very
much. Then one day a fighter bomber happened to drop a bomb on some 55-gallon fuel drums
hidden along the river. So, we went over and searched along the riverbank. Now, it turned out

140

that the riverbank was a depot which stretched for about ten miles. This was along the border with
Cambodia. That whole operation taught us how to operate. The brigade and the battalion
commanders then knew that we wanted to conduct a lot of air mobile search operations, how we
wanted them to be conducted, and that we were going to be very flexible. The only real concrete
accomplishment was that we scarfed up all the supplies that had been stacked along the river, of
which there was a substantial amount. One place had four or five thousand uniforms. I remember
finding lots of sewing machines. We made a haul in sewing machines. It must have been a
quartermaster depot.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any problems with your logistical support on that operation? Later
on, you established policies whereby every three or four days we could just about count on getting
a change of fatigues and underwear, and little things like that — the things that meant something
to the soldiers.

GEN DEPUY: Well, we were just learning. I have to tell you that the first time I ordered the
division to go into the field, I didn't say anything to them except, "We're going. 1st Brigade, go
into that area. 2nd Brigade, go into that area. Division, go there." Now, when we went out, the
division headquarters commandant and all of the principal staff officers stayed back at base camp,
while all of the second team went out with me. That was quite interesting. And, the same thing
was true of logistics. The DISCOM stayed back and all of the assistants — the assistant
quartermaster, the assistant ordnance officer, the assistant transportation officer, the assistant
headquarters commandant, and the assistant chief — went out. Well, we turned that all around.
The first team went out and the second team stayed back. But, it was part of the division's
mentality at that particular time. And, the logistics didn't work very well that first time because
they had never practiced it. It had been home-based logistics, so it took some time to shake that
down. By the way, the logisticians were super. The G-4, Gene D'Ambrosio, was and is one of the
finest logisticians and soldiers the Army has ever had. Once he knew what we wanted, he and the
DISCOM produced miracles.

INTERVIEWER: Another aspect of that particular operation at Lo Go was discussed later in the
Career Course at Fort Benning, and I remember that we were all very impressed that you had fired
into Cambodia during the operation.

GEN DEPUY: We were up at Lo Go. The two battalions up there were Dick Prillaman's 1st
Battalion, 2nd Infantry, and Bill Hathaway's 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry. They moved north
parallel to the Cambodian border and got in a little fight. Some of the fire they were getting was
from across the Ben Go River in Cambodia, so we just fired artillery over there. We fired artillery
along the riverbank into Cambodia, and I remember that some reporter found out about it and
asked me if I had authorized it, and I replied that I had directed it.

INTERVIEWER: At the time, that represented a change to the rules of engagement.

141

GEN DEPUY: Incidentally, there was no population there. It was just the middle of the jungle,
with nothing but birds and snakes.

INTERVIEWER: We're not going to cover each and every operation during your time with the
division, only the ones that seem significant to us. Please discuss your scheme to lure the main
force regiments of the 9th VC Division out into the open so that you could get a crack at them.

GEN DEPUY: I'd like to discuss that in the context of that entire campaign, because we fought a
campaign up there against the 9th VC Division, or maybe they were fighting a campaign against
us, I'm not sure which it was. In any event, for some reason or another, the 9th VC Division,
which had four regiments at that time, including the 101st NVA Regiment, elected to fight a
campaign for control of Highway 13 up north of Lai Khe, north of Chon Thanh. There were four
big battles which all took place in June and the first two or three days in July of 1966. The first
battle was the smallest of them all. Kyle Bowie's 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry, fought that battle
against a battalion up at the Loc Ninh Plantation. No, wait, there was a battle even before that.
The first battle was at the railroad tracks between Chon Thanh and An Loc — the battle of Ap
Tau 0 — where Troop "A" of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, got into a mammoth fight. They
were attacked by a whole regiment there, and we threw Herb McChrystal's 2nd Battalion, 18th
Infantry, into that fight as a relief force. That particular engagement was a very spectacular one. It
involved the entire 272nd Regiment, with all three battalions in line. The VC recon company was
the foot of the "L" shaped ambush. There were very heavy casualties on both sides. But, it was a
troop against a regiment — 135 Americans against 1 ,200 VC. The next battle was Kyle Bowie's at
Loc Ninh. Then, there was the battle at what we called Golden Gate, which was located between
Loc Ninh and An Loc. This battle involved two VC regiments, the 271st and the 273rd Regiments.
The last battle, which we liked the most, although I'm not sure that the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry
loved it so much, was the battle of the Minh Thanh Road, which again, involved the 272nd
Regiment. [See Map 23, page 143]

The precursor of that was the battle of Golden Gate, between Loc Ninh and An Loc, which
occurred because we had told the An Loc Province Chief that we were going to send some cavalry
up to Loc Ninh and bring some engineer road graders back. And, sure enough, within a couple of
days, when we sent the cavalry troop up there, they were attacked by two regiments. So, we
thought that if they were going to do that to us, then we'll try to do it to them. So, we told the
same Province Chief in the presence of his whole staff that although we had a tough time moving
our engineer equipment around the last time, we were going to do it again, only this time we were
going to move them down to Minh Thanh and fix up the airfield down there. We told the Province
Chief that we were going to send our folks down on such and such day and that we'd like some of
his security people to help us. The reason we did that was because we had spotted the radio of the
272nd Regiment located just off that road, about 2,000 meters off the road, and right in the
middle. Anyway, instead of sending one cavalry troop, we really sent two with infantry aboard,
which probably was a mistake. We had artillery that we had brought in under other pretenses
spotted all around the area. We had Bob Haldane's 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, lined up at the
Dutchman's place getting ready to go. We had Jack Conn's 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, down at
Minh Thanh, and John Bard had the 1st of the 18th Infantry all ready to go on the flank of the

142

ambush site. So, we had three infantry battalions, most of the cavalry squadron and a couple of
companies of the 2nd Infantry mounted and ready to go.

INTERVIEWER: "B" Company was the only one mounted!

GEN DEPUY: Okay, only "B" Company was mounted. Your memory is better than mine. We
had air available, and we had the artillery registered. We went down the road and, sure enough,
they did just what we wanted them to do — they attacked us. And then, the reaction forces went
in. It wasn't perfect, but it wasn't bad. Sid Berry was in command; it was his brigade, the 1st
Brigade. I guess we took a lot of pleasure out of the fact that this was one of the few times that
they did just what we wanted them to do rather than us doing what they wanted us to do. And, it
was, I would say, a successful operation.

In these several battles in June and July 1966, we tried to reinforce as rapidly as possible. At Ap
Tau 0, the cavalry battle, we were able to get one infantry battalion into the area but at the very
end. That was 2-18 under Herb McChrystal. At Loc Ninh we did not reinforce — not enough time
and too far away. At Golden Gate we brought in 2-18 in two locations plus the 1-28 and 2-2. At
Minh Thanh we brought in 1-28, 1-18, 1-16, and 2-2. So, you can see that we were getting
better — faster and more nimble.

CHON THANH

en

MICHELIN PLANTATION U

• DAU TIENG

LAI KHE

L

5 MILES

A critique of the Battle of

Ap Tau 0 for members of the

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry

Map 23 - The Battle of Ap Tau 0

143

INTERVIEWER: I would be remiss from the historical point of view if I left this particular chapter
of your career without asking about that marvelous fighting invention, the "Go-go Chinook."

GEN DEPUY: Somebody put a lot of guns in some Chinooks and formed them into a platoon
called the "Go-go Birds." This platoon was going to be our answer to the ambush. They gave
them to the 1st Division to test. I don't think they liked us very much and left. The first time we
used them was in the battle at Golden Gate. One of these huge things was hit and fluttered down
right in between the two engaged forces. Finally, somehow, while our hearts were in our throats,
it lurched back out of there. At the Minh Thanh road, the same thing happened. One got shot
down right in the middle of the ambush, right at the most critical point — geographically and
chronologically. So, they were an interesting embellishment to the proceedings. It was an idea
whose time had not yet come. However, the crews of the Go-go birds were incredibly brave and
aggressive.

INTERVIEWER: But, it was one way of getting a lot of firepower into the action, at least that's
the way I always saw it. The next operation that was of note was ATTLEBORO.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, ATTLEBORO was one that we got into through the backdoor. This was when
the 196th Infantry Brigade was out cutting its teeth in the area west of the Michelin, where a lot of
rice had been found before. They were patrolling all around the area, and it so happened that the
9th VC Division had decided to attack the Soui Da Special Forces camp about that time. Two of
the division's VC regiments went into attack positions in fortified camps right in the middle of the
area where the 196th was patrolling. So, from finding nothing and having no contact at all for
several days, the 196th suddenly found itself in the middle of a hornet's nest. The brigade was all
broken up into company-size and smaller units. It quickly turned into a terrible shambles. At one
time, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, Sandy Meloy, was commanding, oh, I
don't know how many companies, probably nine or ten companies — and he had been without
sleep for three or four days. It was just an awful thing. Anyhow, General Weyand ordered us to go
over there and get involved and take over, which we did. In fact we were already there when he
issued the order. We got the 196th out of there and back to their camp at Tay Ninh, where they
had to sort themselves out. They had taken a lot of casualties. It was really a tragic thing. We had
many small fights and one large battle which occurred when Jack Whitted's 1st Battalion, 28th
Infantry, was put down about 300 meters from the VC's main ammo dump. We took out
thousands of rounds of ammunition, weapons, mines, claymores, etcetera. [See Map 24, page
145]

I'd like to say something about that fight because some people have been critical about the 1st
Division's use of a lot of firepower. I would say, and this obviously sounds somewhat defensive,
that we fired a lot of ammunition during fights but fired much less ammunition between fights. I
happened to look up the records and had some charts made before I left over there. The 25th
Division fired more artillery than the 1st Division fired by a wide margin. But, we got our reputation
from the concept that we used when fighting. Let's say that there was a company or a battalion in
a clearing and the VC or the NVA were attacking it. The problem, as we analyzed it, was that one
of three things was happening in a "doughnut," a doughnut that might be two or three hundred

144

yards in depth. The enemy were either reinforcing, or they were maneuvering, or they were
withdrawing. But, you never knew which, because you could not see them. The least reliable
reports come from people in contact because they are under fire. So, we would take artillery
batteries and simply put boxes of fire around the fight and tell them to continue to shoot until we
told them to stop. Maybe on one side we'd put in air strikes and put in artillery boxes around the
rest. So, they fired a tremendous amount of ammuntion during those fights. And, old "Slam"
Marshall in the story about ATTLEBORO, said that "quite by accident" a VC battalion had walked
into one of these barrages and was eliminated. Well, that was no accident. It was the only way I
knew of employing firepower in a jungle fight. I still think that that is precisely the right thing to do,
but it has been interpreted as just throwing a lot of artillery out that's not under adjustment.
Anyway, I wanted to get that in the record.*

Map 24 - Operation ATTLEBORO
Operation ATTLEBORO commenced on
September 14, 1966, with
elements of the 196th Infantry
Brigade conducting an air
mobile assault followed by
a search and destroy operation.
Although contact with the enemy
was initially light and sporadic,
before the operation was completed
on November 25, it would involve
over 22,000 American and allied troops.

*For a detailed discussion of Operation ATTLEBORO, see S.L.A. Marshall, Ambush: The Battle of Dau Tieng
(Nashville: The Battery Press, Inc., 1969).

145

INTERVIEWER: Sir, the 1st Division flew in and took over direct control of Operation
ATTLEBORO. Did the 196th Brigade then work for you?

GEIM DEPUY: The sequence was rather interesting. I happened to have flown over to visit the
196th Brigade one day just out of plain curiosity, or perhaps, I smelted a fight. At that time they
were beginning to get all these contacts. I looked at the brigade's operations map; they had five
battalions, so they had 15 companies scattered around. They had the two "Wolfhound"
battalions, the 27th Infantry, as well as the three of their own. I looked at that map and listened to
what they were telling me, and I knew that there was a disaster under way. Every hair went up on
the back of my neck; every instinct told me that they were in terrible trouble. I didn't know exactly
what was going on out there, but I sensed that they were in terrible trouble.

I flew home and ordered Colonel Mickey Marks to move his 3rd Brigade headquarters to Dau
Tieng. No, I told him to send a battalion to Dau Tieng and to be ready to move his headquarters.
That's right, that's the first thing I did. He sent a battalion and the next day I went up again.
General Westmoreland's deputy, John Heintges, was up there, and he went back and reported to
General Weyand, who was temporarily in command of the II Field Force, and told him that there
was a disorganized big fight going on up at the Michelin and that he wanted the 1st Division to go
up and take over.* I had already ordered Mickey to move. I also ordered the cavalry to make a
night move with the artillery. They moved all the way from Lai Khe down through Saigon, and all
the way up Route 1 to Tay Ninh City and then back to Suoi Da that night. There was some
confusion in the area but no casualties. I wanted some artillery up there and the next morning we
moved a lot more in by helicopter. The next day, General Hollingsworth went over and took
charge of the Special Forces. They too, were in terrible shape. They had a Nung battalion, a
"Mike" or mobile strike force, that had run into one of the VC regiments. The 196th had run into
another one. So, Holly took charge of the Special Forces battle, Jack Deane went to the 196th
Brigade particularly to Sandy Milloy's fight, and I took charge of bringing in the 1st Division. Then
we began to pull the 196th out. Eventually, we had most of the 1st Division involved.

INTERVIEWER: Did you recommend the relief of the 196th Brigade commander?

GEN DEPUY: No, I did not, but I have to say that his relief or transfer neither surprised me or
displeased me because I didn't think that the brigade was being well handled.

INTERVIEWER: He was relieved then?

GEN DEPUY: He was by Westmoreland. Perhaps transferred is a more correct term.

*Lieutenant General John A. Heintges, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1936,
following graduation from the United States Military Academy. In World War II, General Heintges commanded both
an infantry battalion and regiment in the 3rd Infantry Division in the European Theater of Operations. Other
assignments included duty as the Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (1963-64); Commanding General, US
Army Infantry Center and Commandant, US Army Infantry School (1964-65); Commanding General, I Corps (Group),
Korea (1965); Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1965-67); and Deputy Commanding
General, Eighth US Army, Korea (1969-70).

146

- v'<"> , '. ',■,'.''

life, ■■

Scenes from Operation ATTLEBORO

147

INTERVIEWER: I think this is a good point to ask you about the technology of modern warfare
that you had under your control, particularly the firepower, the new aspect of firepower
coordination required by tactical air, and the mobility inherent in helicopters. How did you use
them and what did you get out of them?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I guess that the 1st Division, without being organized as an air mobile
division, and without having a large air cavalry squadron, tried to practice what I now understand
to be the tactical concepts of an air mobile unit. Sometimes people laughed about the 1st Division
being the first air mobile division (heavy), and so on. The fact of the matter is, that in the early
days in Vietnam, we had more helicopters available operationally from the 1st Aviation Brigade
than the 1st Cavalry Division. And, since the 1st Cavalry Division had to maintain its own
helicopters, they found it very difficult to lift an entire battalion in one lift. But, you will recall that
in the 1st Infantry we did that repeatedly. In fact, there were days when we had 90 lift ships
available to the division, plus lots of gunships. That was more air mobility than anybody had
before or after, including the 1st Cavalry or the 101st. And, that was true for much of 1966.

Well, as we discussed earlier about the French at the Mang Yang Pass, the whole name of the
game in Vietnam was to make a contact, and you had to do that with a relatively small unit or you
would scare off the enemy. Of course for the small unit that made the initial contact, it was more
often than not a nightmare. It often occurred in inaccessible terrain and usually on ground chosen
by the other side. So, from then on, the salvation of your own troops, and the success or failure of
the operation, depended on how rapidly you could get in combat power. Time was of the essence.
We had a rule in the 1st Division that we would not operate one of our infantry battalions outside
the range of our own artillery. In order to do that, we often had to position our artillery all around
the countryside. I was never happy if we had only one battery of artillery in range. I really
considered that at least two batteries of artillery, firing from two different directions, was the
minimum because one battery could also come under attack at the same time. Often we had
three, four or five batteries that could fire. And, we tried to get the air in as quickly as possible. I
think we solved fairly well the problem of being able to fire the artillery and utilize air assets and
gunships simultaneously. The heavy ordnance comes from the artillery and the air. The heaviest
ordnance is from the air, but when you look at the rate at which they deliver their bombs, it's not
any heavier, and sometimes not as heavy, as the artillery in terms of pounds of explosive and
lethality, although when the air comes in with Cluster Bombs (CBUs) they are very lethal. So, it
was a question of coordinating all of that.

Now, in order to do that you had to work out the air procedures. You had to have your
artillerymen completely indoctrinated and have them positioned in the right place. They had to
have their ammunition available at the gun site and be able to shoot fast. You had to have infantry
units that could be ordered to move. For example, we might inform a battalion, "We are sending
helicopters — load when they arrive — and then come to this area. I'll tell you what to do when
you get here." We had to have infantry that could move just like that. There were several
occasions when I asked battalions to move without sending them any helicopter lift. They
bummed rides here, there, and everywhere. Once I told Jack Conn and his 2nd Battalion, 2nd
Infantry, to get up to Quan Loi any way he could. We were in a fight and were using all of the
helicopters. He arranged to borrow two C-130s from the Air Force and made it from Lai Khe in
about four hours. First, it's the mentality; it's a doctrinal understanding of agility and speed. It's

148

the technical ability to coordinate maneuver with air, artillery and gunships, without having long
pauses in which nothing happens. By and large, I think we succeeded in doing all of that. People
have said our air/mobile operations were too large and we put so many troops in that there was no
chance of any contact. I think that's a legitimate criticism, and we did some of that. On the other
hand, if you are trying to surround something fast, or trying to get in fast, like Al Haig did when he
put his entire battalion into Ben Sue in a matter of 30 seconds after they appeared over the trees,
then that's okay. There are times when you want to put a lot in.

That brings to mind a period during the time when General Abrams was in command and there
were very few contacts. It was very difficult to establish contact because the enemy was in
Cambodia. And so, they broke down battalions into companies, companies into platoons, and
platoons into squads, for the purpose of conducting saturation patrolling. They weren't getting
any contact. However, as soon as you start getting large contact, your forces congeal back up to
company level as a minimum size, because a company is the smallest element that can take care
of itself if you expect heavy contact. So, that takes you back to the profile of activity in
Vietnam — very high in 1965, '66, and early '67, and very low in late '67 until TET, high in TET
and for six months after TET, and then, low again. So, it was a roller coaster. If you talk to people
present in one period, they tend not to understand what was going on and to be critical of what
happened in another period.

This may be a good time to talk about the functioning of the division staff and some of the
people involved. During my tenure with the 1st Division I had three G-3s — Sam Walker, Al Haig
and Paul Gorman. Bill Le Gro was the G-2 and Gene D'Ambrosio the G-4. Ed Kitchens was the
Chief of Staff following Bill Glasgow. It was a super staff, and the ADCs — Bernie Rogers, Jack
Deane, Mel Zais, and the incomparable Jimmy Hollingsworth* — were no small shakes either.

*General Sam S. Walker, USA Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1946. During the Korean conflict,
General Walker served in the 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Other assignments included duty as the
Commander (Cdr), 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1966); Commanding General (CG), 3rd Infantry Division (1972-
74); Cdr, Berlin Command (1974-75); and CG, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe (1977-78). General Alexander
M. Haig, Jr., USA Retired, was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1947. During the Korean conflict, he served as Aide-
de-Camp to the X Corps CG. Other assignments included duty as the Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (1970-73); and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (1973). After retiring in 1973, General Haig served as
the Chief of Staff to the President (1973-74). Recalled to active duty in 1974, General Haig served as Supreme Allied
Cdr, Europe (1974-79). Retiring again in 1979, General Haig later served in the Reagan Administration as the Secretary
of State (1981-82). General Paul F. Gorman, Jr., USA Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1950. During the
Korean conflict, General Gorman served in the 32nd Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division. Subsequent
assignments included duty as the Cdr, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (1970-71); CG, 8th Infantry Division (1977-
79); Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1981-83); and Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
(1983-84). For a biographic sketch of General Bernard W. Rogers see page 109. General John R. Deane, Jr., USA
Retired, was commissioned in the Infantry in 1942. During World War II, General Deane served with the 415th Infantry
Regiment, 104th Infantry Division, in the European Theater of Operations. Other assignments included duty as the
CG, 173rd Airborne Brigade (1966-67); CG, 82nd Airborne Division (1968-69); Chief of Research, Development and
Acquisition (1973-75); and CG, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) (1975-77).
General Me/vin Zais, deceased, was commissioned in the Infantry in the US Army Reserve in 1937. During World War
II, General Zais commanded the 3rd Battalion, 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 17th Airborne Division, in the
European Theater of Operations. Subsequent assignments included duty as the CG, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) (1968-69); CG, XXIV Corps (1969-70); CG, Third Army (1972-73); and CG, Allied Land Forces,
Southeastern Europe (1973-76). Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, USA Retired, was commissioned in the
Infantry in 1940. During World War II, General Hollingsworth commanded a company, a battalion, and an armored
task force in the 2nd Armored Division, in North Africa and the European Theater of Operations. Other assignments
included duty as the CG, Fort Jackson (1969-70); CG, US Army, Alaska (1970-71); CG, Third Regional Assistance
Command and Senior Advisor, Military Region 3 (1971-72); and CG, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea (1973-76).

149

We based all of our operations on Bill Le Gro's intelligence. The Le Gro/Gorman team was
unbeatable. We moved fast to exploit intelligence obtained concerning any location or movement.
No matter how fast we moved or how many battalions we threw into a battle, our logistics system
always rose to the occasion. Many of our biggest battles occurred when we sought the enemy out
based on our intelligence and on our appreciation of their most likely actions. Signal intelligence
was our primary source. Long range patrols sometimes verified such intelligence but often
provided invaluable negative intelligence — that is, information that the enemy was not in a
certain area. We studied his infrastructure and managed to locate almost all of his main camps.
Often we were surprised, but so was he. We fought several major campaigns against the 9th VC
Division, our worthy opponent — the first on Route 13 in the summer of 1966 and near the
Michelin in the fall. The 9th Division did not fare well in its prolonged contest with the 1st Division.

INTERVIEWER: One type of operation that was controversial in that a lot of the units didn't do it,
was night operations. We really never heard much from you in terms of night operations, yet
those operations that the division did do involved frequent night movements and a lot of
patrolling. But, there were a lot of things that we probably could have done at night and didn't.
What were your thoughts about night operations and were you satisfied with what the 1st Division
was doing?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I probably should have done more, but, really, there are only two things that
you can do at night, one of which is just move without fighting. We discussed that earlier. So, I
think that perhaps we should have moved some battalions and companies into blocking positions
or ambushes at night. But, as far as moving and fighting at night, when you don't know exactly
where the enemy is, I'm against it because I don't think you can develop any combat power. If
he's there and organized, and you're moving and disorganized, you are not going to like the
results. However, don't forget how effective our operations were in the Rung Sat, the mangrove

Typical scenes in the Rung Sat Special Zone

150

swamps below Saigon, where the VC tried to mine the ship channels. In the Rung Sat we moved
through the swamps on foot waist deep in water and muck to establish ambushes. The VC moved
only by boat. They did not know — could not know — where we were. At night, as they moved
about by boat, they would run into our ambushes and be destroyed. We rotated a number of
battalions through Rung Sat and had spectacular results. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry
pioneered that technique. There were no big battles, just dozens of successful ambushes.
Normally, the battalion in the Rung Sat achieved the best combat results of all the battalions in the
division. We also found whole villages on stilts and naval mine factories there. All the fighting in
Rung Sat — every bit of it — was at night.

INTERVIEWER: Hopefully, you can get them to attack you at night, which is even better.

GEN DEPUY: Oh, yes. They did a lot of that.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of night operations, I thought that that was what we did best.

GEN DEPUY: Yes, that's what I wanted to do, to have them attack. Additionally, we found that
units deployed across major VC supply and courier routes had great success at night. For
example, Al Haig's battalion, the 1st of the 26th Infantry, loved to sit on a sandy hill south of Chon
Thanh, because all night, every night, small groups of VC would stumble into his outposts.

INTERVIEWER: That's why, as a policy, the division always dug in. They didn't sit around in their
hammocks waiting for the dark to come.

GEN DEPUY: Right. So did the Romans. They always put up a camp. The Romans put up a wall
wherever they were; an earthen wall at first. They dug in every night because they operated alone
in hostile territory — and so did we.

INTERVIEWER: As time went on, what was your appraisal of the technical ability of your small
units and individual soldiers? I'd like for you to address three things: did you think they could
shoot; what did you think of their ability to move, i.e. did they react properly; and, what did you
think of their communications capabilities?

GEN DEPUY: I suspect that we didn't shoot very well. I suspect that in those quick encounters
we did poorly compared to say, the British and the Australians. With respect to the cloverleaf and
that type of activity, to the extent it was used — and, by the way, I know it was used only by
some units because I saw a lot of examples where it wasn't. I remember a patrol in Rufe Lazzell's
battalion, the 1st of the 16th Infantry, near Suoi Da, when General Bernie Rogers landed and tried
to collect them. There was a platoon that was bumbling through the woods in the old-fashioned
way — single file — and just happened to stop for a rest break in the middle of an ambush. They
decided that that was the end of the day's work. So, they just sat down in the middle of an
ambush which made it very easy for the VC. But, they weren't cloverleafing, you can be sure of
that. Nonetheless, I do think that we had fewer units stumbling into killing zones because of that

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technique. But, maybe the wish is the father of the thought here. That's what it was designed to
do, and I think it did help that way. As far as communications were concerned, at what levels are
you talking about?

INTERVIEWER: Do you think that we talked too much on the radio? That's a frequent criticism.

GEN DEPUY: I'm sure we did and I think that the analysis afterwards by the signal intelligence
people pretty well proved that we did. We did a lot of talking in order to increase the control and
agility of the division, and the speed with which we could move. But, I think we probably paid a
high price for it. That still bothers me. I still think our SOIs are too cumbersome. So, we erred on
one side. If you followed the current SOIs completely, you didn't have time to fight. What we
need to do is come out in the middle. We had Doc Bahnsen working on that at Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). I think he made some progress, but I don't know how much.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of support for the deployed battalions, combat service support mainly,
were there any unique problems or solutions that stand out in your mind?

GEN DEPUY: Well, you are in a better position to answer that question than I am. We pretty
much left it up to the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and brigade trains to provide what
was needed. The critical supplies upon which division operations wholly depended were
ammunition and POL — POL to move and ammo to fight. We were major users of CH-47
choppers to move both. Our DISCOM was flexible and fast under the directions of our G-4s who
were the best in the business. I could throw the division around the III Corps area at will and the
support would always be there. But, you were at the receiving end, and it always looks different at
the other end — it never looks as good. What did you think?

INTERVIEWER: We always had what we needed. One thing that you had, and it probably saved
Whitted's battalion, were the pre-rigged bundles of various types of ammunition standing by. I
remember Clarence Sprouse, the Division Sergeant Major, was down there guiding helicopters in
and getting the stuff out to those who were shooting it up as fast as it could be given to them.

GEN DEPUY: That system was in effect long before that particular battle. That's very important
too, because when a unit needs ammo there is no time to count it or time to ask for this, that, and
the other thing. It's got to be a pre-packaged push package.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to hit a major controversy, if you will, that surrounds your reputation as a
commander in Vietnam — the handling of leaders who were found to be incompetent. It's been
said that you fired scores of battalion commanders and I'd like you to address that issue. Also, if
you would, contrast the handling of unsatisfactory leaders in World War II, with how it was done
in Vietnam.

GEN DEPUY: Well, I guess I have to say that I'm fairly well convinced that once a man has made
a bad mistake, not of judgment, but of incompetence, and revealed himself by his actions, actions

152

that are the consequence of a general weakness in command, then there is very little you can do
to change him at that stage in his life. Of course, I can't say that I can predict ahead of time who
they are going to be. Now, as for relieving scores of people, based on the paper which you have
just shown me which refreshes my memory, there was one infantry battalion commander, a
former Special Forces officer, who was relieved rather early on. He really should never have been
a corporal. But, other than that, there were three infantry battalion and three artillery battalion
commanders relieved. I am prepared to admit that it's possible I was wrong on some of those. In
the case of two of the artillery battalion commanders, the DIVARTY commander relieved them
and I agreed with his actions. In one case, I took the initiative. And, in the case of one of the
infantry battalion commanders, it was just plain unwillingness to obey orders and do what he was
told to do. In the case of another one, I really should have relieved him the first time he failed but I
gave him another chance, and he killed a lot more people — our people. In the case of the third
one, I think I may have acted hastily. So, really, we're not talking about dozens or hundreds, we're
talking about a few. And then, there were some division staff people, a G-5, a Provost Marshall,
and a PIO, and some others like that. Oh, I don't know what they all added up to but I would say
10 or 12, something on that order.

INTERVIEWER: Well, as of the end of December 1966, there were 11. Now, in your
correspondence we found at least one reference where you declined to accept an officer because
you felt that he didn't have the necessary experience. I believe it was an artilleryman and I've
always thought that perhaps it was not accepting people that led to the horrible stories that were
going around in the ranks of the lieutenant colonels and colonels for a period of time.

GEN DEPUY: Well, the first thing that happened was that they sent me a list of 24 lieutenant
colonels to fill a whole variety of jobs. They were from all branches but most of them were slated
for battalion command. I believe that I only accepted two from that list. Now, the reason I turned
them down is that these were men who had been — most of them had been — lieutenants in
Korea, and hadn't had any kind of experience with combat units since.

That's one of the reasons the Army is wise now to select for command. You know, being a
commander of a unit is not a right, it's a privilege, a privilege that you've got to earn. You have to
train for it. I just didn't see any reason why we should train people who had never had a company
command, had never been a battalion S-3, and had never been a battalion exec, when we wanted
to win a war, and when others were available. So, now you have heard my feelings on that. In
World War II and specifically in the 90th Division, the problem was that prior to combat there
wasn't any effort made to eliminate people who were clearly deficient. As a consequence, we
suffered inexcusable and enormous casualties. In the six weeks in Normandy prior to the
breakout, the 90th Division lost 100 percent of its soldiers and 150 percent of its officers. In
infantry units, where these casualties were almost entirely concentrated, the rates ran at 300 to
400 percent — in just six weeks, as you will remember. That's indelibly marked on my mind. I told
that story to General Johnson when he came out to see me. And, I told him that I couldn't
change; I either would have to be removed or I would continue to remove officers who I thought
didn't show much sign of learning their trade, and, at the same time, were getting a lot of people
hurt. You can't get a soldier back once he's killed.

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I know that's the way wars are frequently fought, but Vietnam didn't have to be fought that way
because it was a small war. Besides, we didn't put everybody in it, anyway. We could have put the
good ones in and kept them longer. We could have saved lives and been more effective that way.
Here we had a conflict between using Vietnam to train the Army for the next war, versus trying to
win the war in Vietnam. Those were the two conflicting points of view. So, with regard to having
six months in command and trying to rotate everybody through, I've always said that that was
running the war for the benefit of the officer corps. So, in any event, I'm sure I made mistakes on
some of the people I relieved. But, I don't think I made very many. I think most of them were cut
and dried cases of pure ineptitude or malfeasance. I acted in every case on behalf of the lives of
our 1st Division soldiers who always paid the price for the actions of weak or incompetent leaders.
So, if I had to do it again, I'd probably do the same thing, only I'd probably do it a little more
cleverly.

INTERVIEWER: It needs to be remembered that there were, in fact, just 1 1 names on that letter
which is a far cry from what people back in the United States apparently were talking about.

GEN DEPUY: You might be interested to know that in the First World War, in the first month of
the war, Field Marshal Joseph Joffre relieved, I believe it was 72 general officers — several Army
commanders and scores of corps and division commanders. Now, you see what that process was.
It was a peacetime army going into war, and when you send an army into war you find that a lot of
people aren't fit for war. They just aren't the kind of people you want to fight a war. And, you
have a lot of human wastage; you have wastage of both the people who are relieved, and of the
people who suffered while they were in command before being relieved.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, one of the things that marked the division by the time I got there, which was
in July of 1966, was that the division was really proud of the fact that it was the "Big Red One."
There was a good feeling about the division. We had confidence in our leaders. We had
confidence that we had the stuff we needed to fight and we felt very strongly that anytime any of
us got into trouble, the whole division was going to get us out. That's just the way we felt about it.
Now, one of the things that you did — and you appeared to have your ADCs working that way,
too — was that in terms of keeping people feeling good, there seemed to be a rather liberal policy
towards awards and decorations, visits, pats on the back, and that sort of thing.

GEN DEPUY: Well, I'd like to pick up on your comment about the division going to the aid of
somebody. That was a conscious policy that we talked about quite a lot. Now, the people to
whom that was really important, were the sergeants and the privates who went out on patrols.
Whether they were in the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), or just in an infantry
battalion, they knew that we would, in fact, not only go to help them, but go right away. It was
very important for them to know that. And, I agree with you, that belief did permeate the division.
It was a great morale builder. To this day, I meet soldiers who remember that. They believed that.
As a matter of fact, during that entire time, we had no men missing in action. We even committed
two battalions to retrieve Sergeant Nunez's body. In that kind of war, it's a very important thing to
do. You are asking a lot of people to take a lot of risks, and to do a lot of things they would rather

154

not do. They'd rather be doing almost anything else. So, we did have that reputation and that was
a natural outgrowth of our quick reaction type operation.

As for being liberal about awards and decorations — sure. My God, why not? I don't know
precisely how many people but perhaps a hundred thousand men from all over this country went
through the 1st Division while it was in Vietnam. They were only there for a short period of time. If
they were in the infantry they didn't last very long. They got sick, wounded, or something else
happened to them. They didn't go home with much. So, all those decorations now are scattered
all over the United States. And you know, my guess is that for awhile they hid them away but are
now getting them out. Secondly, the 1st Division was lucky in that it was a magnet for talented
officers. I won't name them all but during my one year with the division we had Bernie Rogers,
Jack Deane, Mel Zais, Jim Hollingsworth, Paul Gorman, Al Haig, Sam Walker, Bob Haldane, Dick
Cavazos, Dick Prillaman, and 30 others who became general officers. I don't have time to mention
the colonels and captains who were legion.*

INTERVIEWER: With regard to awards and decorations, there have been accusations made that
there was something called a "battalion commander's packet." This was an awards packet or a
basic load of awards and decorations, that if one survived as a battalion commander he
supposedly received when he left. Would you comment on that?

GEN DEPUY: Well, if they had such a thing I didn't know about it. I will say this, though.
General Patton had a theory. He said, "Every successful battalion commander has earned a
Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). Every one in Third Army." He said that we might not know
about what he had done to earn it, but for sure he had done it. Well, I feel a little bit like that about
a battalion commander, or a company commander for that matter. I know they earned it if they
were any good. But, we just didn't know about it. However, I don't know anything about any
such packet. I never heard that expression.

INTERVIEWER: Right now the Army is involved in a little bit of a controversy concerning special
items on uniform. What are your thoughts on this subject?

*For biographic sketches of General Rogers, Deane, Zais, Hollingsworth, Gorman, Haig, and Walker, see page 149.
Lieutenant General Robert Haldane, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1947.
Prior to entering the United States Military Academy in 1943, General Haldane served in the European Theater of
Operations as an enlisted soldier in the Army Air Corps. Other assignments included duty as the Commander, 3rd
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1968-69); Commanding General, US Army Training Center, Fort Polk (1974);
Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (1975); Chief of Staff, US Army, Europe (1979-80); and
Chief of Staff, European Command (1980-82). General Richard E. Cavazos, USA Retired, was commissioned a
second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1951. During the Korean conflict General Cavazos served as a platoon leader and
company commander in the 65th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division. Subsequent assignments included duty as
the Commander, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1970-72); Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division (1977-80);
Commanding General, III Corps (1980-82); and Commanding General, US Army Forces Command (1982-84).
Lieutenant General Richard L. Prillaman, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Armor in 1950.
During the Korean conflict, General Prillaman served as a company commander in the 5th Regimental Combat Team.
Subsequent assignments included duty as the Commanding General, US Army Training Center and Fort Jackson
(1974-77); Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division (1980-82); and Director, Operations, J-3, Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (1982-84).

155

GEN DEPUY: Well, I personally am in favor of distinctive items of equipment, and caps, and all
that sort of stuff, as long as it's within reason. But, that's just my personal feeling. I regretted
seeing the berets go. I will say that when I went down to Fort Rucker and saw the band at the
Aviation Center, in orange berets with white laces in their boots, I didn't like the coloring. But, I
didn't have any problems with the black berets on the tankers, or the red berets on the airborne, or
the black berets on the 101st, and so on and so forth. If the troopers liked that, and it made them
feel better and tougher, I'd give it to them anytime.

INTERVIEWER: If we might go back for just a few minutes to some of the tactical things that
happened in Vietnam. Would you compare that war with World War II, tactically, down at the
squad and platoon level, and discuss some of the principles and techniques that you added, or
maybe threw out, in Vietnam?

GEN DEPUY: Weil, the first thing that holds up in both cases is the type of individual foxhole, or
emplacement; I'm now more convinced than ever that you've got to have frontal cover.
Otherwise, you will be suppressed by direct fire, and once you're suppressed by direct fire, the
next thing will be hand grenades, and pretty soon, that will be the end of it. So, that was the same
for both wars, and will be the same in any future war unless you're fighting from an armored
vehicle of some sort.

From the offensive point of view, the big difference was between seeking out the enemy force
and seeking out terrain. Terrain was less important in Vietnam for two reasons. First, most terrain
didn't give you visibility or observation, so it was unimportant from that standpoint. And, it was
totally unimportant if it wasn't important to the enemy. So, except for Nui Ba Den and some other
big mountains used for radio relays, terrain in Vietnam made no difference. Visibility was what you
were looking for, visibility around a defensive position. So, instead of going for terrain and
bypassing the enemy, you were forced to fight the enemy. You were forced to do something with
him on ground chosen by him. You couldn't pry him out of his position by getting the high ground
to his rear, which is what we tried to do in World War II. That led to going right after him, and
going right after him led to the things that we talked about earlier. Sometimes, if there were just a
few of them, a good dashing charge with a lot of shooting was probably the right thing to do; but,
it was awfully hard to tell when that was the right thing to do. If he happened to be in bunkers it
was almost suicidal to do that. As you know, I preferred that the leading elements not
automatically charge the enemy. Attacking the enemy should be done as a result of a decision,
not as a result of an automatic response.

I do not like automatic reactions to contact. And, I say that, even though I admit that if you had
an airborne unit under your command, with all tigers in it, then it might be that on the average,
you'd do better by an immediate charge. If you had a disaster, it would be a big disaster, but often
it worked, in Vietnam, where you had to go directly after the enemy force and you couldn't attack
where the enemy was weak, it raised this other question. So, what I tried to emphasize was that
when you make contact, make contact with a small force because you're going to make contact in
adverse circumstances. You're probably going to be in his killing zone. After you've made
contact, don't go after him unless a competent person like the company commander or the
battalion commander decides to do so. Try to find out how big he is. Now, we had some rules

156

about that. If you only hear rifles, it's probably a platoon; if you hear a machine gun and rifles, it's
probably a company; and if you hear rifles, a machine gun and a mortar, it's most likely a
battalion. So, act accordingly. It is not smart for a platoon to attack a battalion. You'll just lose the
platoon. We should do like the Viet Cong did at Bau Bang against Paul Gorman's battalion —
probe around and find the general configuration of the position, and determine whether it's
fortified or not, then report back to the next higher headquarters. That way you don't get so
enmeshed that you can't shoot at it, or you can't drop a bomb on it. The best thing to do would be
to bring up more force and try to surround it, but don't surround it too tightly; that way you can
still bomb it. Now, we often tried to do that. Sometimes we made a real mess of it. Sometimes
everything went wrong. By the way, the VC decided not to attack Paul Gorman. They were smart.
He was loaded for bear.

So, those are the big differences. I would say that in fighting Russians, or fighting Germans, or
fighting in Europe, it should be a very rare thing when you attack right up the hill into the teeth of
the defense. Remember, he has a large advantage just because he's down, camouflaged and
waiting, while you're up, exposed and moving. You can't see him but he can see you! So, you
don't want to fight under those circumstances if you can avoid it. You'd rather be down and
waiting for him to move up. That's why if you get behind him and force him to move, you reverse
the whole situation. But, in Vietnam that was very difficult to do. You might get behind him but
he'd just sneak off to the flank and disappear.

INTERVIEWER: Many times in Vietnam we just weren't patient enough to do what you're
suggesting.

GEN DEPUY: Well, we might as well talk about that battle on the 25th of August. I believe it was
on the 25th of August. Suffice it to say that Bill Mullen's patrol got into the middle of a VC base
camp, and then his company went in to rescue the patrol, and his battalion came to reinforce him,
and then, I brought in other battalions. Paul Gorman's battalion, the 1st of the 26th Infantry, came
in from the south. "Goony" Wallace's 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, came all the way across from
Lai Khe, while Elmer Pendleton's 2nd of the 28th Infantry, came in from the north and tried to
block that escape route. We tried to get all around the camp because, obviously, the patrol
reported that there were a lot of enemy. It turned out to be a battalion-sized base camp. Gorman's
move was only partially successful. "Goony" Wallace's move was a disaster. Elmer Pendleton
was positioned okay, but they didn't go out his way. The 1st of the 2nd Infantry, when it came in,
was not well in hand. I presided over this very gory and unsuccessful operation. The VC made
monkeys of us. We had a cavalry troop that was in there. We had an APC sitting partly in the
bunkers, and we had people in so close that when Paul and others brought in NAPALM, it burned
the map right out of his hand. It was just a long day.

INTERVIEWER: Well, it was, but the way it actually unfolded — the patrol got into the base
camp and hollered for help. We got artillery for them right away and then proceeded to try to
reinforce them. When my company got into the base camp mounted on a platoon from the 4th
Cavalry, maybe even two platoons, we actually were in a different part of the base camp from
where the patrol was at. But, we were in it. The VC weren't! They had run away to fight

157

Close air support was

frequently available to

support the ground forces.

A typical
NAPALM strike.

somewhere else when they heard us come in. So, really, we owned the base camp then, or at
least pieces of it. We couldn't find the patrol but we had our piece of the camp. I left two platoons
to hold on to the base camp, which I thought to be a good idea, and we sailed along looking for
that patrol. We got down into a swamp and got our tracks bogged down. That's when the 4th
Platoon leader called up and said, "I'm the only man left in the platoon." That's when we realized
that the VC had come back. We then went back to the base camp and actually, we were in pretty
good control of the mess in and around our piece of the base camp. But, two things happened.
First, from an overall perspective, which proves every point that you've ever tried to make about
the things a company commander has to do in the middle of a big scrap, I could only tend to first
things first. I was trying to coordinate a lot of things and was getting no help. The other problem
was that the cavalry troop commander on the scene had flipped his lid. It was about his third big
fight. I didn't recognize it at the time, probably because of being so busy, but we could have
gotten a lot more mileage out of those guys. Anyway, there were all kinds of people trying to help
but because of all of them trying to talk on the radio at the same time, they were worse than no
help at all. And, I remember trying to talk to you, personally. I thought I could get through that
way. I wanted to tell my division commander that we were in contact with something big. We
didn't know what it was, but it was big. And secondly, that we were okay and to go ahead and try
the doughnut thing. Well, I'm happy to discover that you tried to do just that. I have thought all
along that these companies which kept coming in — which was nice to see — screwed up all of
the fire support, and made a bit of a mess of it. While we're on the subject, one of the outcomes of
the thing was the NAPALM strike which you referred to earlier. I don't know if anyone ever told
you what really happened, but I watched that pod of NAPALM sail off of the airplane. Now, there
was a large tree there and the pod hit that tree and instead of following the flight path of the plane
did a 90 degree turn. That's why it came across our position.

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GEN DEPUY:Totheleft?

INTERVIEWER: It burned the map right out of General, then Colonel, Gorman's hands. One of
the things that I was always very proud of was that when confronted, attacked might be a better
word, by the press over this disasterous example of close air support, you sprang to the Air
Force's defense. Now, I've been told that you actually accepted full responsibility for what
happened. At the time, I think people were throwing around numbers like 40 who were killed by
the NAPALM. A reporter saw it happen and drew the inference that we had killed our own people
with NAPALM. I don't think we killed anybody.

GEN DEPUY: I don't think so, either. Well, anyway, Spike Momyer, who was the Seventh Air
Force commander, came up with Westmoreland, and I met him back at the brigade CP. He said
that he wasn't going to drop any ordnance within 500 yards of the 1st Division. I told him that we
really couldn't live with that. And, he said, "Well, I've been getting all sorts of flack." Incidentally,
I saw Spike Momyer two days ago and we talked about this incident. So, I said, "What can I do to
help you?" He said, "Well, you've got to get the press off my back." So, I went down the next
night to Saigon, to what they called the 5:00 o'clock follies, and told all the reporters what had
happened, and said that the Air Force dropped their bombs and NAPALM exactly where we had
asked them to. If anybody got hurt as a result of that, then we took full responsibility for it. I
wanted them all to know that and to get off the Air Force's back. I told them that if they wanted to
get on anybody's back, then to get on ours. So, I did that, and that kept the Air Force more or less
happy with the 1st Division.

INTERVIEWER: Another outcome of that fight was that two or three prisoners were captured. I
understand that one of them talked and that based on his information you were able to determine
the habits of the Phu Loi Battalion. I can remember that you talked on this orchestration of
harrassment and interdiction fires over a period of months, that you were building into a
crescendo so that you could drive the Phu Loi Battalion to the point where they would much
rather give up the war than to carry on. I wonder if you would comment on that?

GEN DEPUY: Well, actually, Paul Gorman was the maestro. We did pick up the Phu Loi
Battalion's roster over by the Song Be River, right after that battle. We found it near the little
village of Phuoc Vinh, near that plantation house. The roster was marked up with various and
sundry pieces of information. It actually contained the wounded and killed on it, and so on. Paul
Gorman, who became the G-3 after that battle, was the man who took it on as a personal project
with my full and enthusiastic approval to round up the Phu Loi Battalion. He was the brains behind
all of that. He was working an agent or two who were supposedly talking to the commander, who
was reported to be a great big fellow. Several times Paul thought that the battalion was about to
defect because of the artillery fire and the general conditions in the area. But, they never did. So,
maybe they were smarter than we were. We're back here and they're still over there.

INTERVIEWER: Just a couple of short questions. First, going back to your earlier statements
about the percentage of people who actually did the fighting in World War II, would you make
that same analysis about Vietnam? Was the percentage about the same, or was it better?

159

GEN DEPUY: It was better but I don't know the percentages. I'd be willing to say that one of the
reasons it was better was because the leadership mixture was higher. We had better company
commanders and better sergeants in the earlier part of the war. As I said, I don't know what the
percentage was but my guess is that 50 percent would be very, very good. I'd say that 50 percent
would be high. I hope they got up to that. "Slam" Marshall measured it in Korea. I think that in
World War II, it was 25 percent, and in Korea "Slam" thought that it got up to 40 or 50 percent.*

INTERVIEWER: I know that he told the story about soldiers who didn't fire their rifles but just got
down in the holes, and about soldiers who occasionally threw grenades but didn't pull the pins.

GEN DEPUY: Well, even in the best airborne battalion that went across the Carentan Causeway,
over half of the men never fired a round.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any difficulties or experiences that you had as a division commander
that came as a surprise? In other words, were there things that you didn't really expect might
happen but, in fact, did?

GEN DEPUY: I was not surprised at the high proficiency of the VC and the NVA, because during
my two years as J-3 down at MACV, I had already formed a very good opinion of them. I guess
my biggest surprise, and this was a surprise in which I have lots of company, was that the North
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong would continue the war despite the punishment they were taking. I
guess I should have expected that. I guess I should have studied human nature and the history of
Vietnam and of revolutions and should have known it, but I didn't. I really thought that the kind of
pressure they were under would cause them to perhaps knock off the war for awhile, as a
minimum, or even give up and go back north. I understand that from 1965 to '69 they lost over
600,000 men. But, I was completely wrong on that. That was a surprise.

I guess I was surprised a little bit, too, after I took over the division, about the difficulty we had
in finding the VC. We hit more dry holes than I thought we were going to hit. They were more
elusive than I had expected. They controlled the battle better. They were the ones who usually
decided whether or not there would be a fight. They were going to attack Soui Da. They were
going to attack Loc Ninh. They were going to attack An Loc. By the way, these were campaign
plans, not battle plans. We got around somehow and engaged them, but they could have said no
at any point. I think when the American Army looked for them during much of Abe's tour there,
and didn't find them, again, they were making all the decisions. That is inherent in such a war. The
enemy was smart. He wanted to win, not lose battles. He rarely charged into our killing zones. If
he didn't like the odds he withdrew into Cambodia or otherwise evaded us.

INTERVIEWER: General Marshall, S.L.A. Marshall, quotes you as asking him about this same
time, how much longer we had to win the war. That indicates to me that you saw a problem in
terms of our staying power.

*For a discussion concerning the percentage of infantrymen firing their personal weapons in Korea, see S.L.A.
Marshall, "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea," Operations Research Office Report,
0R0-R13: Project DOUGHBOY (Chevy Chase: The John Hopkins University, 1951).

160

GEN DEPUY: Well, I did. I was very worried about our staying power. I didn't think the American
people would put up with the war for very long, given television, and given what I was reading in
the press from the United States. But, the big surprise was that the VC and N VA were simply able
to avoid enough direct confrontations that they were able to survive. They metered out their
casualties, and when the casualties were getting too high, as for example in 1966 and '67, and
then again, during and after TET, they simply backed off and waited. They came back later, under
circumstances in which they could afford to sustain more casualties. Now, I wish that we had all
been smart enough to say in 1965, when we went in, "That's what they are going to do to us." If
we had been that smart then maybe we wouldn't have gone in. We did intervene on behalf of a
very weak and dubious regime, albeit one better than communism. Still, it was very dubious in
terms of political weight and meaning. But, I don't remember anybody saying that, do you? Not
even the experts, the scholastics, or the academics said that. Oh, there was one who did, Francois
Sully, who is now dead. Now, the reason he did is because he had been through it before with the
French. He told me and he told others. He said, "You're never going to win it. You're not going to
be able to find them. You're going to thrash around and you're only going to fight the battles that
they win." Well, he wasn't quite right. He wasn't right in every detail, but he was right in net and
sum. What we also didn't anticipate was the massive intervention of the North Vietnamese Army.
In 1965 who would have thought that the North Vietnamese would have 23 divisions in South
Vietnam by 1975? They even replaced the casualties in VC units at the local level.

INTERVIEWER: Sir Robert Thompson said that we came so close to winning that it's really
amazing that we didn't. When we pulled out, had we just continued to supply the South
Vietnamese at a tolerable rate then they would have maintained the struggle, but we didn't. So,
they no longer had the artillery or lift capability necessary. They didn't have the mobility and
firepower advantages that they had not only learned to use, but that they had grown accustomed
to using.*

GEN DEPUY: Well, you have to have mobility and firepower in a war like that. In other words, if
you want to go back and fight it like the French did, you can, but you will lose. So, we pulled the
wherewithal out from under them. Whether they could have done it all alone, even with the
resources, I just don't know. But, they certainly never had a fair try once we pulled out our tactical
support.

INTERVIEWER: Supposing we had kept the Vietnamese Army in the ball game with all these
massive supplies, the battlefield was just part of their challenge. Now, if they got well from the
village level on up in terms of a government that really was a government, and if the Army could
keep on winning, and if the VC continued coming out where the ARVN could get at them, then
perhaps the government could have won.

GEN DEPUY: Well, I'm not sure. The reason I hesitate to say that the Vietnamese could have
made it alone, even if we had left them with about the same mixture — the helicopters, aircraft,

*Sir Robert Thompson, "The Vietnam War" (Lecture presented at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, 21 September 1978).

161

and artillery — is because of the number of divisions that the North Vietnamese eventually
committed. I think it exceeded the elastic limits of the South Vietnamese. But, we did make a
terrible mistake when we cut the legs off from under them. In the larger context I think the only
way the war could have been won was to establish a defensive line from the South China Sea —
to the Mekong along Route 9 and physically prevent the North Vietnamese from infiltrating
supplies and units to the south. General Westmoreland proposed such a scheme in 1965 and 1966,
but he was turned down.

INTERVIEWER: Continuing on with some more questions on Vietnam, what is your appraisal of
the body count as a measure of success?*

GEN DEPUY: It is a gruesome way of accounting, but there didn't seem to be any other way to
keep track of the progress being made. On the one hand, the intelligence people tried to estimate
the size of the enemy force at all levels, from regular or main forces, down through guerrillas.
Then they subtracted from that the so-called body count and "Chieu Hois." I believe that
problems arose with the body count in certain units. You may recall that the Rhodesians deal in
body count. Even in Ireland, the British keep track of it. I think it's inevitable that people will do
that. Now, if units compete for body count, and they inflate them, then that's a corruption of the
system. So, I think it's inevitable that there will be some kind of counting of enemy casualties, and
that automatically brings you into an area of potential abuse.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have confidence in the accuracy of the body count reporting of the 1st
Division?

GEN DEPUY: Well, not really. I think that General Talbott improved it later by being very precise.
When I was there it really wasn't too much of an issue. Really, the fad hadn't started, and I think
that our body count reports were very general estimates. I suppose there was some inflation factor
in it. At the time, however, I didn't think it was very important.

INTERVIEWER: Did you use the statistics to compare units?

GEN DEPUY: No, I did not.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to add that that's the way it was perceived down at the battalion level.
We were never bugged about body count. Sir, please share with us the prerequisites that you
used when you assessed someone's potential to be a battalion or brigade commander?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I think the first requirement of a battalion or brigade commander, as well as a
company commander or a division commander, is attention to detail; knowing weapons; knowing

*This is the third interview conducted with General DePuy, USA Retired. This interview was conducted on 23 April
1979, at his home in Highfield, Virginia. The interviewers were Lieutenant Colonels William J. Mullen and Romie L.
Brownlee.

162

tactics; studying the enemy; being practical; and having a good firm grip on the unit, whatever
type it may be, and at whatever level, from division all the way down to company.

INTERVIEWER: In your management of the war as a division commander, were you under any
constraints imposed by the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(COMUSMACV), in terms of holding down friendly casualties?

GEN DEPUY: No, not from General Westmoreland. The only pressure I ever had on casualties
was from the Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson, who came out and was critical of the casualties
we had suffered in Phuoc Tuy Province.* I agreed with him that it was most unfortunate. But, it
was one of those episodes in war that was unavoidable if you are going to be aggressive. That
balance between aggressiveness and casualties is the agonizing role faced by any commander,
whether he is a company commander or a division commander. He must be judged on the long-
term averages, I think, rather than on any one little episode. With respect to General Johnson, you
must understand that he was devoted to the concept of pacification. He liked what he saw in the
25th Division under Fred Weyand.

You will recall that the 25th Division was deployed between the Saigon River, which was our
southern boundary, and the Oriental River, which came into Saigon from the Parrot's Beak. This
area was heavily populated. Weyand was correct in his emphasis on pacification and security. On
the other hand, the 1st Division was a jungle division. Except for an area around Di An, south of
the line, Lai Khe — Phuoc Vinh, we had very little civilian population. Instead, what we had was
an enormous operating area which included all of War Zones C and D, and went all the way to the
Cambodian border on the west and north, as far east as Song Be. Our AO was ten times the size
of the 25th Division's AO. I regarded it as my job, my mission, to keep the 9th VC Division back in
the jungle — to engage it continuously, to destroy it if possible, and to keep it out of the
populated areas. While I commanded the 1st Division we succeeded in that mission completely.
The 9th VC Division never penetrated into the populated area during 1966 or early 1967. By the
way, this was the tactical purpose of "Search and Destroy" operations.

INTERVIEWER: Later on in the war, a major activitiy of the friendly forces in Vietnam was
pacification. Earlier in the history of the Vietnamese conflict, before the Americans came in, it is
my understanding that pacification was getting cranked up, but when Diem fell, and a series of
coups came along, followed by the influx of the Americans, the country's pacification effort
became second in importance to the bigger war. During the time of the buildup, when you were
commanding the 1st Division, the division had its own pacification effort. Please describe that
effort in terms of the guidance that you were given, the objectives that you were trying to reach,
and perhaps, some of the people who were involved?**

*General Harold K. Johnson, deceased, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry, in 1933. Prior to
World War II, General Johnson served with the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts. Captured at fall of Bataan in 1942, he
participated in the Bataan death march and was imprisoned until 1945. During the Korean conflict, General Johnson
commanded the 5th Cavalry and the 8th Cavalry Regiments, 1st Cavalry Division. Subsequent assignments included
duty as Commandant, Command and General Staff College (1960-63); Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
(1963-64); and Chief of Staff of the Army (1964-68).

**For an overview of pacification efforts in Vietnam, see Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington: USGPO, 1979).

163

GEN DEPUY: Let me answer the earlier part of your question. When Diem was involved in what
they called the Strategic Hamlet Program, strongly supported by the US, the growth of the Viet
Cong force was still in its infancy, and the North Vietnamese had no units in South Vietnam.
Therefore, the focus of the battle was down in the villages, the hamlets and the districts. The
largest VC units really were found at the provincial level, although the beginnings of some main
force units appeared in War Zones C and D. Then, when Diem was overthrown, the government
became disorganized and relatively less effective. The Strategic Hamlet Program was thought to
have been a failure, and the emphasis swung to the ARVN, not because someone decided to drop
pacification and go to big units but because the opposition organized regiments and divisions and
began to beat the hell out of the ARVN. That's why we intervened with US troops. There is a lot
of rubbish available on this subject, so beware!

For a period from the end of 1964 until 1967, maybe even beyond that, the emphasis was clearly
on main forces — ours and theirs. Then, our government, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the Agency for International Development (AID), the Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS) organization, and the government of Vietnam began to get better
organized and were once again able to address pacification. Once again, pacification began to
take on an added importance and a larger role. Within the 1st Division area we were in an area that
was less populated than were the areas where the divisions in the Delta, or around Saigon, or the
25th Division, or the divisions up in the northern coastal area such as the Americal were located.
You will recall that our AO included a lot of jungle and little population; nonetheless, we did
recognize that success eventually would depend on the quality of the ARVN, and in our case, on
the 5th Division, on the provincial regional forces, on the district and village level, on the popular
forces, and on all of the programs that were then being supported.

So, in order to work with the Vietnamese, we established an organization under Colonel Bobby
Schweitzer, called HELPER — the name itself indicating the purpose. This was a way, we hoped,
by which we would be able to work with all of those echelons of the Vietnamese, and in return, we
could obtain intelligence from them. In that way we would be more effective in supporting them at
every level — supporting them with military operations, supporting them with civic action, and in
supporting their medical, construction, and propaganda efforts, and so on. And, in the case of
Colonel Schweitzer, we had the perfect man. He spoke Vietnamese, was the bravest man I ever
met, was a man of enormous initiative and energy, was wounded a number of times, and had the
confidence of the Vietnamese at every level to the extent that they would assign forces to him at
his request without his even telling them what he was going to use them for. And, there would be
no intelligence leaks of any kind. So, whatever success we had, and I think the HELPER
Organization had many, in strengthening the Vietnamese and in attacking the enemy's so-called
infrastructure, can be credited primarily to Colonel Schweitzer and his men.*

INTERVIEWER: The HELPER Program then, was the result of your own assessment of what was
needed as opposed to something that you were directed to do in your area of operations?

*Lieutenant General Robert L. Schweitzer, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in
1953. Subsequently, he transferred into the Armor branch. His assignments have included duty as Commander, 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment (1973-74); Director, Office of Defense Policy, National Security Council (1981); and
Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board (1983-1986).

164

GEN DEPUY: Yes. We weren't directed to do that. After Komer arrived and CORDS was
created, there was more emphasis on support of the Vietnamese.* As I understand it, under
General Talbott the 1st Division had the principle mission of supporting the Vietnamese, or
assisting in "Vietnamization" as Secretary Laird called it. During my time, we were not directed in
any way to do those things, but it just seemed the necessary thing to do. My guess is that there
was never another Schweitzer.

INTERVIEWER: With regard to Vietnam, the press have been praised or vilified, depending on
who you talk to, but there is no question about the fact they had an enormous impact on the
outcome of the war. We'd like very much for you to comment on the reporters that you came in
contact with and your feelings as to their objectivity, their expertise, their knowledge of the
subject on which they were reporting, and so forth.

GEN DEPUY: Well, I think the reporters over there who worked with the combat troops were
fine. I liked them, and I thought they were fair enough, and very brave, and as good as combat
reporters have ever been. I am thinking about Arnett, Pappas and the like. I think the problem was
not with the reporters so much as it was with the editors back in the United States. I have a theory
which may not hold water, but it seems to me that something happened fairly early on, maybe
even as early as 1962, '63, or '64, which resulted in the intellectual elements of our society — and
this included a lot of the editors, television correspondents, and even some of the reporters —
somehow getting the impression that social justice was on the side of the enemy. This happened
early on and then was repeated again later, with the American public. In other words, I see it as
two waves.

The first wave was amongst the reporters and the intellectuals coming to the conclusion that
somehow or another we were guilty of some form of political aggression and were being heavy-
handed about it. Conversely, there was a love affair with the idea of the brave freedom fighter in
black pajamas making monkeys out of the establishment. Then, that whole thing was repeated
when American troops went over. When the American troops first went over, the American
people, the man on the street, was told that there was a communist menace, and that we were
going over to cope with it. Therefore, at that time, the enemy was the problem. The enemy was
evil. Then, through the bombardment of television and articles written by a lot of the intellectuals
who had already been through this process earlier with the ARVN, it seems to me that the average
American got to the point where he wondered on which side lay the purity of social justice. Now
that we know about the aims and activities of the North Vietnamese and their direction of the
effort from the very beginning, all of this was nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: About the 1st Division scholarship fund, which was set up for the children of
soldiers and officers who were killed in action and became a hallmark of the division, I wonder if

*Robert W. Komer served in the Directorate of Intelligence and Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence
Agency, during the period 1947 through 1960. Subsequently, Ambassador Komer served as the Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council (1961-65), and as Special Assistant to the President (1966-67). Following the completion of
his tour as head of CORDS in 1968, he served as the Ambassador to Turkey (1968-69); Advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for NATO Affairs (1977-79); and as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (1979-81).

165

you would discuss that both in terms of being the commanding general when it was started, and
then, later on, as the president of the society.

GEN DEPUY: Well, for the record, the Scholarship Fund started in a rather interesting way. You
may recall that there was a sergeant named Nunez, who was a member of the division's Long
Range Patrol Company. They went into a jungle area up on the edge of War Zone C, south of
what we called the "Red Barn." It was an area in which there was a large base camp used from
time to time by one of the regiments in the 9th Division, and during this particular patrol one of the
regiments was there. I don't remember which one, I think it was the 273rd. But, in any event, the
patrol ran into a real hornet's nest, and Sergeant Nunez was killed. We put some more troops in
there in order to get his body back because there was a point of honor not to leave any of the 1st
Division's dead in the hands of the enemy. So, we did that. In fact, we had a substantial fight in
the area. Not long after that I received a letter from Mrs. Nunez telling me how much her husband
had loved the 1st Division, and what a great soldier, husband and father he had been, and that she
hoped that her small sons would grow up in his image. She said it much better than that, but that
was the message. Well, it was a very touching letter, so I published it in the American Traveler,
which is the 1st Division's newspaper, with the suggestion that perhaps some of us ought to pitch
in some money to take care of Sergeant Nunez's sons and others like him.

Well, the morning following publication of the newspaper I found on my bunk a letter with quite
a lot of money in it. I've forgotten how much, but several hundred dollars, and a little note that just
said, "From some anonymous artillerymen." I learned later that Colonel, later Brigadier General,
Marlin Camp, the DIVARTY commander, had been the ringleader behind it. That was sufficiently
encouraging, so we started a fund and began to collect money by any and all means, some fun
and some more formal than that. But, in any event, the division commanders who followed me,
particularly General Talbott, really did a tremendous job, and the fund eventually rose to about

Major General DePuy presenting

a 1st Infantry Division

scholarship to Richard Fieller,

son of Sergeant Richard B. Fieller.

Eric Nunez, son of Sergeant

Rudolph A. Nunez, holds his

scholarship certificate.

166

$900,000. Right now it's almost that. Over a thousand scholarships have been awarded at $2,500
each, and the fund is in a very healthy condition. Our worry now concerns the number of young
orphans who will, in fact, use the money. At some point in time we're going to have to increase
the size of the scholarship because of inflation. By 1990 we will have provided well over a million
dollars for about 1000 scholarships.

INTERVIEWER: Please comment, if you would, on the selection of Sergeant Major Woolridge to
be the Sergeant Major of the Army. Was he your sergeant major?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, he was. But, I have to tell you that at the time I didn't have the slightest
inkling that Woolridge was involved with a number of fellow sergeants in the division in ripping off
the various club funds. Woolridge, you may know, was quite a soldier. In World War II he was in
the 26th Infantry, I believe it was "K" Company, and his squad leader was Sergeant Major Dobol.
Another squad member was Sergeant Major Cannon. Another squad member was Sergeant
Major Joe Venable, who was killed with General Ware. So, in one squad of the 26th Infantry were
three future sergeants major of the 1st Division, Dobol, the first Command Sergeant Major in the
whole Army and Woolridge, the first Sergeant Major of the Army. Dobol spent 26 years in the
26th Infantry. Now, Woolridge was a fighter. He was big man; he was tough; and he was brave. I
like to think that he was taken in by slicker parties, but that in no way relieves him of responsibility
for what he did. I was sufficiently impressed with him as the sergeant major of the division, that I
recommended him to be the first Sergeant Major of the Army, and he was selected. And then,
only later, did it develop that he was involved in all of these things, which was a great tragedy and
an occasion, I might say, of great sadness on my part, because I did like him very much. And, it's
been very painful for me ever since; I'm sure it's been more painful for him.

Major General DePuy and
John H. Hay at General DePuy's
change of command ceremony.

Major General DePuy

departing the Republic

of South Vietnam.

167

CHAPTER VIM

Washington Transition:
1967 - 1972

INTERVIEWER: After your tour as commander of the 1st Infantry Division, you returned to the
United States and became the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of
Defense. We would appreciate it if you would comment on what your duties and responsibilities
were, and any recollections that you have concerning significant activities during that time period.

GEN DEPUY: Well, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency was a member of the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so my bosses were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of the Joint Staff. That office was started back in the Kennedy Administration when
counterinsurgency was stylish. A Marine major general named "Brute" Krulak was the
incumbent. He was a very articulate, interesting, and fascinating man. After being the
commander of the Marine Corps, Pacific, he retired and went into the newspaper business. He's a
very fine, intellectually outstanding man. But, those were the days when the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency Special Activities (SACSA), was involved in trying to figure out how the
military services could do guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, escape and invasion, and civic
action around the world, and special operations — the sponsorship for special operations in
North Vietnam, was vested in the SACSA. However, when I came back from Vietnam, General
Earle Wheeler requested that I serve as the SACSA. The nature of the job changed considerably
because I became, in fact, the assistant to the Chairman for Vietnam, in a much broader context
than just counterinsurgency or special operations. I became an assistant across the board, minus
the air war. The air war was the province of the Joint Staff's J-3. For example, when General
Wheeler went to Vietnam on that very famous trip right after TET, I went with him as the only
member of the Joint Staff.*

Also, I became a member of a very interesting interdepartmental group which met frequently at
the State Department. The Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East at that time was William
Bundy and his principal deputy was Phil Habib, whom I had known for some time. The member
from International Security Affairs (ISA), was a very fine man named Dick Stedman, who more
recently has been on a commission to recognize the Joint Staff. The CIA member was George
Carver. So, in this group we had both the civil and military side of the Pentagon represented as

* Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1934. During World
War II, General Krulak commanded the 2nd Parachute Battalion, 1st Marine Amphibious Corps, in the Pacific Theater
of Operations. During the Korean conflict, he served as the Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division. Subsequent
assignments included duty as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot (1959-62); and Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (1964-68). General Earle G. Wheeler, deceased, was commissioned a second
lieutenant in the Infantry in 1932. During World War II, General Wheeler served in the 63rd Infantry Division in the
European Theater of Operations. Subsequent assignments included duty as the Commander, 351st Infantry Regiment
(1951-52); Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division (1958-59); Commanding General, III Corps (1959-60); Chief of
Staff of the Army (1962-64); and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1964-68).

168

well as the State Department and the CIA. We also had a member from the White House, Bill
Jordan, who is now an ambassador. We met at least once a week on interdepartmental policy
issues concerning Vietnam. I represented the Chairman in those meetings. I represented him
personally, and ex officio, the Joint Staff. Although not formally acknowledged, this group tried
to help their principals in preparing for the Tuesday luncheons with the President whose attendees
were the equivalent of the War Cabinet. That was a rather unusual arrangement, one not written
into the charter of the Joint Staff or SACSA. While I was doing that I also supervised the writing
of the Westmoreland report, that first report which was really joint by the Commander in Chief,
Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, and Westmoreland. You may recall that it was a
chronology, a very factual, straightforward kind of chronology. I recruited some people like John
Seigle and others, to help with that.*

I guess the most noteworthy thing that happened during my tour was going to Vietnam with
Wheeler just after TET, during which the very controversial question arose as to whether or not
General Westmoreland had asked for 206,000 additional troops, and whether TET had been a
victory or a defeat. I wrote the report for General Wheeler. Incidentally, as an aside, that is one of
the reports that was featured in the Pentagon Papers case because Daniel Ellsberg leaked that
report, together with the Pentagon Papers. That brought General Gorman and me into the
Pentagon Papers trial in Los Angeles.

When we came back from our post-TET visit to Vietnam, the President convened a group
including General Ridgway, General Taylor, Abe Fortas, Clark Clifford, George Ball, and others.
They were given briefings by Habib, Carver and myself as to what happened during TET. They
met with the President the following day, and reported to the President that the war appeared to
be lost. Well, in my opinion, they had already decided that before they ever came to Washington.
They seized upon those parts of the briefing which supported their view and paid very little
attention to the other parts. However, I must say that the briefings were not encouraging at that
time. And, perhaps those of us who gave the briefings were suffering a little bit from the
Washington point of view, as opposed to the field point of view, despite the fact that some of us
had just been out there.**

Walt Rostow, who was the President's National Security advisor, was astounded by this, and
the President was furious, and demanded to know who it was who had "poisoned the well?" He
was told that there were three people who had poisoned the well — Habib, Carver, and DePuy.
So, he said that he wanted to talk to these three fellows to determine just what it was that they
had said. We went to the White House about two days later, in the afternoon, and Carver and I
gave the President the same briefing. Habib had wisely left town. The President, it seemed to me,
wasn't paying any attention to us; he was making and taking telephone calls. They were taking

*William C. Westmoreland, "Report on Operations in South Vietnam: January 1964-June 1968." Report On the War
in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968) (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 68-347.

**Extracts of General Wheeler's 27 February 1968, "Report of Chairman, J.C.S., on Situation in Vietnam and MACV
Requirements," are contained in Mike Gravel, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United
States Decisionmaking in Vietnam, Vol. IV (Boston: Deacon Press, 1975), 546-549, and The New York Times, The
Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), 615-621.

169

pictures. Patrick Nugent, who was President Johnson's grandson, was running around the room,
and the President would pick him up from time to time and put him on his knee and give him a
drink out of a Coke bottle from which the President was drinking. All in all, it was a very disorderly,
disconcerting episode — almost amusing in a comical sort of way if it hadn't been so important.
When we were all finished, the President sort of waved us out of the room by saying, "Well, I
don't see anything wrong with what you told them." He didn't go on to say, I guess, what was
implicit, which was that maybe the briefing wasn't the problem — maybe we hadn't really
"poisoned the well." But, just two days later, the President announced that he would not seek
reelection. I guess he had made that decision before we briefed him, which may explain his
relative lack of interest.

You asked another question which had to do with perceptions of the war. Well, it was rather
shocking to return to Washington and see what the perceptions were. And, there's no doubt that
the perception in Washington was a gloomy one, one that pervaded all of the agencies of the
government and the press. TET had been a terrible blow to Washington. As I said earlier, it
seemed as though people in Washington — not in the government, but in the press — felt that
somehow or other, we were the aggressors. We were the evil ones; we were the clumsy ones; and
we were the ones who used the big bombs, whereas the other side used persuasion and
intellectual means. Therefore, we certainly were bound to lose, and probably ought to lose! That
was the impression that I had during 1968, 1969, and 1970. Now, don't forget that there were riots
and burnings in Washington at that time. Of course, we now know that TET was a military victory
for us and represented the virtual demise of the VC. We also know that the North Vietnamese
Army was deployed to the south to win the war which could not have been won by the VC alone.
However, that was by no means understood in Washington at that time. General Westmoreland
tried to tell anyone who would listen that TET was a victory — but no one would listen to him.
His credibility was destroyed by TET and only history and time will correct that.

INTERVIEWER: How was your job as the Special Assistant to the Chairman related to the other
job you had when you were in the counterinsurgency business as an Army officer? It sounds like
you were doing for the Army what you later did for the Joint Staff.

GEN DEPUY: Not really. In 1963 and '64, I was involved strictly in the emerging organization and
procedures for counterinsurgency. With Wheeler as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the scope
included the whole war.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of organization, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has that whole Joint
Staff, but he doesn't have an independent brain trust working for him and feeding him advice. It
appears that he often goes into issues meetings, or goes into see the President, or to the National
Security Council (NSC), and is really relying on his own assessment of the situation, an
assessment which he has gained through sitting with the chiefs as a member of the corporate
body, or that he has picked up through his control of the Joint Staff. But, he doesn't really have
people who are dedicated to him, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, feeding him
information, and helping him make an appraisal independent from that of the corporate body, the

170

Chiefs of Staff. It sounds like your organization gave him that capability. You were his "in-house"
experts on the Vietnam War, and he was getting something separate from what might be coming
to him from the Chief of Staff of the Army, or the Chief of Naval Operations.

GEN DEPUY: Well, that's a distorted picture. Remember, the Chairman has the entire Joint
Staff at the disposal. The J-3 and the J-5 both supported him massively and continuously. Also,
the Chairman has a special group which normally consists of a colonel from each of the
services — and he also has a lieutenant general assistant. At one time General Goodpaster was
that assistant, and at another time George Brown was. He later became Chairman. But, among
other things, the Chairman's Special Group was also designed to do just what you are talking
about. Now, in the case of Vietnam, they were colonels, and I worked with them all the time. I
was a major general, I'd been in Vietnam, and had been a division commander, so I had some
credibility.

The rest of what you say is right. The information he got from the services was of value, but it
was different. General Wheeler played an enormously important role. You know, he was
Chairman for over four years, and he was very close to the President. The President had
confidence in him. He was the only uniformed participant in the "Tuesday Lunch," which
included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, the Director of CIA,
some of the White House Staff, and Walt Rostow. That was the "War Cabinet", and at those
Tuesday luncheons decisions were made. General Wheeler was very much a part of that, and he
was also the communications link to the War Cabinet for the JCS and the command in Vietnam,
although, of course, the CIA had its own sources of information, as did Rostow and the
Department of State. Everybody had a line into Vietnam for intelligence. But, the military
intelligence was provided through Wheeler.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, from 1969 to 1973, you served on the Army Staff as the Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff (A/VICE). What did you work on during that time period? What were the major issues,
the highlights during your tour, and what do you consider to have been your main
accomplishments while you were there?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I became the A/VICE in 1969, replacing General Chesarek who went to the
Army Materiel Command (AMC). Let me say a word about why there was an A/VICE, and
incidentally, I would like to refer you to an interview with Colonel, now General, Dave Doyle on
the functions and background of the A/VICE. There is a very interesting genesis of the A/VICE. It
started with Mr. McNamara. When McNamara came into the Pentagon, he brought with him
people like Charley Hitch from the University of California, and Alain Enthoven of systems analysis
fame. These people brought with them the McNamara Management System, which was the five-
year defense program, and the system of making changes to that program, and studies as to what
those changes should be, and whether or not the changes were going to be cost-effective. All of
this caused a revolution in the Pentagon. All of the services were found wanting by Mr.
McNamara. All of the services had something like the old General Staff concept where a
lieutenant colonel would be assigned to make a study on a subject. If his paper made literal sense,

171

they would adopt it. It probably wasn't a quantified study, but a judgmental study, and that was
the character of all the services and certainly of the Army.*

Mr. McNamara was not happy with the data he got from the Army, either in quantity, or in
quality. After Mr. Vance went up to become the Deputy, and Mr. Resor became the Secretary of
the Army, they progressively established within the Office of the Chief of Staff, a small group of
people who became a special information channel through the Secretary of the Army to Mr.
McNamara.** This group consisted of some very interesting people like Dave Parker, a fine officer
and an engineer major general, now retired, who was the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone
during his last assignment. Sam Walker worked in there at one time. Paul Phillips went up and
worked there. A fellow named Stockfisch from up in Defense also worked there. Eventually,
under Chesarek, this function emerged as the office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. It was
comprised of a program shop — like the one Max Thurman now has, and his brother had before
him, and Herb McChrystal, Jim Baldwin and Paul Phillips had before that. The Management
Information Systems Directorate was started by Major General Hank Schrader, an engineer. Also,
a special studies group was formed and was headed up at various times by Seigle, Menetrey,
Bobby Montague, and "Tick" Bonesteel. Finally, and very importantly, it included a weapons
systems analysis shop headed by Dick Trainor. It was a four-legged organization. The most
important part was called the Force Planning and Analysis shop, but what it really became was the
master program office for the Department of the Army.***

The Director of Management Information Systems tried to standardize and regulate both
computer hardware and software for the Army's business systems. For the latter purpose we
activated the Army's computer systems command which provided standardized management
software for personnel, finance, and logistics.

'General DePuy's comment concerning Dave Doyle's interview refers to Lieutenant General David K. Doyle, then
Lieutenant Colonel Doyle, Chief, Staff Management Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the General Staff.
General Doyle conducted an "end of tour" taped interview with General DePuy concerning his service as the
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, in March 1973. Robert S. McNamara, a top executive with the Ford Motor Company for
nearly 20 years, served as the Secretary of Defense during the period 1961-68. Subsequently, he served as president
of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. Charles J. Hitch, an economist and Rhodes Scholar, served as Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) during the period 1961-65. Alain C. Enthoven, also an economist and Rhodes
Scholar, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) during the period 1961-65, and as Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), during the period 1965-69. For a brief description of the McNamara
Management System, see Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1968), 87-104. A much more complete explanation is contained in Samuel A. Tucker (ed.), A
Modern Design for Defense Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology (Washington: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces: 1966).

**Cyrus R. Vance, a career lawyer, served as General Counsel for the Department of Defense during the period 1961-
62, after which he served as the Secretary of the Army from 1962 to 1963. During the period 1964 to 1967, Mr. Vance
served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Vance also served as the Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980.
Stanley R. Resor, a corporate law specialist, first served as the Under Secretary of the Army in 1965 and then as the
Secretary of State from 1965 to 1971. Mr. Resor also served as the US Representative to the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction Talks (1973-78), and as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (1978-79).

***For a brief overview on the creation of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff position, see Ferdinand J. Chesarek, "New
Techniques for Managing Men and Materiel," Army, 17 (October, 1967), 51-52.

172

The weapons systems group supported the Vice Chief in his role as chairman of the Army's
System Acquisition Review Council. It gave him advice independent of the staff. It was, therefore,
thoroughly disliked.

The interesting thing is that when I became the A/ VICE, I worked 80 percent of the time for the
Secretary and 20 percent for the Vice Chief, General Palmer, and the Chief, General
Westmoreland. Four years later, I was proud to be able to say that I worked about 80 percent of
the time for the Chief and the Vice Chief, mostly the Vice Chief, and 20 percent for the Secretary.
In other words, as the office gained stature and confidence, the Secretary was willing to put back
into the "green-suit" part of the house, through the A/VICE and the Vice Chief, the authority and
responsibility which had been taken away from the Army staff during the McNamara regime and
for a long period thereafter.*

I think that's a very important period in the history of the Army General Staff. The Secretary
was making the program decisions for the Army, and was using the A/VICE as his instrument and
channel into the Army. I came out of that assignment fairly well educated in the techniques of
program management, and to this day I am an ardent and enthusiastic believer in program
management as the way to go for any large organization. I won't bore you with all of what that
means, but it's the antithesis of budget management, and it's the opposite of General Staff
management of the old kind.

A/VICE

STUDIES
DIRECTORATE

FORCE

PLANNING

ANALYSIS

DIRECTORATE*

MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION

SYSTEMS
DIRECTORATE

WEAPONS

SYSTEMS

ANALYSIS

DIRECTORATE

Later became the Planning and Programming Analysis Directorate

*General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA Retired, ws commissioned a second lieutenant in the Cavalry in 1936. Branch
transferring to the Infantry, General Palmer served as the Chief of Staff of the 6th Infantry Division and later
commanded the 63rd Infantry Regiment in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. Subsequent
assignments included duty as the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army (1962-63); Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps
(1966-67); Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam (1967); Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (1968-73); and
Commander in Chief, Readiness Command (1973-74).

173

So, that sort of covers what the A/VICE did. We did a lot in the automatic data processing field,
and we did some in the studies field. For example, OPMS, or more specifically, selection for
command, was the brain child of that group. But, basically, through the program system, we
managed the Army down from 1.6 million men to 800,000 in four years — a traumatic period.
Now, you suffered from all of those changes wherever you were at that time, and I'm sure that it
seemed disorderly and hectic. On the other hand, what was going on was a demobilization. The
Army was cut in half very rapidly, and yet, somehow it survived — barely, but it survived. It
survived physically, and I think it has now demonstrated that it has rebounded intellectually, and
from a morale standpoint. But, it was a very difficult period from a management standpoint. Now,
do you want to ask any subsidiary questions?

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned several of the studies that went on while you were the A/ VICE.
One of those mentioned in your papers was the WHEELS study. Would you please comment on
that?*

GEN DEPUY: Well, I will because the WHEELS study was a very unpopular thing. It was part of
that process of bringing the Army down from 1.6 million to 800,000 men with a loss of
commensurate resources, not only of people, which was obvious, but also of money. We were
trying to adjust a large Army into the clothing that would fit a small Army. One of the things we
went after was the number of wheeled vehicles in the Army. We discovered that there was one
wheeled vehicle for every two soldiers in the active Army. That seemed to us to be unnecessarily
high and also to be unnecessarily expensive. It also required a tremendous ordnance tail to
maintain them. So, we went in and whacked out about 100,000 vehicles. That sounds like a lot,
but that only brought us down from 460,000 to 360,000 for an Army of 800,000. And, mind you, in
that Army of 800,000, 150,000 were students, transients, patients, and such. So, we still had one
vehicle for every two soldiers in units and that included the Chief of Staff of the Army, every clerk-
typist, every sergeant major, and so on. Anyway, the WHEELS study was very unpopular with the
people whose ox was gored. I chaired the WHEELS study and my principal ally was Woody
Vaughn, the deputy commander of AMC.

INTERVIEWER: At this particular time a lot of new equipment was entering the inventory. As the
A/ VICE what was your role in the procurement of this equipment and materiel?

GEN DEPUY: I didn't have any role in procurement as such. Procurement is a contractual
arrangement involving the passing of money to contractors to buy things. But, my role as A/VICE
was involved in the decision as to whether or not a particular weapon or piece of equipment would
be put into the program or dropped from the program, or whether the size of the buy would be
adjusted in order to make the program fit the total amount of money we had. There were
thousands of program decisions of that nature.

*For further details on the WHEELS Study, see US Army Materiel Command Report, "Special Analysis of Wheeled
Vehicles," dated 30 August 1972.

174

The decision-making process we used was like this: we had a junior group chaired by the major
general who was the head of the Force Planning Analysis office. At one time it was Jim Baldwin,
at another time it was Herb McChrystal, then it was Roy Thurman, and now it's Max Thurman.
They headed a thing we called the "Prince George Riding Club" which was really the Program,
Guidance and Review Committee (PGRC). They went over all of these program issues at the major
general level. Then we formed a Select Committee or SELCOM, which I chaired. It consisted of
each of the lieutenant generals of the Army staff, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations
(DCSOPS), Logistics (DCSLOG), Personnel (DCSPER), and so on. This really was where most of
the final tough decisions had to be made. What we were confronted with constantly was what we
called decrement exercises. In other words, we needed a twenty-five billion dollar budget, but we
were told that we would only get twenty-three billion, so we had to find those places where we
could cut two billion dollars out of the program. We took some out of the structure, which meant
a reduction in personnel. We took some out of Operation and Maintenance (O&M), which meant
that we lost some readiness, we took some out of depot maintenance, we took some out of
research and development (R&D), we took some out of procurement, and we took some out of
the Reserve components. Every decision was unpopular.

There was a proponent for everything, and each proponent felt that the decisions taken were a
mistake. As the chairman, I tried to get and usually did get a consensus, at least on most of the
tough decisions. When I couldn't, I carried it to the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Vice Chief, based
on our recommendations, would simply make the decision. Now, another thing that I did when we
were in a terrible hurry in the last hectic days of the program cycle, or the budget cycle, was
simply call in the budget and program directors of the staff, and we'd sit up in my office all night
long and make hundreds of relatively minor but always controversial decisions — take this out,
subtract that, reduce this, scratch that out. It was very arbitrary, but it had to be! At the time such
actions were regarded as high-handed by many people, which led to a certain dissatisfaction with
the A/VICE idea on the part of the regular staff agencies. But, it was a way to make the necessary,
tough decisions rapidly during a very difficult management period. You mentioned the "Gama
Goat," with regard to whether or not I was involved in saying, "Go ahead with it." I may have
been; I probably was. I also was probably involved in saying go ahead with the M60A2, and with
the Sheridan deployment to Europe, all three of which have been maintenance nightmares. All I
can say is that those were three decisions out of 10,000 decisions that we made. They may have
been mistakes, but you make lots of mistakes. I think if your batting average is anywhere near 80
percent, then you're probably doing very, very well, indeed.

INTERVIEWER: It was during this time period when the thinking began concerning the
reorganization of the Army which eventually resulted in the creation of the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM). Could you tell us how that started
and about your involvement in it?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. The reason I became involved in the reorganization of the Continental Army
Command (CONARC), which was the instrument by which TRADOC was born, was during this
reduction of the Army, the cutting of the Army in half, we had difficulties with the management of

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M551 Armored Reconnaissance
Assault Vehicle - SHERIDAN

M561 1 1/4-ton Gama Goat

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CONARC. To put it in the simplest form, CONARC was a budget-managed command, not a
program-oriented command. It was a decade behind in management techniques. Management
was in the hands of civilians in the comptroller shops at every level. Not only that, but between
CONARC and the various operating elements, such as the divisions, corps, the schools, and the
training centers, were the Continental Armies. The Continental Armies were 90 percent
civilianized, and were run almost entirely by the comptrollers. So, as I said, they were budget-
driven, were highly bureaucratized, and were generally unresponsive echelons of management.

CONARC divided up money generally in accordance with priorities as they saw them, and then
the Continental Armies generally divided up the money to their subordinate elements, and there
was little visibility over the probable effects during the decision-making process. CONARC didn't
know what the money was being spent for in terms of end items or actions. So, General Palmer
and I had an increasingly difficult time with CONARC, and when we made cuts, as we had to do in
adjusting downward the training base and the force structure, all sorts of unexpected things
would happen out at some division or at some post, that seemed to make no sense at all.
CONARC would ladle out the money and wait for the screams. Some of those screams were
intolerable at the Department of the Army level. For example, one time Sixth Army decided to
meet lower spending goals by simply firing the entire civilian work force — a super "gold watch
ploy". Well, needless to say, CONARC was very defensive about this criticism.*

In fairness to CONARC, and the many fine officers who commanded it and served it, the size
and staffing of that headquarters and its subordinate armies was never adequate to the
management and command responsibilities assigned. After all, CONARC ran the whole Army in
the US except for AMC.

Year after year CONARC received cuts in budget and in staff while at the same time the job
became more complex. The demobilization after Vietnam broke the camel's back.

So, finally, General Palmer gave me the job of looking into the reorganization of CONARC. I
accepted the task with enthusiasm. I turned to my studies group, at that time headed up by John
Seigle, and we pulled out two sharp lieutenant colonels, Bill Tuttle and Jim Edgar, and gave them
a month to come up with a concept. CONARC was clearly too big to be managed. So, the
concept was to split CONARC in half, and take the troop part out of it and call it something else.
Or, describing it the other way around, pull the schools and training centers out, and then
CONARC would be divided into two commands. The next thought which automatically came
along was, if you're going to create a separate schools and training command, then why not
combine it with the Combat Development Command (CDC)? The interface between the CDC and
the school system had always been very important but very difficult to manage. Although there
was a Combat Development Agency at each school, it did not belong to the school. Also, doctrine
was really the business of the schools, which taught it to the Army. So, the simple framework for
the whole reorganization was just that — split CONARC in two and combine the CDC with the
schools and training center part, and call it something new.

*"gold watch ploy" is a term referring to a bureaucratic maneuver by which a subordinate element deals with an
unwanted reduction by offering to cut or eliminate that which it knows the higher element would never cut or abolish.
The term stems from the ploy of offering to eliminate the gold watch presentation for 20 years of service. Its origin is
business rather than military.

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That concept was fleshed out in very broad terms in a month by those two young officers with
some supervision from me. We then had a very remarkable experience that probably should go
into the Guinness Book of Records. We took this study to General Palmer on a Monday, and he
was very enthusiastic about it. We then went to General Westmoreland on Tuesday, and he
approved it. We went to the Secretary of the Army on Wednesday and he approved it. Then we
had a delay. We could not get to the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, until Friday, at which
time he approved it. That is not the actual chronology but is very close to it. In about a week, we
went from concept to final approval.*

Thereafter, all we had to do was figure out how we were going to solve all the details. We
brought General Kalergis in and made him the head of what was called the STEADFAST Study
Group, which was charged with working out the details. But, the decision had already been made.
Now, that certainly makes it a lot easier to implement than doing it the other way — that is,
preparing a big study which includes all of the details, and then trying to get people to agree,
which is something they'll never do. Although I'm prejudiced and subjective about it, I really think
that (a), it was a very good idea whose time had come; (b), it was a simple idea; and (c), I think it
has proved itself to have been very good for the Amry. It was hard to argue with. You could argue
about the details but couldn't argue about the heart of the issue.**

INTERVIEWER: When the concept was initially briefed at CONARC headquarters how was it
received? Did they perceive it as having their ox gored, or did they see it as a good move?

GEN DEPUY: They perceived it as having their ox being gored very badly, as did the CDC. Jack
Norton was commanding the CDC at the time, and I went out and told him what the conclusions
of the study were. The first reaction was "Okay." But, upon reflection, and I think after
consultation with his troops, he also considered this to be a bad idea. It's very interesting though,
when you look back. When George Forsythe was the commander of the CDC, he formally asked
General Palmer in a message to have all of the schools assigned to him. Of course CONARC
thought he was having a stroke of madness of some sort to suggest such a thing. But, he was
right. He had the right idea. His only problem was that his idea was a year or two premature. The
time just wasn't right. But, when we put TRADOC together and combined the schools, the
training centers, and Combat Development Command, it was, in part, just a logical outgrowth of
Forsythe's proposal. What George had said was that he had no power, no teeth and no assets. His
command was simply too small to get things done. Now, Jack Norton really felt the same way.
Jack felt that the commander of CDC should be a four-star general. Well, he was later, but only
because the job was expanded into something which people felt to be more appropriate. Now, in
that respect, at one time it looked as though the TRADOC commander was going to be a
lieutenant general. Not because General Abrams didn't want to have a four-star general in there,

*Melvin R. Laird, a member of the House of Representatives in the 83rd through 90th Congresses, served as
Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1972. Later, he served as Domestic Advisor to the President during 1973-1974.

**For more information on STEADFAST, see James G. Kalergis, "Purposeful Changes: Reorganization, 1973,"
Army, 23 (October, 1973), 62-64.

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but because he didn't know whether or not he could manage the authorization for another four-
star general.

Also connected with that was the fact that when he picked the two commanders, General
Kerwin and me, he was somewhat undecided as to which one of us ought to get which command.
In retrospect, I can see where he would have wondered about that. But, in any event, he made the
decision to send "Dutch" to FORSCOM and me to TRADOC. I personally preferred TRADOC,
and that made it easy because "Dutch" preferred FORSCOM. When they told me that I would
receive that command, they said, "But you probably will be a lieutenant general." I told them, "It
doesn't make any difference to me." I then went down and became deputy commander of
CON ARC for about three or four months, from March to July of 1973. But, I was told before I
went there that on the 1st of July I would become the TRADOC commander.

INTERVIEWER: Did they know that at CONARC?

GEN DEPUY: CONARC knew it. Well, "Dutch" knew it. You see, "Dutch" went down in
February, and I arrived in March, but he knew it. Well, I guess everybody knew it. It hadn't been
announced officially, but it had been announced unofficially.*

*For an overview on the early months of both FORSCOM and TRADOC, see Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., "In Army Forces
Command The Mission is Readiness," Army, 23 (October, 1973), 27-30; and William E. DePuy, "TRADOC: A New
Command for an Old Mission," Army, 23 (October, 1973), 31-34.

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CHAPTER IX
Changing An Army

INTERVIEWER: When you arrived on the scene at Fort Monroe, which was to become the
headquarters of TRADOC, what did you perceive to be the most critical tasks that you needed to
tackle, both within your own headquarters, and those things that you wanted to do for the Army
through TRADOC?

GEN DEPUY: Well, the most urgent task was to organize the TRADOC under sound manage-
ment concepts. Fortunately, from TRADOC's standpoint, the Army echelon, the Continental
Armies, were over with FORSCOM, so I didn't have to bother with them. So, we decided that it
would be direct management from Headquarters, TRADOC, to some 19 operating agencies,
which is quite a broad span of control. I brought to TRADOC my four years of experience in
Program Management at the departmental level and brought people along with me who were able
to install that — John McGiffert and later, Max Thurman, Max Noah, and people of that caliber.
TRADOC was recognized to be the best managed, most responsive command in the Army right
off the bat because of that. We knew what was going on. We had visibility over all of our
programs. You may recall that we introduced the contract system which I still believe is the only
civilized and effective way to deal with 19 different installations.

The contract was simple. I signed a piece of paper jointly with, say the Commandant of Fort
Benning, or the Commandant of Fort Sill, or the Commander of the Training Center at Fort
Jackson, which laid out in great detail exactly what it was that he was going to do during the year
with the money and the other resources that I gave him. What that also forced us to do was to
decide precisely what we were not going to do. If it wasn't on that piece of paper, then we weren't
going to do it! But, if it was on the piece of paper, then he was going to have to do it with the
resources I provided. So, we negotiated the contract which ensured that we had no misunder-
standings. If during the year, I had to change the resources available such as pulling money away
from one of my commanders, then I personally went to see that commander, and we renegotiated
his contract. In other words, we both agreed as to what additional things he would not do\
Therefore, there were no surprises, and we didn't do a lot of dumb things. They didn't throw a lot
of "gold watches" at me in the hopes that I would not take the money away from them. I would
just say, "I'm going to take the money away from you. Now, we're going to decide what the new
contract will say." They still use that, and I still believe that it's a good system.

INTERVIEWER: Please give an example of the types of things that Fort Benning would contract
to do.

GEN DEPUY: Sure. One of the things they would contract to do would be to handle a certain
student load such as a certain number of lieutenants in the basic course, a certain number of
young men learning to jump out of airplanes in the airborne course, a certain number of captains

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in the advanced course, and a certain number of sergeants attending certain Noncommissioned
Officer Education System (NCOES) courses. Commanders would contract to spend so much
money on the repair and maintenance of facilities. They would contract to support certain
peripheral activities in the general area of Fort Benning in support of reserve components, and so
on. In short, everything they would have to do during the upcoming year was in the contract in
sufficient detail to be binding — both on them and on me.

INTERVIEWER: In addition to the school and training centers you also took on the Combat
Development Command and integrated that with the schools. How did you assess that marriage,
as such, taking place?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I assessed the marriage as being necessary and natural. After all, the Combat
Development Agencies already were located at the schools. Although not under the command of
the schools, they were involved in matters which really should have been under the jurisdiction of
the schools. I brought to TRADOC some strong feelings about the way the combat development
process had worked, or had not worked, in the past. One of the feelings I had was that they spent
too much time on very long-range studies — like the "Army 1990," or the "Army 2000," which
never seemed to cause anything to happen. Therefore, I changed the focus and brought it way
back in close, and incidentally, I've been heavily criticized for doing that. What I believed was that
instead of trying to divine by some intellectual process, what the Army would look like in the year
2000, I was more interested in whether or not we needed a replacement for the M-60 tank, or for
the M-113 personnel carrier, or for the Chaparral-Vulcan. I based this belief on the premise that
people aren't smart enough to see what we'll need in the year 2000. The reason we aren't smart
enough to do that is that the people we ask in 1979, for instance, to look at the shape of the Army
in the year 2000, possess a 1979 mentality. So, the Army they see out there is simply a reflection of
the 1979 Army with some gimmicks. They'll say, "By then we'll have more lasers, and we may
have atomic energy, and we may have this, and we may have that." But, the concept is all based
on a 1979 consciousness and information. I just don't believe humans can look to the long-range
future that well, so I stopped most of the long-range studies.

I also tried to make some sense out of the so-called weapons requirement process. They used to
have things called QMRs or Qualitative Materiel Requirements. This was a little bit like the Army in
the year 2000. Somebody was supposed to sit down and visualize the perfect weapon of the
future. Then, after you have visualized and described it, you turned it over to the engineers and
the scientists and asked them to make one. Well, in the first place, there isn't anybody in
TRADOC or CDC who can see further than the scientists or the engineers have already seen.
Secondly, the QMRs constituted a hunting license for the scientists and engineers in the labs to
spend a lot of money seeking a vague objective. I tried to turn that around and said, "We will
study the M-60 tank. We will say what it is that we don't like about it, or the things we would like
to have improved on that tank. Then we'll ask AMC to tell us what they can do, and have them
certify that they can make the gun fire farther, or more accurately, or that they can provide better
armor, obtain longer ranges, improve fuel consumption, or enhance maintenance. They'll write all
that down and certify that that's all true, and that they can accomplish it given the state of the art.

181

Then, we'll agree on what we're going to do, and that will be a ROC or a Required Operations
Capability." Now, I got the reputation of being a "ROC-crusher" because I wouldn't approve
ROCs unless the developer certified that he could do it. That way I wasn't giving him a license to
steal, and I could hold his feet to the fire. Those were the two areas in which I tried to bring this
very vague intellectual exercise back into the realm of hardware and practicality. By today's
mentality I am judged to have been in the Stone Age. Time will tell.

INTERVIEWER: I know that you put together some new organizations to help you do that, like
the Logistics Center and the Combined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA) at
Leavenworth.

GEN DEPUY: Well, in a way, these organizations had existed before. There was a Combined
Arms Combat Development Agency at Leavenworth, and there was a thing called the Personnel
and Logistics Agency at Fort Lee. We took that agency and had it concentrate on logistics only
and created an Admin Center at Fort Ben Harrison to handle the personnel aspects. So, the
Admin Center had finance and the Adjutant General, Leavenworth had all of the combat arms and
combat support elements, and the Log Center had all of the combat service support. They were
intermediate management echelons. I would have to say that all of them have had trouble. They
are in a rather awkward middle position between TRADOC and the operating agencies of the
schools, and it's been difficult for them to find out exactly how to operate in order to find the
levers of power. Just as I left, the deputy from TRADOC went out and became the head of the
Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth. We put good talent out there, and I think that they're
now beginning to perform their function fairly well. But, it is a very difficult job. Part of the
problem is that they are a long way from the flagpole — a long way from the TRADOC flagpole, a
long way from the R&D flagpole, and from AMC, and from the Department of the Army.
Sometimes they tend to get behind the power curve.

INTERVIEWER: Of course one of the things that you did at TRADOC was bring a new
philosophy of training with you, which started at the Army Training Centers, in the Service
Schools, and even reached out into the units. What were your thoughts about training as you
arrived at TRADOC, and how did you intend to get those thoughts translated into actions?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I would have to say that when I first visited the schools and the training
centers I was unimpressed. I was horrified by some of the things that I found. For example, at the
Engineer School I discovered that the engineer lieutenants were never given an opportunity to
learn how to drive a bulldozer, or run a road grader or a front-end loader. Yet, they would
eventually go to an engineer platoon having that type of equipment, and I couldn't understand
how they would be able to supervise, or to criticize, or to train. Down at Fort Benning most of the
training of the lieutenants was accomplished in a classroom instead of out with troops. The
orientation was very academic, very intellectual. I don't know whose fault it was. Some people
didn't think it was a fault. There's been a big argument for years about education and training. I'm
not sure what all the differences are, but I do know that the Army had moved pretty much towards
education and away from training. TRADOC is now criticized for going too far towards training.

182

My conviction is that we were totally unbalanced towards education, and that as hard as
TRADOC works, it will only bring the thing back into balance. As between the two, education and
training, you need both.

At Fort Knox I thought that the training of the tank lieutenants, the armor lieutenants, was
awful. They really weren't being trained to be tank commanders first and tank platoon leaders
second. They were really being trained to be tank company commanders. The basic courses in all
of the service schools taught them not to be what they were about to be, but what they eventually
might be. And, when they went to the advanced course, they were taught about brigades and
battalions instead of about being a company commander. I found that to be very interesting. It
was part of the philosophy of the Mobilization Army in which everybody got a job one or two
grades above where he then stood. But, we don't have a Mobilization Army; we have an 800,000
man Army! That's what we are going to go to war with. Why should we go to war with untrained
platoon leaders, untrained company commanders, and untrained battalion commanders, when
they have to win the first battle? So, the first thing I tried to do was to bring the school system
back closer to where the Israeli school system is, which is a training system that trains tank
commanders, tank platoon leaders, and tank company commanders at about the time that they
are going to discharge those duties. As I said, this is controversial, and right now there is a bit of a
reaction setting in to all of that. I just hope things do not go back to where they were, which was
really bad.

Now, the training centers really upset me. CONARC had run the training centers with an iron
hand. Everything that was done in the training centers was prescribed by CONARC. There was no
latitude or flexibility, and the first consequence of that was that there was also no feeling of
responsibility. No matter how dumb it might be, the answer always was, "It's in the directive. It's
in the Program of Instruction (POD. We're doing just what we were told to do." This meant that
the major general commanding the training center went around and inspected only to see how
well his Center was doing what CONARC had told them to do. The colonels, the lieutenant
colonels, and the captains all went around with their eyes glazed over, bored to death. The drill
sergeants had taken over. Over time, the drill sergeants will distort even a very clear directive, and
find some little aspect of it that was never intended to be important and make that the centerpiece
of some training exercise or bit of instruction. Well, it was really bad. The execution was bad, the
concept was bad, the training was bad, the supervision was bad, morale was bad, and motivation
was bad.

One term they used in the training centers that conveys part of the problem was what the drill
sergeants would refer to as being "on the trail." I don't know whether or not you know where the
term "on the trail" comes from, but it refers to driving cattle herds from Texas to Colorado, or
from Oregon to Colorado. That was the mentality that pervaded the training centers. The cadre
were just getting one bunch of cattle through, and then another bunch of cattle would come along
to be herded through, with a lot of screaming, shouting, yelling, and cursing, but with little effort
to teach. It was just an effort to get through the day, to get another 100 trainees, or another 1,000
trainees through without an accident and without some sort of disciplinary problem. Well, what I
did was say, "Each of you major generals running a training center is now totally responsible. If
there's anything that goes on that's wrong or dumb, stop it, and change it. Do what's smart, and
tell me later." I told them, "I don't ever want to be told by you or any of your colonels, captains,

183

lieutenant colonels, or sergeants, that you're doing something that's dumb, or that I find out is
dumb, because you were told to do it. From now on you are going to do only what you think is
right." Well, that had quite an impact. Now, one of the impacts that it had was that they all
started doing things much better, and they thought up all sorts of marvelous new things to do,
and marvelous new ways of doing it. Suddenly, they were enthusiastic. They now had a man-
sized job to do, and they couldn't cover up anymore. In my opinion, it turned the whole situation
around.

Recently, the Army got all excited when folks discovered that there were differences between
the training programs at the various training centers. You may be sure that they are minor. You
may also be sure that the price the Army pays for absolute conformity is too high. It results in
lousy, irresponsible, lackluster training by officers and NCOs who are bored to death with "on the
trail" type training.

Now, the last and biggest part of all of this is the whole philosophy of training. There I have to
talk about General Gorman, because General Gorman and the others who were with him on the
Combat Arms Training Board (CATB) at Fort Benning, brought to TRADOC a new concept of
performance-oriented training, which is a systematic way to go about the setting of training
objectives through the careful determination of tasks, conditions, and standards. They also
brought to training some exciting new technology and procedures. It took me some time, frankly,
to digest it all myself after I came to TRADOC. But, finally, I saw the great benefit and logic of
what they were doing and fully supported it. The credit for the concept really has to go to General
Gorman and to a number of other people who worked with him, both earlier and later. They are
the ones who articulated this concept, and who were the leading proponents of it in the Army.*

General
Paul F. Gorman

hFora biographical sketch of General Gorman, USA Retired, see note, page 149.

184

INTERVIEWER: This concept included the Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs).

GEN DEPUY: That's right, the Soldiers' Manuals, SQTs, and the ARTEP — performance-
oriented training of all kinds. Plus the front-end analysis of the tasks, and then, the establishment
of standards against which you trained the soldier, and the conditions under which he had to
perform the tasks before he was then ready to go on to the next step. You can apply that system
to almost any kind of Army training, however complex — even tactical training. I would like to
say that in addition to General Gorman, there was General Seigle who took over CATB, and Bill
Hilsman and George Stotser, who also had CATB, and certainly eminent among all of the
contributors to the theory, were Frank Hart and Bob Dirmeyer. Now, there are many others, but I
haven't the time or the memory to name them all. There were a lot of very bright people who
became the apostles and disciples of Gorman. Some of them, I suppose, were the ones who put it
in Gorman's head in the first place and who have carried the ball in what I'm sure is the right
direction for the Army.*

INTERVIEWER: What is your view on the classic issue of training versus education of the Officer
corps?

GEN DEPUY: Interesting question. I'm not sure that I have it right because I have been accused,
along with General Gorman, of being a trainer, not an educator. In fact, at one time, General
Rogers, then Chief of Staff of the Army, asked me to take on the job of sorting out doctrine at
echelons above corps. That doctrine fell between the cracks when General Abrams eliminated the
"Army" echelon because he believed that Army Groups would control the corps and that such
Army Groups would be multinational. Well, I told General Rogers that I would do that but that I
needed the Army War College as the instrument. That would leave training and doctrinal issues

*Ma/or General John W. Seigle, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor in 1953. In Vietnam
he commanded the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (1967-68). Other assignments included duty as
the President, CATB (1972-73); Commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (1973-74); Deputy Chief of Staff for
Training, TRADOC (1977-79); and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR (1980-82). Lieutenant General
William J. Hilsman, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps in 1954. Other
assignments included duty as Commander, 144th Signal Battalion, 4th Armored Division (1969-71); President, CATB
(1973); Commander, 1st Signal Group (1973-75); Commanding General, The Signal Center and Commandant, The
Signal School (1977-80); and Director, Defense Communications Agency (1980-83). Major General George R.
Stotser, USA, was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor in 1956. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 12th
Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in 1969. Other assignments have included duty as Commander, 1st Brigade,
1st Armored Division (1974-76); President, CATB (1976-77); and Commander, 2d Armored Division (Forward) (1982-
83). General Stotser is presently serving as Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division (1985- ). Colonel Franklin A.
Hart, USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1954. In addition to commanding the 4th
Battalion, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam (1968-69), he served as a member of the CATB (1972-74); as
President, CATB (1974); as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (Plans and Projects), TRADOC (1975-79); and
as Commander, Army Research Institute of Behavior and Social Sciences (1979-81). Colonel Robert P. Dirmeyer,
USA Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery in 1955. Assignments included command of
the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, in Vietnam (1968-69); command of the 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery
(Airborne), 82d Airborne Division (1970-71); duty as a member of CATB (1972-73); as Chief, Individual Training
Branch, TRADOC (1975); and as Chief, Training Management Institute, TRADOC, with duty station at Fort Eustis,
Virginia (1975-77).

185

for battalions, divisions and corps at Leavenworth, and for corps, armies, army groups, and
theaters at Carlisle. As you can see, there would have been overlap at the corps level. He thought
that that made sense but the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), which
controlled the Army War College (AWC), was horrified at the thought that TRADOC might get its
hands on his "educational" institution. I suppose he thought that Gorman and I would send drill
sergeants to Carlisle. In any event, TRADOC did not get the AWC. The void in doctrine is being
cobbled together slowly by a conglomerate of DCSOPS, Leavenworth, Carlisle, and the National
War College (NWC). As to your original question, I suppose that training deals with "how to
perform" a task or a group of tasks within a function, such as how to (1) assemble, (2) clean, (3)
load, (4) aim, and (5) fire a rifle. The performance test would be whether or not the bullet hit the
target, with all of the previous tasks being subsumed in the process. Education, on the other
hand, would permit the soldier, or officer perhaps, more than the lower ranks, to put the function
of firing a rifle at an enemy in combat into the larger context. And, the context is almost infinite as
it can be expanded to go beyond the technical, organizational, tactical and operational dimensions
to the strategic, political, historical, psychological, and ethical spheres as well. In shorthand,
training tells us "what and how;" education tells us "why" and even "whether."

INTERVIEWER: What developments do you consider to have been the most significant while
you were commanding TRADOC?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I guess we should take them by functional category. Starting with training, I
would say that reorienting the school system so that it had a larger training as opposed to
educational aspect to it. I regard that as very important. General Gorman and I saw eye to eye on
that. But, there are those who feel that that was a mistake, and there are those who feel that we
should educate officers and train soldiers. I think that is wrong. I think you should train a man for
the job he is going to perform, and then you can educate him so that the intellectual and moral
environment in which he pursues his particular job will be enhanced. That way you will have
safeguards against stupidity, immorality, illegality, and so on. But, I believe you have to train a
gunner to shoot. You have to train a squad leader to lead a squad. You have to train a man to be a
tank commander. You have to train a man to be a tank platoon leader, and incidentally, he
shouldn't be a tank platoon leader unless he first has been trained to be a tank commander
because a tank platoon leader is also a tank commander.

I think you train a company commander. You don't educate him, you train him to use tanks and
tank platoons and infantry and antitank guided missiles. You teach him all about those things,
about their tactical employment and about the organizations which employ them. Also, you teach
him how to train the people inside his organization. I believe you train a battalion commander to
operate a battalion. You look at a manual for a battalion task force, tank or mech, and I think you
are looking at an operator's manual just like when you buy a car and you get an operator's manual.
You buy a Toro lawn mower and you get a little booklet that tells you how to put it together and
how to operate the thing. I think that the field manuals on the combat operations of a platoon, or a
company, or a battalion, are, in fact, the operator's manuals, and the lieutenant colonels, or the
captains, or the lieutenants, or the sergeants, need to be trained to get the most out of the
mechanisms they have inherited.

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Now, TRADOC did a lot in that direction, both in the officers' school system, in the NCO school
system, in the training centers, and even in the Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs)
for unit commanders. It partakes to a very great extent of the Israeli system. The Israeli system is
almost purely training. They don't have the time or the structure to educate for some future war.
They only have time to train for this war, or the one they think could start tomorrow morning. So,
it is a very austere, efficient, concentrated, and highly focused effort. I think it is also appropriate
and necessary because of the complexity of modern weapons. I don't think that any other
approach can cope with the modern battlefield and modern weapons. So, TRADOC moved the
pendulum toward the center between education and training by pushing it hard towards training.
We did that because training had almost disappeared, particularly for the officers. Not to worry
that education was stamped out. It was not. It was simply that we tried to bring the training of
officers up to an equal status with their education. I doubt that we ever made it and you can be
absolutely certain that the pendulum will swing back. Performance-oriented training is so
demanding that weak sisters will begin to drift away from it and drift back to the warm embrace of
vague educational goals instead of specific training tasks. You can bet your farm on it!

Now, of course, with combat developments, as I indicated earlier, we tried very hard to bring it
back to the practical, real world, where people could understand it and do something about it.
And, we tried to orient it towards Europe, which is the principal and directed mission of the Army.
TRADOC was involved in the process of decision-making during weapon system development
through operational test design and then, by taking the test results through analysis, and drawing
judgments as to whether or not the system was cost-effective in comparison with its predecessors
or current competitors. This keeps TRADOC in business during the long years it takes to develop a
new tank, a new antitank guided missile or a new aircraft. Some of these systems were taking ten
to twelve years. But, during this period of time, there are very formalized steps during which the
new model is tested and then the test results are analyzed to determine whether or not it is a good
idea to proceed further when you compare the new weapon's actual performance against either
the old weapon that it is scheduled to replace, or against some alternative weapon system. So,
without saying a whole lot more, I think that the combat development process was sharpened up
considerably, and the leverage of the user through TRADOC was increased.

Now, the third area, which really falls in between the first two in a rather awkward way
organizationally, is doctrine — how to fight. After many experiments and much puzzling over
where to put the responsibility, I finally put it in a special office called the Tactical Doctrine Office,
which was an appendage of my own office. I understand that General Starry is going to create a
separate staff section, but for the same reason. If you give it over to Combat Developments you
have trouble because it gets into an area where a lot of individual weapons systems are being
developed. There you don't seem to find the initiative and authority required to take new doctrinal
directions. Those new initiatives almost have to come from, and with, the authority of the
commander of TRADOC. That's what I discovered and that's what General Starry is discovering. I
wasn't able to get Leavenworth to do it. Although they did a lot of good work, they just didn't
seem to be able to do that. If you put it over on the training side of the house you have the same
problem. So, Starry is deciding now what I decided a long time ago, which is, if you are going to
change the doctrine by which the Army fights, which is enormously important and controversial,
the higher level commanders must be directly involved. So, after the Arab-Israeli war, and after

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our examination of new weapons systems, we embarked on updating the doctrine for the fighting
elements of the Army. Our aim was to put out 40 or more "How to Fight" manuals, which would
tell everyone in the combat and combat support arms how the Army would fight on the modern
battlefield at every echelon from the weapons crew up through the division. That effort is about 60
to 70 percent complete now. The first manual was FM 100-5, and all the others in some way or
other, are related to, or derived from FM 100-5.

IlRlttP

"How to Fight" Manuals

FM 100-5 Operations

FM 71-1 The Tank and Mechanized
Infantry Company Team

FM 71-2 The Tank and Mechanized

Infantry Battalion Task Force

It was not a revolutionary doctrine, it was evolutionary, but it's more weapons oriented than any
doctrine we have ever had before. It starts with weapons and then goes to the enemy, and then
looks for the best solution for applying the weapons against the enemy in accordance with
whatever mission you may have, like, for example, the defense of Europe. The doctrine in FM 100-
5 was influenced greatly not only by weapons but also by the difficult military-political situation
facing the German Army. General Abrams and Lieutenant General Hildebrandt, the Inspektur
(Chief of Staff) of the German Army, directed me and Lieutenant General von Reichert, the
German Army's Vice Chief of Staff, to conduct a series of staff talks to harmonize US and German
doctrine, procedures and, if possible, weapons requirements. Very simply, the German problem is
that West Germany has very little depth in which to conduct mobile operations. The Germans are

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not interested in maneuvering around and through the industrial heartland and population centers
of the Bundesrepublik which lie just a few miles from the border. Thus, with the German
insistence on "Forward Defense," the military-political compromise we reached was to conduct
an "active" (read highly mobile) defense compressed into a band of terrain of perhaps 20, 30 or 40
kilometers from the border. Recently, this concept has come under heavy criticism and has been
labeled "attrition warfare."*

Furthermore, the argument goes that US doctrine is oriented too much towards the defense
and is too dependent on high technology. These are profound questions which will be argued for a
long time. There are no easy answers. That, I would say then, is the third major contribution of
TRADOC.

Behind all of that is a big testing organization, an analytical organization, a training publications
organization, ROTC, and many other things, but those were the big three — training advances in
technique and in practicality; bringing combat development forward into the world of today's
technology and getting it out of the vague distant future, while systematizing TRADOC's
involvement in weapons systems acquisition; and then, lastly, updating or publishing a full new
set of operating manuals for the Army.

INTERVIEWER: One of the things that you initiated when you commanded TRADOC was a
study on the organization of the division. Would you tell us just how that fits into all of this?

GEN DEPUY: Yes. Very simply, the new doctrine of the Army or the doctrine which is expressed
in FM 100-5 and all of the derivative manuals, very clearly is based around weapons systems. It
says that you study the weapons, yours and the enemy's, and then you look for ways of
optimizing the employment of your new weapons and minimizing your vulnerability to his
weapons. Now, what we are confronted with is that new weapons are arriving in great numbers,
all within a very short period of time. If you believe what the doctrine says, which is that tactics are
based on weapons applied against a particular enemy for a particular purpose, then when you get
new weapons you have to take a look at your organization and your tactics.**

Division 86, which is what they now call it — we called it the Division Restructuring Study —
is an effort to adapt our organization to new weapons which are more lethal and more
complex.*** For example, the XM-1 tank, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (ITV), the Improved Tow
Vehicle (ITV), the new air defense weapons, the attack helicopter, advanced tactical fighters, new
artillery ammunition, TACFIRE, and other automated control systems, are, in most cases, as
complicated or more complicated than World War II aircraft, which were all flown by officers. I
say it is not too great a stretch of the imagination to have only lieutenants in XM-1 tanks. I could

*These criticisms and an excellent discussion of the evolution of Army doctrine during this period are contained in
John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982
(Washington: USGPO, 1984).

**This discussion refers to the 1976 version of FM 100-5. The Field Manual was changed substantially in 1982.

***For an overview of the evolution of Division 86, see John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86, 2 Vols. (Fort Monroe:
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982).

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justify that. I am not suggesting that we do it right now. Frankly, I would suggest that we put
warrant officers in as an immediate solution just to raise the quality of the tank commanders. If we
already are having trouble in achieving full performance with the weapons we have today, and I
maintain that we are having great difficulty in extracting the full potential from our weapons and
from our organization, then we have to look for solutions.

There are two areas of solution and Division 86 is simply a reflection of that search. The first
question we must answer is whether or not we intend to raise the quality of the operators to match
the quality of the weapons. We just don't have the last surviving corporal in charge of a XM-1 if
you want to exploit the capabilities of the XM-1 any more than the Air Force would put the oldest
surviving mechanic in the cockpit of an F-15. The Air Force would never consider it, yet we
consider it every day. We even take people out of the orderly room and the mess hall and put them
in tanks. The Air Force doesn't do that. In the Army you buy quality by rank. If you can only get so
much quality for $400 a month and you need to pay $1500 a month for the kind of quality you
need, then what you are talking about is a lieutenant. If you are willing to pay $800 a month then
you are talking about a sergeant. So, in the Army you get quality by raising the rank or increasing
the rank mixture.

Now, because of the complexity of these weapons, both tactically and mechanically, the
second thing you want to do is simplify the tactical training and maintenance responsibilities of the
platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion commanders, to a level where they can
cope with it. Right now they can't cope with it. They have too many men to be trained on too
many weapons, in too short a time, with too many diversions. We know from testing that the
difference between a well-trained crew and an average crew is very great. It can range from 20 to
50 percent of effectiveness, sometimes even more. So, that means you can get more combat
effectiveness by increasing the performance of the unit than you ever could by putting new
weapons in it. Well, that's what Division 86 is all about — an effort to improve performance by
improving quality, by increasing the leadership mix, and through simplification by reducing the
size of units so that the tactical and technical training comes back down to manageable levels.

INTERVIEWER: You have written extensively in the area of doctrine and have published in a
number of periodicals. All of the work you did at TRADOC was focused on finding the essence of
how the United States is to successfully conduct warfare in the future. I wonder if you would
outline for us the lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and what you took from that
war that is applicable for the United States Army.*

GEIM DEPUY: Well, the first thing the Arab-Israeli War did was to provide a marvelous excuse or
springboard, if you will, for reviewing and updating our own doctrine. Some of the evidence
coming out of that war was awesome. For example, the losses of equipment that occurred in a
short period of time, and the fact that the Israelis ran more tanks through their maintenance

*Among the numerous accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, some of the more readable include: Avraham
Adan, On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael: Presidio
Press, 1980); Chaim Herzog, The War of Attonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975);
The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times The Yom Kippur War (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1974); and Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978).

190

system than the total number of tanks they possessed at the beginning of the very short war. The
lethality and range of weapons and the tremendous importance of well-trained crews and tactical
commanders, as evidenced by the performance in certain areas of small numbers of Israelis
against large numbers of say, Syrians. It also fed into our training philosophy which I discussed
earlier — the training of a platoon leader, a tank commander, a gunner, and a battalion
commander. It helped us argue for more training within the Army establishment.

Now, as far as "how to fight" goes, the big lessons applied to the lower echelons: the crew
drills of the Israeli armored force; the mine-clearing techniques; and the assault of fortified
positions. There wasn't anything that happened in the Arab-Israeli War that is in conflict with the
doctrine which now has been published; but, it would be incorrect to say that the Arab-Israeli War
was the sole foundation upon which that doctrine was built. In fact, there are aspects of the
current US Army doctrine which the Israelis do not consider directly applicable to their tactical
situation, one being elasticity or the active defense. They believe that they are perfectly able to
defend on their frontiers and although they had trouble doing so in the Sinai, they essentially
pulled it off in the Golan region. So, there are differences.

FM 100-5, therefore, partakes of the lessons of the Arab-Israeli War primarily in terms of the
importance of weapons and weapons operators' proficiency and performance. As for the overall
tactics, they are drawn much more from the very unique environment of NATO, which involves a
two-to-one or three-to-one enemy superiority, the requirement for forward defense because of the
political dynamics involved, particularly in West Germany — the fact of the matter is, there isn't
much depth of terrain to fight on and there isn't much terrain to give away — and lastly, as I have
described more than once, the fact that the reserves in the Soviet Union are a lot closer than the
reserves in the United States, and the Soviet Union's reserves are much larger. So, from the
moment the battle starts, we are at a disadvantage, and as the war goes on it gets worse, not
better, as far as force ratios. So, FM 100-5 tries to express a unifying concept behind all of the new
doctrine. It starts out and discusses at great length, weapons characteristics. Next, it talks at
some length about the tactics of the Russians.

When FM 100-5 was written it was just before the current emphasis on a broad front attack, or a
single echelon attack, or a daring thrust, whatever you want to call it. In those days most people
were thinking about the classic breakthrough operation. It has since become very clear that there
are other options and that the Russians may well use a broad front attack and what now are called
Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs). It really doesn't change what you have to do, but it does
make it more difficult. FM 100-5 says that the first thing you have to do is understand the enemy.
You have to understand his weapons and you have to understand his tactics. Also, you have to
understand your own weapons, and how to use them to their absolute maximum, and to try to
minimize your vulnerability to his weapons. It says that you have to have superior intelligence or
information on the enemy if you are outnumbered. You have to have intelligence good enough
and soon enough so that you have at least a slight jump on your enemy, something that is very
difficult to accomplish. As he concentrates, whether in five big concentrations, or 30 little
concentrations, or even 120 little concentrations, you know through your sensors and
reconnaissance, and your target acquisition systems, at least the general location of his mass and
the direction of his movement. Then, using your own mobility, you can begin to concentrate to
defeat each of your enemy's concentrations. To do that you need all of your ground mobility, all of

191

your air mobility, all of the TAC AIR, and all the flexibility of your artillery, missiles and rockets.
That is all concentration. And, the manual describes, and I think correctly and clearly, that
concentration is primarily the business of division and corps commanders. The business of getting
the Army on the right part of the battlefield and acquiring the intelligence which is needed in order
to do that is the job of the generals at division and corps and above. Now, if you have been able to
concentrate an adequate force quickly, then perhaps you can stop him and then counterattack to
destroy him, and you can accomplish this mission well forward, which, of course, is what the
Germans hope will happen.

If, on the other hand, there has been some glitch in the intelligence, some hesitation in the
concentration, some deception on the enemy's part, or just a mistake on our part, and he hits our
small force with a very hard blow, from a very large force, then the doctrine says that we have to
trade a little bit of space for time and casualties. It describes how we can, in fact, fight a very
stubborn action in a very small area, against a very large force, if we are very good at it, very well-
trained, have good control, understand weapons, and use those weapons at their optimum
engagement ranges, and then, move so that we are always fighting battles where they are most
advantageous to us and least advantageous to the other side. There are many other things that
need to be done including the synchronization of maneuver, air defense, fire support, electronic
warfare, and all of the combat service support, through good command and control.

I would like to end this discussion by saying that there are people who feel that the doctrine of
the Army is too defensive. They feel that success in battle only comes to the attacker. And, they
are disturbed about the amount of time, effort, and concentration that we now have on the
defense. I agree with all of that. I think it is too bad. I don't think it is a formula for winning the
war. At best, it is a formula for a stalemate or for deterrence. Unfortunately, however, the facts of
life in NATO, and the correlation of forces as the Soviets call it, are such that we do not have a
general offensive capability in Europe. If you ask the Germans why they defended for two and one
half years in France during World War I they would tell you because the forces were almost equal,
and they used the rest of their forces to defeat the Russians. If you ask the Germans why they
defended in Russia for two and one half years after their initial attack in World War II, they would
say because the ratio of forces, the resources and the means of war dictated that. I once
discussed this with General Haig. He accosted me with the fact that he thought we were
concentrating too much on the defense. I replied that I wasn't concentrating on the defense, he
was. I pointed out to him that in FM 100-5, we had one chapter on the offense and one chapter on
the defense, and that he was the one who turned to the chapter on the defense and for very good
reasons — because he has to defend. The correlation of forces is such that he must. I said, "If,
on the other hand, you prefer to attack, go back to Chapter 1. It tells you how to do that. But, I
notice that you are spending all of your time on Chapter 2."

So, this causes the Army some moral anguish. It hurts the feelings of soldiers to always be
talking about the defense; there is a yearning to attack and to counterattack. Incidentally, the
counterattack to destroy an enemy force which has been stopped by defensive fires is the essence
of the "active" defense. But, the counteroffensive — to do that you need the forces, you need
the resources, you need the ammunition, and you need the ability to sustain it. It is my judgment
that the man who writes the doctrine doesn't decide how to fight any particular campaign; rather,
the man who decides which part of the doctrine he is going to use is the operational commander

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and he decides how he is going to fight in whatever theater of war he happens to be in at the time.
Presently, it is Haig and Blanchard. At one time it was Pershing, and at another time it was
Eisenhower. They all acted in accordance with the relative strength of the forces opposing them
and their mission.*

INTERVIEWER: If you had to put your finger on two or three things that spell the difference
between fighting outnumbered and winning and fighting outnumbered and losing, what would
they be?

GEN DEPUY: If you have force ratios that are near the three-to-one or two-to-one level,
performance by the crews and tactical leaders is going to make the difference. The quality of our
corps, division, brigade, battalion and company commanders, and the quality of our tank crews,
infantry fighting vehicle crews, air defense crews, and helicopter crews, will make the difference. I
believe that the difference between the good unit and the bad unit is often a factor of four or five,
even though they have the same number of men and the same weapons. There is no way that we
can get the same degree of improved performance out of some small change in weapons as we
can get through the careful selection of people, the training of people, the selection of leaders,
and the training of leaders and units.

INTERVIEWER: You're talking now, not only of optimizing the capability of weapons, but of all
the equipment. I remember when you discussed Vietnam, you were concerned with the agility of
your units. The helicopters were there and all of that, but it was the commander who could think
through how to successfully use that equipment who made the difference.

GEN DEPUY: Mobility is mental. Given any set of weapons at any particular time, the battle will
be more affected by the difference in leadership and troop performance between the two armies
than it will be by differences between weapons. The difference between the M-60 tank and XM-1
tank, although important, is less important than the difference between high performance units
and low performance units.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned mobility yet one of the criticisms that has been directed at the
active defense has been that it assumes a mobility differential that we do not have.

GEN DEPUY: I don't think the active defense claims that you need a mobility differential — sort
of a tank for a tank, or an IFV for an IFV, or a helicopter for a helicopter — because you don't.
Really, it's intelligence; it's the decision-making process; it's the technique of using mission-type
orders and moving fast; it's that mobility of mind. The mobility of the Air Force is high enough for
concentration, and the mobility of the attack helicopter is high enough for concentration because

*For a biographical sketch of General Haig, USA Retired, see note, page 149. General George S. Blanchard, USA
Retired, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry in 1944. During World War II he served with various
infantry regiments in the European Theater of Operations. Subsequent assignments included duty as the Executive to
the Secretary of the Army (1964-66); Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division (1970-72); Commanding General,
VII Corps (1973-75); and Commander in Chief, US Army Europe (1975-79).

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the other guy is moving on the ground. The flexibility in long-range artillery and missiles is good
for concentration, and our mobility on the ground, the cross-country mobility of our heavy
equipment, is about the same as his. So, that criticism is, I think, ill-founded. I would say that
mental agility is more important than physical mobility. The commander who is thinking ahead,
leaning forward, figuratively speaking, issuing warning orders, and having everybody right on the
tips of their toes ready to move at an instant's notice to one of three or four different places, and a
unit commander who can say, "Follow me," and the unit will go with him and be briefed while
moving — that's the kind of mobility that we need.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, throughout your career you developed a lot of concepts and important
doctrinal points. Would you please mention those that you consider to have been significant
developments?

GEN DEPUY: I think I will just go right to World War II and say that I really was impressed with
the fact that we saw the German soldier only on very rare occasions, nor were we able to suppress
him very well. So, the first lesson I learned was that he was a master at field craft — at cover and
concealment. Later, when I looked at his positions, I was impressed by the way he picked
positions where his body and his head were protected from frontal fire yet he was able to defend
his position no matter what we threw at him. In turn, then, I was impressed with our inability to do
suppression with indirect fire only. In the early days of the war we didn't use enough direct fire
overwatching — I didn't know that word then — for suppression. I didn't even know the word
"suppression." We used base of fire, but we didn't use enough base of fire and we weren't
organized too well for it.

I also was very much impressed when I watched armored divisions doing what they call
reconnaissance by fire, which is, in fact, suppression — watching the fantastic firepower of an
armored task force as it swept by a wood line and just absolutely scorched it with fire and received

Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with Bushmaster

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no return fire. So, I am not only a believer in suppression, but I am a believer in massive direct fire
suppression; that is why I have been one of the greatest supporters of the Infantry Fighting
Vehicle with the Bushmaster on it.

Of course another thing was the great utility that you got out of issuing very specific orders to
soldiers. My conviction is that eight or nine out of ten soldiers off the streets need to be told
specifically what to do on the battlefield. The battlefield is a terrifying place. It is an alien
environment for a normal, gentle, human being; most people are not at home on the battlefield,
and would prefer to be elsewhere. If they have the choice between being active and inactive, they
will be inactive. Still, most of them will do what they are told to do. That tells me that we need a
lot of instructions going to the soldiers all the time during battle. If not, nothing will happen. It will
all die down and pretty soon there will be no activity of any kind — no firing, no movement, no
initiative, nothing. I was impressed with the fact that the Germans always were talking a lot during
the attack. You could hear them all the time issuing instructions such as go there, do this, and do
that. On our side there was very little of that. So, what this tells me is that we need a lot of
leadership on the battlefield and that that leadership has to be active. Otherwise, we will not get
the soldiers to participate in the battle. We'll end up with only that hardcore 10 percent fighting,
and that simply is not good enough; but, that is all we will get.

The other thing I discovered, which I have already mentioned, is that if we give our soldiers a
separate mission like we did with the squads in the night attack at Maizieres les Metz, and let them
figure it out for themselves, they just do magnificently. And, finally, the last point that came out of
my European experience was the utter futility and the homicidal aspects of attacking an enemy
head-on through his killing zone where he is strong. Vietnam bore that out again, as did Korea.
Those were the things I really picked up there.

When I went to the 8th Infantry, in the early 1950s, which was my first command after the war, I
formalized the overwatch which now has become the doctrine of the US Army in the cavalry, the
armor, and the infantry. I also formalized the use of frontal cover with the foxholes — dig in
behind the tree, behind the rock, or pile something up in front of you, and fire at an angle. Be able
to see forward if you have to, but don't fight straight forward, otherwise you will be subjected to
effective frontal suppression by the enemy and you won't be able to defend your position. The
next chance I had with troops was with the 30th Infantry, which was the first mechanized battle
group in the Army. There I learned that armored warfare requires different command techniques
than does foot warfare, and that you can move faster and that you should exploit that capability.
You need to think ahead. Again, most units have more mobility than they can use; so, you have to
have mission-type orders, to move by checkpoints, and you have to have people who are trained
to move very rapidly. Also, I learned a lot more about suppression while moving.

INTERVIEWER:

dissatisfaction?

Sir, looking back over your career, do you have any regrets or any

GEN DEPUY: Well, that is a very difficult question. I would do a lot of things differently. I think
all of us would if we had known then what we either know or have figured out now. But, the main
regret that I have is that I don't think I was very good at teaching. In other words, I think that if I
had it to do over again, I would spend a little bit more time trying to teach people, as opposed to

195

managing or directing them. Now, that is easy to say but maybe it is unrealistic; some officers are
very good at teaching while others are not so good. I think that I might have been able to
propagate my ideas more effectively if I had been a little more patient with people and spent a little
more time with them instead of being in such a bloody hurry. Looking back throughout all of my
time in the Army, that's the one great regret I have.

INTERVIEWER: General Hackett's book, The Third World War, lists you as a contributor. Would
you discuss your involvement with that book?*

GEN DEPUY: Well, I don't think I am violating a confidence with General Hackett. He wrote me
a letter and told me that friends of his had suggested that I might help him, or participate with him,
in writing a book. At that time I don't think it had a title, but he sent me an outline and the outline
simply provided that the Russians would launch a surprise attack and NATO would be defeated in
a very short period of time. The purpose of the book was to alert the governments of Europe to the
problem and thus, hopefully, induce them to greater efforts — more money, more troops, and so
on. I wrote back and told him that I had spent a number of years convincing or trying to convince,
our Army that it could fight and win if it fought the right way, and that I really didn't want to
associate myself with a book describing the defeat of our troops. I really couldn't walk away from
what I had been doing over the last several years.

General Hackett wrote back and said that General Benecke of the German Army, a former
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, had had somewhat the same reaction and as a
consequence, he was going to change the approach. If you have read the book you will notice
that it ends with a situation that many people say is very improbable. He has been criticized for
that. But, no defeat was inflicted on NATO. I felt that a defeat would be bad for the morale of the
soldiers and would not inspire the Dutch, the Danes, the Belgians, or the British, to spend more;
rather, it would make it all seem even more hopeless. In any event, I then did send him some notes
and suggestions, some of which found their way into the chapter on V Corps. He and his
colleagues, whoever they are, then turned it into an exciting battle story. You will notice that the
tactics contained in the book are FM 100-5, 71-1 , and 71-2 tactics, and that the corps commander
becomes the USAREUR commander. That was his idea, not mine, but it was a good one. So,
that's the background.

INTERVIEWER: One final question. After several years of working with industry, how does the
Army development program look from the outside?

GEN DEPUY: The short answer is frustrating. By that, I mean that the weapon systems
acquisition process and structure are so enormously complex that industry finds it difficult to
cope. The decision-making process is diversified and obscure. From inside it looked orderly and
logical. From outside, it looks chaotic. For example, it is true that eventually decisions are made at
or near the top by the ASARCS (Army Systems Acquisition Review Council), the DSARCS
(Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council), congressional committess, or sometimes, willful
individuals such as the Vice Chiefs of Staff, assistant secretaries, under secretaries, etcetera. But,

•General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War: August 1985 (New York: MacMillan, 1978).

196

industry is incredibly well-informed through a penetrating intelligence network, about the shape
and origin of the papers and studies upon which the decision-makers act. After all, the decision-
makers are only as smart as the information they have. The information they have is carefully
managed and metered by the staff agencies and commands upon which they depend. They are
almost totally at the mercy of these information sources which, in turn, are vulnerable to their own
internal workings and biases. This is the endemic disease of large bureaucracies. I know because I
have been victimized many times by that system.

Let me give you a typical example. When the development community launches a new effort or
proposal, it knows that it must show decisive improvement over the older model with the same
function, e.g., the old scout helicopter versus the new scout helicopter, etcetera. A common
argument is that the old model has reached its technological limits and it is now necessary to start
from scratch. The amusing (a cynical choice of words) fact is, that just as soon as the new model
is securely lodged in the program and budget, the development community discovers marvelous
ways of improving the older system. You can bet your farm that the product-improved older
system was not given a fair comparative evaluation during the decision-making process with
regard to the new replacement — comparative that is, from a cost effectiveness standpoint.
Now, this "information" on the lack of growth potential for the old system came from the same
engineers and managers who suddenly saw all kinds of options five years later when they could do
so without jeopardizing the new product. I call your attention to the M48A5 and M60A3 tanks as
product improvements that flourished after the M-1 Abrams tank was secure. In this case it is
important to acknowledge that chobham armor developments did require a new tank. Another
example is the AH-1 D Cobra attack helicopter versus earlier efforts to develop a light experimental
helicopter. The vulnerability of decision-makers to the information control held by the
development agencies is never higher than when the development agency is pushing its own
design against all comers. The development commands compete with industry when they
organize around some particular technology and push it through the decision process from an
"insider's" position. The materiel command agencies are in the unique position of being the
prosecutor, judge, and jury against any threatening competitor.

My advice to the Army Materiel Command is to disqualify the development command as an
evaluative agency — which, by the way, is its primary function — when it has its own horse in
the race. Being composed of humans, it is only too humanoid in its biases. The kind of
"information" it supplies the decision-makers is often downright sinful. I could give examples but I
then would be in a contest in which the "information" given to the high command in refutation of
my charge would come from the accused. Thus, we then would re-enact the venal process one
more time. In addition to disqualifying the government's development agencies as evaluators of
their competitors one more step is essential. Industry must be afforded open channels to the
decision-makers. These by-pass channels are essential to give decision-makers a balanced
information diet. Of course industry will put its best foot forward. Of course it will bias its
presentations. But, decision-makers need to hear opposite views and when possible, call for side-
by-side evaluations — fly-offs, shoot-offs, etcetera. Industry tends to see the services as follows:
the Navy owns its contractors; the Air Force is in cahoots with its contractors; and the Army fears
its contractors. Overstated? Sure! But close enough for government work.

197

INTERVIEWER: Well, I believe that sums up what we set out to do.

GEN DEPUY: I want to thank you for taking the time and trouble to do all of this. I wish you both
good luck and happy service.

Retirement review in honor of General DePuy, 30 June 1977.

198

1985 AFTERTHOUGHTS

When the director of the Military History Institute informed me that this oral history would be
published he also asked if I had anything to add. Reading back over the manuscript it seemed to
me that some subjects were not adequately or fairly covered because of the conversational
method and the interaction of the participants. In short, some important subjects were dropped in
midcourse as our attention turned to something else. Thus, these afterthoughts recorded five
years later.

The first topic on which I have some afterthoughts is tactical doctrine. Recently I have given
vent to my concern that "maneuver doctrine" has been oversimplified and that a basically good
idea stands in danger of being corrupted by the uncritical enthusiasm with which it has been
surrounded. My central thoughts on this subject are exposed in an article, "Toward a Balanced
Doctrine," contained in the November 1984 issue of Army magazine, so I won't repeat them
here.*

A second afterthought is related to the issue of weapons technology. It concerns the vast mis-
understanding which I perceive in respect to the impact of technology on tactics. Few subjects
have been the target of such loose thinking. On the other hand, nothing could be more important.

First, let me say that the so-called Congressional Reform Movement has been the source of
nonstop rubbish on this subject. Unfortunately, they have apparently convinced a large number of
otherwise sensible people that high technology is the enemy. They have taken some obvious
truths and moved their argument abruptly to the big lie. No reasonable man favors "runaway"
technology — weapons that won't work, costs that cannot be borne, or machinery that
demands skills not to be found in the military population.

A description of the dark side of the military weapons development program, the worst
examples, have been airily ascribed to the whole sincere and difficult search for excellence in the
equipment to be provided the US Armed Forces — forces faced with formidable opponents
worldwide, opponents who do not themselves shrink from high technology.

Much of the argument would be ludicrous were it not so dangerous. For example, some of the
more feverish reformers yearn for the good old days of "low-tech" when our forces were
equipped with P-51 fighters and SHERMAN Tanks. In their time, of course, P-51s and
SHERMANS were high-tech. But, the baleful effects do not stop with such limited damage.
These same worthies have managed to associate high technology with "attrition warfare". Whole
battalions of impressionable minds have signed up for these mental gymnastics, this "disarming"
concept.

At the same time, the anti high-tech crowd loves maneuver warfare — a concept of fighting
which demands the highest technology man can design. The very systems of mobility (M1
Abrams tank, M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, M3 Scout vehicle, AH64 Attack helicopter, and UH60
Blackhawk utility helicopter), firepower (smart munitions and long range delivery systems),

*William E. DePuy, "Toward a Balanced Doctrine (Synchronization in Maneuver Doctrine)," Army, (November,
1984), 18-21.

199

intelligence (airborne sensors and analysis centers), and C2 (satellite communications, cellular
radios, graphic aids to decision making), upon which a maneuver doctrine utterly depends, is a fair
inventory of the very highest technology.

The real issue is how to exploit American science and technology for decisive military purposes.
How can we defeat our enemies quickly with the least cost in American lives and treasure? The
Army has gone after this objective through the "Concept Based Requirements System". It
supposes that the weapons systems acquisition process starts, or should start, with military
requirements derived from operational concepts. This puts the conceptual people at the head of
the line, that is, in the number one spot in a linear sequence. [See Chart, page 201]

This is not a bad concept except for one thing. It doesn't work that way. Operational concepts
have never been able to "get out front." If you read them carefully — Airland Battle 2000, Army
21, Focus-21, and so on, you will find that they are, in fact, a description of the application of
currently understood technology within the mainstream of tactical evolution. Ideas about air
mobility followed the helicopter, they did not precede it! Go back and read Gavin's "Cavalry —
And I Don't Mean Horses" in the '50s, in Army magazine.*

Deep attack, Follow on Forces Attack, and Assault Breaker, followed the discovery that we
could make smart munitions. There are virtually no exceptions to this sequence. The technology
comes first and then the applications, applications that are conditioned and constrained by the
tactical concepts, follow.

It is important to understand and accept this relationship. But, the thought goes farther. The
relationship between the research community, the developers and the users, is clearly circular.
That is, the relationship is interactive and continuously so. As with all circles, there is no point of
origin and no end point. Research is not conducted without an awareness of potential
applications. Development of those applications is not undertaken in an employment vacuum.
Concepts of employment are a synthesis of tactical experience and new technical capabilities.

Unfortunately, the circular imperative collides with the linearity of our organizations and
procedures, particularly with the rigid temporal linearity of the program and budget process. Every
element or link in the chain yearns for the orderly, simple, linear process. The user states a
"military" requirement and the research and development community follows orders. How naive!

It is the feedback loops between the creators (researchers), applicators (developers), and
exploiters (tactical users), that are critical and enormously difficult to achieve. Linearity hates
feedback loops. They interrupt the smooth flow of the program and funding process. They
embarrass the user who changes his performance specifications. They cause cost overruns and
change test criteria.

I see no easy way out of the dilemma. It calls for an appreciation of the complexity of the
relationship and constant vigilance. Let me cite two examples, one good and one bad. The
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle — later known as the M2 Bradley — program was
interrupted and delayed, and cost increases occurred when the users finally realized after testing
that the fighting vehicle needed a two-man turret instead of the original one-man version. The
change was made. The developer was mad at the user, and Congress was mad at everybody. Yet,
it was exactly the right thing to do. This change was the product of a circular, not a linear process.

*James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, And I Don't Mean Horses," Armor, 68 (May-June, 1954), 18-22; and Combat Forces
Journal, 4 (June 1954), 22-27.

200

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In the case of the division air defense weapon system, it became apparent through analysis first,
and tests later, that the guns alone could not do the whole job. The circular feedback loop cried
for the addition of a light missile like STINGER. But, the orderly forces of linearity prevailed —
backs were stiffened, necks were bowed, and the Army has a troubled system. Human beings
aren't smart enough to move operational concepts beyond the state-of-the-art. People aren't
smart enough to antic/pate the kinds of information that will begin to flow to them from the
feedback loops during research development and exploitation.

Management has tried to build a fail-safe linear system. Remember "fly before buy,"
independent testing, and independent cost analysis? Well, to date, management has failed. They
should start all over again and accept the circular process. After all, it is easier to move on a wheel
than a skid. A stone boat was a linear concept.

The third and last afterthought pertains to the soldier. Reading back over the transcript I don't
think I gave the soldier — the private soldiers and the junior NCOs in World War II — a fair
representation. You recall I said that only a small fraction did the fighting. That was true, but it
was the product of untrained leaders at every level. To the best of my knowledge, in every
army — and my German and Israeli friends verify this point — only a few men are natural,
aggressive fighters. The rest respond only to firm, sensible leadership. When casualties are high,
leaders go first. In the six weeks in Normandy the 90th Division ran through two to five sets of
infantry company officers — 150 percent of the total number of officers in the division, which
represented about 2,000 men. This had two effects. First, these junior officers never had time to
season, and second, their training was mechanical and technical rather than tactical. The training
never did improve, but as the war went on a few survivors accumulated some seasoning through
luck and natural cunning. Once the meat grinder of Normandy was broken up, the casualty rates

201

went down and the reciprocal seasoning rates went up. By the midpoint of the war we had a fair
number of smart, tough fighters. Troop performance improved along a parallel path. By the end of
the war the 90th was a good division, not brilliant, but good — as good as one could expect, and
better than most.

General McLain, a splendid officer, told us when he first arrived that there was nothing wrong
with the 90th Division except for its leaders. The troops, he said, were just like those in the best
divisions, and he was right. Therefore, the secret to success lies in the selection and training of
leaders before the first battle so that the seasoning process can stay ahead of the casualty
process. When the opposite happens, as in the case of the 90th Division, a downward spiral
occurs and the resultant disaster is a producer of mass casualties without any offsetting
contribution to the war effort. In Normandy, the 90th Division was a killing machine — of our
own troops!

This leads to the crucial question as to what has been done to avoid a repetition of this process.
I am happy to be able to say that the present officer selection and training process is light years
ahead of the "peoples' army" of World War II. It is also miles ahead of the process used during the
Vietnam War.

First, the Army now selects its battalion and brigade commanders from among its highest
quality officers through a centralized process. The difference in performance, even in peacetime,
is startling.

Second, training has been moved to a new and much higher plateau of effectiveness and the
credit for the conceptualization of that massive change goes to General Paul Gorman, the
revolutionary Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at TRADOC from 1974 to 1977. To Gorman goes
the credit for moving from time oriented training — "In the next hour we will discuss the platoon
in the attack, or the operation of the PRC-77 radio, or the M-1 rifle" — to performance based
training — "At the completion of this demonstration you will be required to place the PRC-77
into operation in the proper manner. If you cannot perform this function you will repeat the
instruction on an individual basis."

From World War I until 1975, the Army followed the Army Training Program which carried a
division from individual training through squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment or brigade,
to division, in each arm or service on the basis of so many hours for this and so many hours for
that. Men and units proceeded through the program whether they learned or not. Frankly, nobody
knew. There were few tests and what there were, were subjective. If you could survive the
schedule you were presumed to be trained. The heart of the Gorman revolution was that no
soldier proceeded to Step 2 until he had demonstrated satisfactory hands-on performance of Step
1. This same procedure was applied to units. The concept led to the soldiers' manuals, Skill
Qualification Tests, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program. Gorman was also the
conceptualizer of the National Training Center and of advanced simulation and simulator
development throughout the Army.

My net assessment of the effect of these two vital programs — leader selection and
performance training — is that the performance and battle participation level of the American
Army has moved from the 20 percent to the 60 percent level and is rising.

In fact, the whole Army in every department is in great shape. The soldiers, by every
measurement, are the best the country has seen in its Army and vastly better than during the

202

draft. Officers are better trained and more carefully selected for command. NCOs are
progressively trained in their own education system. Individual performance — as in tank
gunnery — has never been higher. Unit performance because of such programs as the NTC is
the highest ever achieved in a peacetime Army. The new doctrine is superior to the old and the
whole Army is intellectually engaged in that collective enterprise. The image of the Army as
portrayed in the press and on television is radically out of step with the realities. It is too bad that
the American public does not know what a fine Army they have. Perhaps they are beginning to
appreciate the higher quality of this critically important institution. It is not perfect. It is sometimes
hard to love. But it is solid and honest and sincere in its unremitting efforts to achieve excellence.
It will serve the country well.

This brings me to my last observation — a word about the Army as an institution and a career.
The Army has been good to me. It has given me an exciting and satisfying life — a purpose and a
fulfillment. The common caricature of military life is one of stultifying regimentation, a narrow and
confining life, and a numbing boredom. Perhaps we shouldn't let the secret out that this
caricature is not only wrong but is, in fact, a reversal of the facts.

My experience and opinion, particularly after observing the great American industrial
establishment at close hand, is that there are more degrees of freedom in a military career than
one could find outside with rare exceptions. The distinguishing characteristic of a command
position AT ANY LEVEL is that the incumbent is ON HIS OWN. If he expects to have his hand
held — it won't happen. The higher the command the more total is the veil of silence which
descends upon the commander. He is given all the elbow room he needs to put the stamp of his
own convictions and capabilities on the enterprise over which he presides. He also has enough
rope to hang himself should he be inadequate to the challenge. The difference in style and
substance between two military commands is as great or greater than that between any two
civilian enterprises, and the differences flow from the man in charge.

My advice to the serving officer is to think long and hard before jumping into the "Greener
Pastures" on the other side of the fence. You are now in the most productive years of your life in
the most important business in the country, and you will find few opportunities on the outside to
match those which you take for granted in the Army.

203

INDEX

Abrams, Creighton W. GEN: 63, 149

Active Defense: 63,192-193

Agency for International Development (AID): 123-124, 126, 134, 164

All Volunteer Army: 103

ApTauO, Battle of: 142

Armies, US

Third: 40
Army War College (AWC): 185-186
Association of the US Army (AUSA): 113
ATTLEBORO, Operation: 144, 146
Barth, George Bittman, MG: 17, 35, 41, 52, 61, 98-99
Beau Coudray: 31-32,35-36,39-40
BinhGia: 131

Blanchard, George S. GEN: 71
Bradley, Omar N. GEN: 35,41
Bulge, Battle of: 45, 58, 68, 84
Camps, US Army

Barkley: 7, 12

Granite: 8
Cavalry Divisions, US

1st: 133-135, 148
Cavalry Regiments, US

4th: 142, 157
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 105, 118, 123, 126-127, 164
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): 130
Chambois: 49

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS): 164-165
Close Air Support: 82
Colonel "X": 52
Combat Decorations: 91-93,155
Combat Developments Command (CDC): 177-178, 181
Command and Control: 76-77, 84, 93, 96-97, 140-141, 150, 153-154, 192
Concept Based Requirements System: 200-201
Congressional Reform Movement: 199
Continental Army Command (CONARC): 175-179, 183
DePuy Foxhole: 109, 195
DePuy, William E.

childhood: 1

father of: 1,2

grandfather of: 1,2

mother of: 1

205

as an ROTC Candidate: 2, 4, 5

as a college student: 3

at Desert Training Center: 10-11

great-grandfather of: 2

as a Communications Officer: 5,7

as a battalion commander: 52

as a student at Fort Leavenworth: 102

in Hungary: 103

in the Central Intelligence Agency: 105

in the Chief of Staff's Office: 112

as a division commander: 137-167

as a Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency (JCS): 168-171

as Assistant Vice CSA: 171-179

as TRADOC Commander: 180-192
Engineer Regiments, US, 109th: 3
FalaiseGap: 41,47,49
FM 100-5, Operations: 188-189, 191-192, 196
Forsythe, George I. LTG: 102, 106-107, 111-112
Forts, US Army

Benning: 5, 182

Dix: 12

Knox: 183

Leavenworth: 182, 185-187

Leonard Wood: 5, 12

Snelling: 94
Freund, "Fritz" COL: 127-128
Gold: 88-89

Gorman, Paul GEN: 149-150, 157, 159, 184-185, 202
Gourbesville: 24-25
Hackett, Sir John GEN: 196
Haig, Alexander M. GEN: 149, 192-193
Hamilton, Edward LTC: 17, 41, 46
Harkins, Paul D. GEN: 121
Harris, Ray: 3

Hedgerows: 13-14,24-31,43
Heintges, John A. LTG: 146
Hollingsworth, James F. LTG: 146, 149
HopTac: 137
Infantry Brigades, US

196th: 144, 146
Infantry Divisions, US

1st: 40-41, 124, 138-167

2d: 18

206

4th: 108-109

9th: 134

34th: 3

80th: 68

90th: 7-8, 16-18, 35, 54, 63, 72-73, 87, 90

95th: 54,72
Infantry Divisions, Viet Cong

9th: 130-131, 138, 142, 144, 150, 163
Infantry Regiments, North Vietnamese

101st: 142
Infantry Regiments, US

1st: 5, 12

2d: 138, 141, 142, 148

3d: 94

8th: 43, 107-109, 195

16th: 145, 151-152

18th: 142, 151

20th: 5, 12

26th: 43, 157, 167

27th: 146

28th: 138, 142, 144, 157

30th: 43,115-117

63d: 5, 12

357th: 7, 12, 24-25, 32, 36, 46, 52, 72-73

358th: 32,40,49
Infantry Regiments, Viet Cong

271st: 137

272nd: 137, 142

273rd: 142
Johnson, Harold K. GEN: 163
Johnson, Lyndon B., President: 169-170
Journalists: 165

Kerwin, Walter T. "Dutch" GEN: 179
Komer, Robert "Blowtorch": 123-125, 165
Korean Syndrome: 71
Landrum, Eugene M. MG: 31-32

Leadership: 16, 35, 52, 54, 57-58, 61, 90, 114, 152-153, 193-194, 202
LeGro, William COL: 150
Logistics: 151
LoGo, Battle of: 140
Louisiana Maneuvers: 3, 5
Maizieres-les-Metz: 58
Marshall, S.L. A. BG: 145, 160

207

Mason, John COL: 41, 52, 58, 61

McLain, Raymond S. MG: 16, 31-32, 40, 66-67, 202

McNamara, Roberts.: 171-173

Metz: 68,72-73,84

Milburn "Shrimp" LTG: 5

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV): 121, 123, 125-127, 131, 137-138

Minh Thanh Road, Battle of: 142

Moselle River: 68, 72, 81, 84, 92

Murphy, James P.: 3

National Guard: 2, 16

Normandy Invasion: 17-24

Palmer, Bruce Jr., GEN: 173, 177

Patton, George S. GEN: 38, 58, 68, 101, 155

Pentomic Division: 112,114

Phu Loi Battalion, VC: 137, 159

Piburn, Edward MAJ: 3

"Pile On Tactics": 138

Rogers, Bernard W. GEN: 113, 149, 151

ROTC: 94-95

Saar River: 54-57,68,72,80-81,84

Schweitzer, Robert L. LTG: 164-165

Selfridge Department Store: 17

Sheehy, COL: 35,41,52

Siegfried Line: 54, 76, 92

South Dakota State College: 2

Starry, Donn A. GEN: 86, 187

Stilwell Richard GEN: 32, 99-100, 103, 121, 133

St. Suzanne: 47

Tactics: 5, 7, 10, 25-26, 30-31, 38-39, 43-45, 66, 68, 71-73, 76, 78-80, 85-87, 91-96, 124, 140,

149-151, 155, 157
Talbott, Orwin C. LTG: 99, 162, 165
Task Force Weaver: 46

Taylor, Maxwell D. GEN: 112, 118, 123-124, 169
Tet Offensive: 125, 169-170

Training: 8, 11, 13-14, 100, 107-108, 115-116, 183, 186-187, 191, 194-195
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC): 119-120, 175-192
United States Agency for International Development (USAID): 123-124, 126, 134, 164
United States Air Force (USAF): 159, 190
United States Information Agency (USIA): 123-124
United States Marine Corps (USMC)

Recruiting: 3

in Vietnam: 131
Van Fleet, James A. MG: 32, 66-67, 68, 72, 73

208

Weaver, William G. MG: 80, 97-98

Westmoreland, William C. GEN: 112, 121, 123-124, 127, 130-131, 146, 169-170, 173

Weyand, Frederick C. GEN: 106, 144, 146, 163

Wheeler, Earl G. GEN: 168-171

Wheels Study: 174

Williams, Samual T. "Hanging Sam" MG: 17, 31

Wilson, Charles MG: 4, 102, 111

YBham: 127-128

Y-Tlur: 127-128

209

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DePuy, William E. 1919-
Changing an Army

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